Consolation, July 24, 1940
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Contents
Dred Scott and the Flag 3
Points of Comparison 4
The Majority Opinion 4
How About Making Everybody Salute? 6
American Civil Liberties Union 7
The Minority Opinion 8
A Terrible Decision 11
The New Government
The Witness in Eire 12
Mus Decumanus at Skewen 12
Not a Sheep Will Be Missed 13
Kingdom Publishers in Sweden 14
Jehovah's witnesses in England 16
Counsel by J. F. Rutherford
"The Last Days" Here 17
The Hierarchy's Fifth Column (Part 2) 19
Hitler and the Pope 20
"Father" Coughlin 20
Fifth Column in the United States 21
The Supreme Court Sees the Danger 21
The Pope and Coughlin 22
Under the Totalitarian Flag
Scourgings in Southern Rhodesia 25
British Comment
Britain's Needs 28
Praying for Victory 28
Jesuit Comment 29
"Dixie Land" 31
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Appetizers
Service
At two o'clock in the morning a lady telephoned the president of a large department store. After much ringing, the mogul answered with a sleepy and gruff "Hello!"
"This is Mrs. Soandso," said the lady in a syrupy voice; "I just couldn't help calling you personally to tell you that the hat I bought at your store last week is simply stunning."
"That's all very nice," yawned the president, "but would you mind telling me, madam, why you call me at this hour of the night about a hat you bought last week?"
"Because," she replied politely, "your truck just delivered it."—The American Flint.
Just a Dream
The patient had just come out of a long delirium.
"Where am I?" he asked feebly, as he felt loving hands making him comfortable. "Am I in heaven?"
"No," cooed his wife, "I'm still with you, dear."—Labor.
Her First Chicken
They were just married and she had cooked her first chicken. When he was about to carve, he said,
"What did you stuff it with, dear?"
"It didn't need stuffing, darling; it wasn't hollow," she replied.—Australian Consolation.
New Name for a Corporal
Proud Clydach mother, to woman next door: "I am delighted to tell you that my son has been promoted."
"Indeed? What is he now, a captain, major or what?"
"No, he has been made a cockerel."
Ambiguous
From a church notice-board:
Evening Subject:
"What Is Hell Like?"
Come and Hear Our Organist.
Seventeen Demons
The village paper said Mrs. J. Z. Brown delivered an address on "Personal Devils" and seventeen were present.
CONSOLATION
"And in His name shall the nations hope."—Matthew 12:21, A. R. V.
Volume XXI Brooklyn, N. Y., Wednesday, July 24, 1940 Number 544
Dred Scott and the Flag
IT IS more than 83 years since Dred Scott, the one-time slave, gained liberty for himself and his family. The question of his emancipation had much to do with bringing on the Civil War. It was a Missouri lawyer who pressed the issue upon public attention. The Supreme Court would have acted more wisely to have faced the issue than to have evaded it. Evasion never settled anything.
More than fourscore years passed from the time Montgomery Blair, brother of the famous Missouri counselor, Francis P. Blair, Jr., appeared in a time of great stress and public excitement in behalf of this poor slave, pleading for his physical liberty, when another famous counselor, Judge Joseph F. Rutherford, also from Missouri, appeared before the same tribunal, pleading, this time, on behalf of the free men and women of the future, the boys and girls, children of Jehovah's witnesses, who today are beaten as Dred Scott was beaten, choked as perhaps he was choked, kicked as perhaps he was kicked, threatened as perhaps he was threatened, and ostracized as he was certainly ostracized, and all because they can not and will not worship any creature or thing in violation of the express command of the Creator himself, set down in Exodus 20: 3-5.
Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of any thing that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth: thou shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor serve them.
The demand of any person or persons that any other person must worship (salute—bow to) any flag, no matter how good the government it represents, is a demand that can not and will not be complied with. It is an illegal demand, and a plain violation of every principle for which the United States flag stands. It is leading the United States into Armageddon as surely as it entered the Civil War. When the Civil War was over there were no slaves, but multitudes had perished. When Armageddon is ended there will be no little folks kicked, choked and beaten because they love and worship God, but all their enemies will have gone for ever.
The Dred Scott Case
Dred, born in Missouri about 1810, was a slave of Dr. Emerson, an army surgeon, who took him in 1834 to Rock Island, Ill., and May 1836 to Fort Snelling, Wisconsin Territory (now Minnesota) where he married Harriet, a slave of his master, and had two children. Slavery was illegal in both places: in Illinois by its constitution, in Wisconsin (upper Louisiana Purchase) by the Missouri Compromise. In 1838 he was taken back to Missouri—Saint Louis.
Here in 1848 was living the eminent free-soil lawyer, Francis P. Blair, Jr. He learned of Dred's migrations, and wishing to test the right of slavery to reclaim persons once free, induced Dred on being whipped by his master to sue for assault and battery in the State Circuit Court of Saint Louis County. Blair and his free-soil friends furnished funds and legal assistance. The suit was sustainable only if Dred was a free citizen charging violence from another citizen; and the court held that his residence on free soil had made him free, and there was no legal power to re-enslave him. Appeal was taken to the supreme court of Missouri, which reversed the decision; the two associate justices against the chief justice decided that Emerson had only made a temporary change of domicile in obedience to government orders, that his property was held according to the laws of his permanent domicile, and that Scott's servile character was merely in abeyance and fully resumed on return to Missouri.
[The case at length got to the United States Supreme Court.]
It was argued at the December terms of 1855 and 1856. Montgomery Blair (brother of Francis P.) and George Ticknor Curtis (brother of Judge Curtis) were counsel for Scott ... Justice Nelson prepared a brief abstract of the decision; but the public excitement over the slavery question was so intense and menacing to the Union (just after the Buchanan-Fremont election), that it was decided to have Chief Justice Taney write a full and careful review of the whole law on the subject of slavery, in hope of making the members of the free-soil party accept it contentedly and cease their agitation. Taney and six assistant judges concurred against Scott; Curtis and McLean dissented.
The written decisions were withheld from the public till 6 March 1857, two days after the inauguration, to avoid embroiling Pierce's last months. The decision proper was essentially the same as that of the Supreme Court of Missouri; that Dred Scott as a negro was not a citizen of the United States within the intent of the constitution, and therefore the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction and the suit should be dismissed. . .
[The decision "inflamed the public wrath immeasurably".]
The dissenting judges pressed the notorious distinction between citizenship and suffrage; called attention to the Constitution's repeated mention of the negroes as "persons," and to the fact that free negroes were actually voters in five of the states in 1787, and were so even yet save where the States had changed their Constitutions to disfranchise them; and held that the civil rights of free negroes were the same at least as those of women and minors. . . The whole question was soon decided by the war.—The Encyclopedia Americana.
Points of Comparison
Dred Scott and his family were born slaves, and for a time the laws and courts stood between them and liberty. The human family were born slaves of that "prince of this world", or "god of this world", who invited Jesus up into a mountain and showed Him all the governments of the world, present and future, and promised Him that He might have them all if He would fall down and worship him. In effect this was an effort to get Him to 'salute the flag'.
It cannot be denied that 'the whole world lieth in the wicked one, and they are taken captive by him at his will', nor can it be denied that the Creator has promised that His Son Christ Jesus shall have 'the uttermost parts of the earth for His possession; He shall break them with a rod of iron; He shall dash them in pieces like a potter's vessel'. (Psalm 2: 8, 9) "And in the days of these kings shall the God of heaven set up a kingdom, which shall never be destroyed; and the kingdom shall not be left to other people, but it shall break in pieces and consume all these kingdoms, and it shall stand for ever."—Daniel 2: 44.
Jehovah's witnesses have come to the clear knowledge that Jehovah's Kingdom is now functioning in the earth and every other government will be dissolved in Armageddon, when the Theocracy for which Jesus taught His followers to pray shall be ruling in all its power, and the time shall have come when "the saints of the Most High shall take the kingdom, and possess the kingdom for ever, even for ever and ever".—Daniel 7: 18.
Dred Scott lived at the time when slavery was about to perish in the Civil War. Jehovah's witnesses and their children live at the time when slavery to the Devil has already perished as far as they are concerned and slavery is to perish utterly at Armageddon. Meantime it is their privilege to "appeal to Caesar" (that is, appeal to the courts), as did Paul, the apostle. And in the case of Jehovah's witnesses there is the further reason, that the United States government has officially decided that it is a Christian government.
The Majority Opinion
The majority opinion of the Supreme Court delivered June 3, 1940, was not in accord with the argument so ably presented by Judge Rutherford at 2:30 p.m. April 25, and recorded on pages 19 to 24 of Consolation No. 540. [See also the editorial entitled "The Supreme Court on Trial", which constitutes the leading article in No. 541.] The majority opinion, an eight-to-one decision, is summarized by The United States Law Week as follows:
Requirement of the board of education of a Pennsylvania school district that pupils salute the national flag in a daily school exercise as a condition of attendance at such public schools, enforced against the religious objection of members of a sect known as "Jehovah's witnesses," does not infringe the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
It is well established that religious freedom does not operate to relieve the individual from obedience to general laws not aimed at the promotion or restriction of religious beliefs. Although past cases have involved exertion of legislative power to promote some specific interest of secular society, such as protection of the family, promotion of health or the common defense, these are specific activities of government all of which presuppose the existence of an organized political society. The flag is the symbol of our national unity and as such fosters the "cohesive sentiment" which is the foundation of that organized society.
State legislatures and school authorities are not "barred from determining the appropriateness of various means to evoke that unifying sentiment without which there can ultimately be no liberties, civil or religious". That end is legitimate. "The effective means for its attainment are still so uncertain and so unauthenticated by science as to preclude us from putting the widely prevalent belief in flag-saluting beyond the pale of legislative power. It mocks reason and denies our whole history to find in the allowance of a requirement to salute our flag on fitting occasions the seeds of sanction for obeisance to a leader."
American Bar Association Opinion
The Committee on the Bill of Rights, of the American Bar Association, consisting of Grenville Clark, chairman (of the New York Bar), Douglas Arant (of the Alabama Bar), Zechariah Chafee, Jr. (of the Rhode Island Bar), Osmer C. Fitts (of the Vermont Bar), Lloyd K. Garrison (of the Wisconsin Bar), George I. Haight (of the Illinois Bar), Monte M. Lemann (of the Louisiana Bar), Ross L. Malone, Jr. (of the New Mexico Bar), Burton W. Musser (of the Utah Bar), Joseph A. Padway (of the Wisconsin Bar), and Charles P. Taft (of the Ohio Bar), presented a brief to the United States Supreme Court on the same day that Judge Rutherford addressed the Court on this subject.
In that brief these able men expressed the opinion that, as far as Jehovah's witnesses are concerned, the flag salute must be regarded as a religious ritual; that there is no public need for a compulsory flag salute overriding such scruples; that legislation is new in America which would compel a particular form of expression, such as the flag salute; that a compulsory flag salute is a very different thing from a voluntary flag salute; that compulsory salute legislation is void because it unjustifiably infringes upon the liberty of an individual, and that the compulsory flag salute cannot be sustained on the ground that public school education is granted as a matter of grace so that the requirement, even though arbitrary and capricious, can be enforced by expulsion from the public school.
A few paragraphs taken from the Bar Association Brief will be read with interest by all:
First: Neither the legislative branch nor the courts have any power to declare that a given practice does not and cannot carry a religious significance, in the face of an individual's sincere and honest determination that for him a religious significance exists. Consequently the finding of fact that the respondent children sincerely regarded the salute as a religious ritual forbidden by the Second Commandment is a conclusive answer to the contention that the salute must be considered merely a patriotic ceremony which cannot have any religious significance. To hold otherwise and thus to deny the right of private judgment as to what carries a religious meaning would, we shall submit, strike at the heart of religious freedom.
Second: Granting that the State, under some circumstances, can constitutionally override religious scruples, such action cannot constitutionally be taken unless there is a clear showing that the overriding of the individual's religious belief is essential in the public interest. No such showing, we shall submit, has been made here; and consequently the school regulation cannot be upheld as a reasonable measure in the public interest.
In our view, the two points just stated should, for clarity, be carefully separated and dealt with as distinct issues. The former involves the question whether the right of private judgment as to the religious content of a particular practice shall be held inviolate. The second point relates to a wholly different matter, viz.: Assuming the existence of the religious scruple, under what circumstances may the State constitutionally override it? The second question is of a character that the courts have been accustomed to deal with in a variety of situations. But the first issue, as to whether it is within the power of legislature or court to pass upon the fact of the existence of a particular religious scruple or its validity, involves the question whether our courts are to enter upon an unfamiliar type of determination in theological matters.
Third: We shall submit that even if no question of religious liberty is deemed to be here involved, there is another and broader ground upon which legislation of this character should be held void, viz., that to compel the salute over objection is an unconstitutional infringement upon individual liberty, even though the refusal to comply is not deemed to involve a religious question. The state courts have said several times, in broad terms, that the legislature may properly enact laws to promote loyalty and morale and that the compulsory salute may be justified as an exercise of legislative discretion as to the means to be employed to that end. The breadth of the language used in expressing this thought gives one pause and raises questions of a serious character.
When it is said that the legislature has a broad discretion to prescribe ceremonies in order to promote loyalty, it is fair to ask how far this doctrine extends. For instance, suppose that under such a doctrine a law were enacted requiring all adult persons to salute the flag at fixed intervals. Would such a law be constitutional under our system of government even in the absence of an assertion of religious scruples as the ground of opposition? We shall submit that it would not be constitutional; and if this position be sound, the question arises whether there is a constitutional difference between the imposition of the compulsory flag salute upon children and the imposition of a like requirement upon adults.
We respectfully suggest that this Court should consider the implications which are inherent in the broad language used by some of the state courts as to the extent of legislative discretion to require ceremonies of this sort. And we shall submit that this Court should hold, if necessary, that the compulsory flag salute is unconstitutional even if the refusal to conform thereto is not treated as involving an issue of religious liberty.
Fourth: Apart from the main issues above mentioned, there is also a subsidiary question of a more technical nature, as to whether the right to attend state supported schools is a mere privilege the enjoyment of which can be conditioned in any way that the State sees fit. Under a fourth heading, we shall submit that any such contention as a ground for the dismissal of this suit for reinstatement is without basis.
Further Excerpts from the Brief
The record of history shows that the existence and seriousness of religious beliefs are not to be measured by the current opinion of the time. History shows that the existence of religious scruples lies in truth and fact within the breast of the individual and nowhere else; and no current opinion or fiats of legislatures or courts have ever been able to establish that a particular act or ceremony has no religious significance when the individual himself asserts the contrary.
The truth is that the attempt to adjudge whether or not a particular ceremony can have or does in fact have a religious significance is something beyond the competence of legislatures and courts. This is so for the simple reason that whether or not such religious significance exists lies inherently within the mind and heart of the individual man or woman.
The Committee respectfully suggests that this Court should definitely repudiate the idea that a governmental agency can predicate any official action whatsoever upon the notion that it, rather than the individual, can determine whether or not a particular ceremony carries a religious significance. When the legislature, the executive, or the courts enter this sphere, they are doing no more or less than attempting to tell the individual what is or is not displeasing to God. . . .
It follows that a recognition of this new ground—the presumed promotion of loyalty and morale—as a basis for the overruling of religious scruples would be a new extension of legislative power. The present dominance of totalitarian ideas in other parts of the world suggests that an extension of legislative power in this direction should be viewed with suspicion and, in the absence of a showing of clear necessity, should be condemned as a deprivation of individual liberty without due process of law. . . .
Never having encountered a compulsory salute in their own school experience, many persons may tend to regard the ceremony as a normal gesture of respect to a national symbol. They may thus fail to appreciate the distinction in practical effect between a voluntary and compelled ceremony. The difference is, however, fundamental. Persons who willingly give a voluntary salute find that it increases their own loyalty. Then they may assume that, as a matter of course, the compulsory salute will increase the loyalty of others. But it by no means follows that the same effect of increased loyalty will be caused by a salute given only under compulsion and in violation of one's deepest convictions. The willing saluter easily assumes that failure to salute even under compulsion shows a lack of loyalty. Because the willing act of saluting is associated with loyalty in his own mind, he may assume that the failure of others to salute under compulsion is associated with disloyalty. But plainly this is not the fact. A concrete proof to the contrary is that the lower courts have expressly found, as indeed it has been proved or assumed in every litigated flag salute case, that the children are loyal American citizens and have not intended to show any disrespect for the Government. . . .
How About Making Everybody Salute?
It may be said that a portrait of a man differs from the flag in that the flag is merely an abstract symbol. Whether such a distinction is valid may be tested by inquiring whether it would be constitutional for the legislature to require all persons, young and old (except young infants, the infirm and the sick), to salute the flag at stated intervals. The statute of Pennsylvania in the case at bar permits the school authorities to require the salute from children; and statutes of other states directly require the ceremony and frequently prescribe its frequency, such as once a week and even daily. The requirement of the salute from the whole population would therefore be merely a matter of extending these very statutes to a different age group.
Specifically, let us suppose that a statute of Pennsylvania or New York should require the whole adult population to give this particular form of salute once a week at a time to be fixed by the Governor or other executive agency. Let us suppose that many citizens refused to comply, but none on religious grounds. Some would presumably refuse on grounds of mere inconvenience; others might object to the particular form of the salute as too much resembling the Nazi and Fascist salutes. Still others would doubtless invoke their "liberty" as American citizens without further specifying what they had in mind. Let us suppose that these objectors were arrested and put on trial as to whether they should suffer penalties for their non-compliance and that they were to plead the unconstitutionality of the legislation as depriving them of their "liberty" under the Fourteenth Amendment. Would this plea be good?
We submit that the plea would be good and that such legislation would be unconstitutional. The requirement of such a ritual is clearly alien to our institutions. It would be an intolerable invasion of individual liberties. Because it is inherent in the very nature of Americans to resent unnecessary assertions of authority, such a measure would not further the end of promoting loyalty and strengthening morale, but would have precisely the opposite effect. It would be unconstitutional because there would be no "appropriate relation" between the legislative command and the prescribed punishment, on the one hand, and the avowed objective on the other.
As already pointed out, it was not until the first of these flag salute statutes was enacted that any American Government had attempted to force its citizens (not in military service) to go through any form of ceremony similar to this. We suggest that the supposed legislation would be held void for the broad reason that such an encroachment on the liberty of the citizen would be unnecessary and unreasonable and wholly inconsistent with the spirit of our institutions.
If the above conclusion be sound in respect of legislation seeking to compel a salute from the whole population, does precisely similar legislation become valid merely because it is restricted to children of school age? We suggest that this difference is not sufficient to sustain the legislation. . . .
The philosophy of free institutions is now being subjected to the most severe test it has ever undergone. Advocates of totalitarian government point to the speed and efficiency with which such systems are administered, and assert that democracy can offer nothing to outweigh these advantages. The answer is to be found in the value of certain basic individual rights and the assurance afforded by free institutions that these shall not be required to yield to majority pressure no matter how overwhelming.
American Civil Liberties Union
The American Civil Liberties Union presented a brief on the flag issue at the same time that Judge Rutherford addressed the Supreme Court of the United States on that subject. From that brief are now quoted a few of the many interesting paragraphs which it contains.
None of the signers of this brief are members of Jehovah's witnesses, nor do they share the religious conviction that saluting the flag violates the law of God. But they and the Union consider that the issues raised by the record in this case, and the still graver issues which lie just beyond it, are of vital importance not only to the religious freedom of individual American citizens, but to the sources of that deep affection and confidence from which alone can spring an abiding popular loyalty to the American system of government and the American flag. . . .
The respondents believe that God has commanded them to withhold the salute from any flag whatsoever,—and of their obligations to their Creator they must, of necessity, be the final judges on this earth. That the Board of Education of Minersville has deprived them of the liberty of school attendance,—and threatened to deprive them of other liberties,—in consequence of their loyalty to their religion, seems to us perfectly clear. Was it within the Board of Education's authority, as the body charged with the secular education of the children of Minersville, to do what it has done? Was it within the police power of the State acting through its agency, the School Board? We know of no direct precedent for the solution of such a problem under the Constitution of the United States. . . .
It was never more important to reaffirm and give meaning to the principle of religious liberty than today. The principle that matters of religion are to be decided by the individual and not by Government, be it Court, Legislature or Executive, should be unmistakably reaffirmed by this Court in this case. The principle that religious belief and practice are within the guarantees of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, protected from State interference, should be firmly established. And it should be made clear that the only purposes for which a State may exercise its police powers are in the domain of action, and not the heart.
In this case, no practical consideration justifies soiling our national emblem "with the tears of a little child" who, in the view of most of us, may be misguided or even misinstructed, but whose religious convictions, in the absence of overwhelming public necessity, must be respected and not penalized.
The Newspapers and the Flag
Among the newspapers of the United States that have published editorials differing from the majority opinion of the United States Supreme Court in the flag case are the following:
Asbury Park (N.J.) Press; Altoona (Pa.) Mirror; Arvin (Calif.) Tiller; Ann Arbor (Mich.) News; Arlington (Kans.) Enterprise; Auburn (N.Y.) Citizen-Advertiser; Akron (Ohio) Beacon Journal; The American Freeman, Girard, Kansas; The American Guardian, Oklahoma City, Okla.; The American Protestant, Washington, D.C.; Bridgeport (Conn.) Post; Boston (Mass.) Post; Boston (Mass.) Herald; Birmingham (Ala.) Age-Herald and News; Baltimore (Md.) Sun; Boston (Mass.) Transcript; Bayonne (N.J.) Times; Brockton (Mass.) Enterprise; Butte Montana Standard; Buffalo (N. Y.) Times; Bismarck (N. Dak.) Tribune; Benton Harbor (Mich.) News-Palladium; Sonora (Calif.) Banner and News; Buffalo (N.Y.) Courier-Express; Chicago (Ill.) Tribune; Chicago (Ill.) News; Christian Century, Chicago, Ill.; Chicago (Ill.) Times; The Covenant Weekly, Chicago, Ill.; Cincinnati (Ohio) Enquirer; Cincinnati (Ohio) Post; Columbus (Ohio) Citizen; Columbus (Ohio) State Journal; Camden (N.J.) Courier-Post; Cleveland (Ohio) News; Cleveland (Ohio) Plain Dealer; Cleveland (Ohio) Press; Svenska Amerikanaren Tribunen, Chicago, Ill.
Dallas (Texas) News; Dallas (Texas) Dispatch-Journal; Daily News, Wellington, Kans.; Denver (Colo.) Post; Decatur (Ill.) Herald; Detroit (Mich.) Times; Duluth (Minn.) Herald; Des Moines (Iowa) Register; Dayton (Ohio) News; Detroit (Mich.) Free Press; The Daily Republic, Mitchell, S. Dak.; Easton (Pa.) Herald; Fort Myers (Fla.) News-Press; Fergus Falls (Minn.) Journal; Frederick (Okla.) Press; Fort Worth (Texas) Star-Telegram; Greenfield (Mass.) Recorder-Gazette; Greenfield (Mass.) Shopping News; Glens Falls (N.Y.) Times; Glenwood (Minn.) Herald; Great Falls (Mont.) Tribune; Hemet (Calif.) News; Hollywood (Calif.) Citizen-News; Hartford (Conn.) Courant; Johnstown (Pa.) Democrat; Johnstown (Pa.) Daily Tribune; Jacksonville (Fla.) Journal; Key West (Fla.) Citizen; Kansas City (Mo.) Journal; Simpson's Leader-Times, Kittanning, Pa.; Louisville (Ky.) Times; Louisville (Ky.) Courier-Journal; Los Angeles (Calif.) Examiner; Los Angeles (Calif.) News; Press-Telegram, Long Beach, Calif.
Miami (Fla.) Herald; Miami (Fla.) News; Milwaukee (Wis.) Sentinel; Minneapolis (Minn.) Tribune; Massillon (Ohio) Independent; The Monitor, Aurora, Mo.; Mobile (Ala.) Press; Memphis (Tenn.) Press-Scimitar; Bartlesville (Okla.) Morning-Examiner; News Bulletin, National Education Association, Washington, D.C.; New York Times; New York Herald Tribune; New York Daily News; New York Post; New York Sunday Mirror; New York World-Telegram; The Nation, New York city; Newark (N.J.) News; Newark (N.J.) Ledger; North Adams (Mass.) Transcript; New Britain (Conn.) Herald; Nashville Tennesseean; Oakland (Calif.) Tribune; Oroville (Calif.) Mercury-Register; Orlando (Fla.) Sentinel; Omaha (Nebr.) World-Herald; Plainfield (N.J.) Courier-News; Passaic (N.J.) Herald-News; Portland Oregonian; Portland (Oreg.) Journal; Pittsburgh (Pa.) Press; Pittsburgh (Pa.) Courier; Philadelphia (Pa.) Bulletin; Philadelphia (Pa.) Public Ledger; Philadelphia (Pa.) Inquirer; Philadelphia (Pa.) Transcript; Philadelphia (Pa.) Record; Punxsutawney (Pa.) Spirit; Pittsfield (Mass.) Eagle; Pathfinder, Washington, D.C.; Pueblo (Colo.) Chieftain; Portland (Maine) Express; Portland (Maine) Press-Herald; Peru (Ind.) Tribune; Providence (R.I.) Journal; Quincy (Mass.) Patriot Ledger; Rochester (N.Y.) Democrat and Chronicle; Rochester (N.Y.) Times-Union; Rockford (Ill.) Register; Redding (Calif.) Record; Raleigh (N.C.) News and Observer.
San Francisco (Calif.) Chronicle; Sacramento (Calif.) Union; Sacramento (Calif.) Bee; San Diego (Calif.) Union; San Francisco (Calif.) News; San Diego (Calif.) Sun; Santa Rosa (Calif.) Independent; St. Louis (Mo.) Globe-Democrat; St. Louis (Mo.) Post-Dispatch; St. Louis (Mo.) Star-Times; Seattle (Wash.) Post-Intelligencer; Seattle (Wash.) Star; Sault Ste. Marie (Mich.) Evening News; Newark (N.J.) Call; Springfield (Mass.) Union; Salem (Oreg.) Statesman; Steubenville (Ohio) Herald-Star; Springfield (Ohio) News-Sun; Shreveport (La.) Journal; Wellesley (Mass.) Townsman; Tampa (Fla.) Times; Tallahassee (Fla.) Democrat; Tacoma (Wash.) Labor Advocate; Tacoma (Wash.) Times; Tacoma (Wash.) News-Tribune; Trenton (N.J.) State Gazette; Toledo (Ohio) Blade; Tucson Arizona Star; Topeka (Kans.) Capital; Urbana (Ill.) Courier; Utica (N.Y.) Observer-Dispatch.
Washington (D.C.) Herald-Times; Washington (D.C.) Star; Washington (D.C.) Post; Waterbury (Conn.) Republican; Waterbury (Conn.) American; Washington (Pa.) Observer and Reporter; West Philadelphia (Pa.) Chronicle; Athenæum, Morgantown, W. Va.; Intelligencer (Wheeling, W. Va.); Tribune, Willmar, Minn.; Sun, Westerly, R. I.; White Plains (N.Y.) Reporter; Winston-Salem (N.C.) Journal; Youngstown (Ohio) Telegram; Youngstown (Ohio) Vindicator.
The Minority Opinion
The minority opinion, which was delivered by Mr. Justice Stone, is of special interest to those familiar with the Dred Scott case, to members of the American Bar Association, to the American Civil Liberties Union, to 171 of the leading newspapers of the United States, to the public in general interested in the preservation of civil liberty, and, most of all, to the people of good will toward Jehovah God, who hope to see the vindication of Jehovah's name at Armageddon. It may be that because of this dissenting opinion the great and good God may permit Mr. Justice Stone to pass through Armageddon and over into the reign of peace and justice and truth and honesty which is the heart's desire of every true child of God. His courageous dissenting opinion is printed in full.
I think the judgment below should be affirmed.
Two youths, now fifteen and sixteen years of age, are by the judgment of this Court held liable to expulsion from the public schools and to denial of all publicly supported educational privileges because of their refusal to yield to the compulsion of a law which commands their participation in a school ceremony contrary to their religious convictions. They and their father are citizens and have not exhibited by any action or statement of opinion, any disloyalty to the Government of the United States. They are ready and willing to obey all its laws which do not conflict with what they sincerely believe to be the higher commandments of God. It is not doubted that these convictions are religious, that they are genuine, or that the refusal to yield to the compulsion of the law is in good faith and with all sincerity. It would be a denial of their faith as well as the teachings of most religions to say that children of their age could not have religious convictions.
The law which is thus sustained is unique in the history of Anglo-American legislation. It does more than suppress freedom of speech and more than prohibit the free exercise of religion, which concededly are forbidden by the First Amendment and are violations of the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth. For by this law the state seeks to coerce these children to express a sentiment which, as they interpret it, they do not entertain, and which violates their deepest religious convictions. It is not denied that such compulsion is a prohibited infringement of personal liberty, freedom of speech and religion, guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, except in so far as it may be justified and supported as a proper exercise of the state's power over public education. Since the state, in competition with parents, may through teaching in the public schools indoctrinate the minds of the young, it is said that in aid of its undertaking to inspire loyalty and devotion to constituted authority and the flag which symbolizes it, it may coerce the pupil to make affirmation contrary to his belief and in violation of his religious faith. And, finally, it is said that since the Minersville School Board and others are of the opinion that the country will be better served by conformity than by the observance of religious liberty which the Constitution prescribes, the courts are not free to pass judgment on the Board's choice.
Concededly the constitutional guaranties of personal liberty are not always absolutes. Government has a right to survive and powers conferred upon it are not necessarily set at naught by the express prohibitions of the Bill of Rights. It may make war and raise armies. To that end it may compel citizens to give military service, Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U. S. 366, and subject them to military training despite their religious objections. Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U. S. 245. It may suppress religious practices dangerous to morals, and presumably those also which are inimical to public safety, health and good order. Davis v. Beason, 133 U. S. 333. But it is a long step, and one which I am unable to take, to the position that government may, as a supposed educational measure and as a means of disciplining the young, compel public affirmations which violate their religious conscience.
The very fact that we have constitutional guaranties of civil liberties and the specificity of their command where freedom of speech and of religion are concerned require some accommodation of the powers which government normally exercises, when no question of civil liberty is involved, to the constitutional demand that those liberties be protected against the action of government itself. The state concededly has power to require and control the education of its citizens, but it cannot by a general law compelling attendance at public schools preclude attendance at a private school adequate in its instruction, where the parent seeks to secure for the child the benefits of religious instruction not provided by the public school. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510. And only recently we have held that the state's authority to control its public streets by generally applicable regulations is not an absolute to which free speech must yield, and cannot be made the medium of its suppression. Hague v. Committee of Industrial Organization, 307 U. S. 496, 514, et seq., any more than can its authority to penalize littering of the streets by a general law be used to suppress the distribution of handbills as a means of communicating ideas to their recipients. Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147.
In these cases it was pointed out that where there are competing demands of the interests of government and of liberty under the Constitution, and where the performance of governmental functions is brought into conflict with specific constitutional restrictions, there must, when that is possible, be reasonable accommodation between them so as to preserve the essentials of both and that it is the function of courts to determine whether such accommodation is reasonably possible. In the cases just mentioned the Court was of opinion that there were ways enough to secure the legitimate state end without infringing the asserted immunity, or that the inconvenience caused by the inability to secure that end satisfactorily through other means, did not outweigh freedom of speech or religion. So here, even if we believe that such compulsions will contribute to national unity, there are other ways to teach loyalty and patriotism which are the sources of national unity, than by compelling the pupil to affirm that which he does not believe and by commanding a form of affirmance which violates his religious convictions. Without recourse to such compulsion the state is free to compel attendance at school and require teaching by instruction and study of all in our history and in the structure and organization of our government, including the guaranties of civil liberty which tend to inspire patriotism and love of country. I cannot say that government here is deprived of any interest or function which it is entitled to maintain at the expense of the protection of civil liberties by requiring it to resort to the alternatives which do not coerce an affirmation of belief.
The guaranties of civil liberty are but guaranties of freedom of the human mind and spirit and of reasonable freedom and opportunity to express them. They presuppose the right of the individual to hold such opinions as he will and to give them reasonably free expression, and his freedom, and that of the state as well, to teach and persuade others by the communication of ideas. The very essence of the liberty which they guaranty is the freedom of the individual from compulsion as to what he shall think and what he shall say, at least where the compulsion is to bear false witness to his religion. If these guaranties are to have any meaning they must, I think, be deemed to withhold from the state any authority to compel belief or the expression of it where that expression violates religious convictions, whatever may be the legislative view of the desirability of such compulsion.
History teaches us that there have been but few infringements of personal liberty by the state which have not been justified, as they are here, in the name of righteousness and the public good, and few which have not been directed, as they are now, at politically helpless minorities. The framers were not unaware that under the system which they created most governmental curtailments of personal liberty would have the support of a legislative judgment that the public interest would be better served by its curtailment than by its constitutional protection. I cannot conceive that in prescribing, as limitations upon the powers of government, the freedom of the mind and spirit secured by the explicit guaranties of freedom of speech and religion, they intended or rightly could have left any latitude for a legislative judgment that the compulsory expression of belief which violates religious convictions would better serve the public interest than their protection. The Constitution may well elicit expressions of loyalty to it and to the government which it created, but it does not command such expressions or otherwise give any indication that compulsory expressions of loyalty play any such part in our scheme of government as to override the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and religion. And while such expressions of loyalty, when voluntarily given, may promote national unity, it is quite another matter to say that their compulsory expression by children in violation of their own and their parents' religious convictions can be regarded as playing so important a part in our national unity as to leave school boards free to exact it despite the constitutional guarantee of freedom of religion. The very terms of the Bill of Rights preclude, it seems to me, any reconciliation of such compulsions with the constitutional guaranties by a legislative declaration that they are more important to the public welfare than the Bill of Rights.
But even if this view be rejected and it is considered that there is some scope for the determination by legislatures whether the citizen shall be compelled to give public expression of such sentiments contrary to his religion, I am not persuaded that we should refrain from passing upon the legislative judgment "as long as the remedial channels of the democratic process remain open and unobstructed." This seems to me no more than the surrender of the constitutional protection of the liberty of small minorities to the popular will. We have previously pointed to the importance of a searching judicial inquiry into the legislative judgment in situations where prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may tend to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied on to protect minorities. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152, note 4. And until now we have not hesitated similarly to scrutinize legislation restricting the civil liberty of racial and religious minorities although no political process was affected. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, supra; Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U. S. 284. Here we have such a small minority entertaining in good faith a religious belief, which is such a departure from the usual course of human conduct, that most persons are disposed to regard it with little toleration or concern. In such circumstances careful scrutiny of legislative efforts to secure conformity of belief and opinion by a compulsory affirmation of the desired belief, is especially needful if civil rights are to receive any protection. Tested by this standard I am not prepared to say that the right of this small and helpless minority, including children having a strong religious conviction, whether they understand its nature or not, to refrain from an expression obnoxious to their religion, is to be overborne by the interest of the state in maintaining discipline in the schools.
The Constitution expresses more than the conviction of the people that democratic processes must be preserved at all costs. It is also an expression of faith and a command that freedom of mind and spirit must be preserved, which government must obey, if it is to adhere to that justice and moderation without which no free government can exist. For this reason it would seem that legislation which operates to repress the religious freedom of small minorities, which is admittedly within the scope of the protection of the Bill of Rights, must at least be subject to the same judicial scrutiny as legislation which we have recently held to infringe the constitutional liberty of religious and racial minorities.
A Terrible Decision
THERE is a tiny religious sect in the United States known as Jehovah's witnesses—a few in Massachusetts, a few in Texas, a few in Pennsylvania, a few elsewhere, perhaps 20,000 in a country of 130,000,000.
Small religious sects often have ideas regarded by most of us as peculiar. There is a sect in Ohio, for example, which bars the use of buttons on clothing as being too worldly, so the brothers and sisters use hooks and eyes. The small sect known as Shakers believes the sexes should live separately. The Holy Rollers are so called because, in emotional religious ecstasy, they roll on the floor.
The peculiar thing about Jehovah's witnesses is that they are forbidden by their religion to salute the flag. This does not mean that they are unpatriotic, that they do not love their country. It simply means that, as they read the Scriptures, to salute the flag is to violate the divine commandment stated in verses 3, 4 and 5 of the Book of Exodus, [chapter 20] forbidding the bowing down to a graven image.
This, as we say, is very, very peculiar, but the members of Jehovah's witnesses do not think so; they are very sincere about this part of their belief, so much so that they are willing to go to jail rather than salute the American flag or any other flag; they are willing further to risk the anger of mobs—which is a lot more than many professional flag-wavers are willing to do. Last Saturday, 40 Jehovah's witnesses were rescued from such a mob in Odessa, Tex., and placed in jail for their belief.
Yesterday the Supreme Court of the United States, by the incredible vote of 8 to 1, held constitutional a regulation requiring school children to salute the flag, and, just as incredibly, the celebrated liberal Felix Frankfurter delivered the majority opinion.
With such scrutiny I cannot say that the inconveniences which may attend some sensible adjustment of school discipline in order that the religious convictions of these children may be spared, presents a problem so momentous or pressing as to outweigh the freedom from compulsory violation of religious faith which has been thought worthy of constitutional protection.
The case involved two small children, Lillian and William Gobitis, 12 and 10 years old, members of Jehovah's witnesses, who refused to salute the American flag as a part of the daily exercises in a public school in Minersville, Pa. The children were expelled from school and the case eventually found its way to the highest court in the land.
In fighting their case, Jehovah's witnesses acquired an unexpected ally: the Committee on the Bill of Rights of the American Bar Association, headed by the famous lawyer, Grenville Clark, of the New York law firm formerly headed by Elihu Root.
A powerful argument was made by Mr. Clark's committee. It is contained in a 45-page written brief signed by, among others, Charles P. Taft, Lloyd K. Garrison, Monte W. Lemann and Zechariah Chafee, Jr. The brief in learned and eloquent language upheld the right of Jehovah's witnesses to worship God in their own way—a right guaranteed by the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
We wish we could quote at length from the American Bar Association's brief, but perhaps this one passage will be enough:
The philosophy of free institutions is now being subjected to the most severe test it has ever undergone. Advocates of totalitarian government point to the speed and efficiency with which such systems are administered, and assert that democracy can offer nothing to outweigh these advantages. The answer is to be found in the value of certain basic individual rights and the assurance afforded by free institutions that these shall not be required to yield to majority pressure, no matter how overwhelming.
The worth of our system must ultimately be judged in terms of the importance of those values and the care with which they are safeguarded. We consider them immeasurably important. We believe that the letter and spirit of our Constitution demand vindication of the individual liberties which are abridged by the challenged regulation.
But this argument was cast aside by the Supreme Court, and now by judicial fiat Lillian and William Gobitis will be compelled to perform an action which, in their creed, is a sin against God.
We think this decision of the United States Supreme Court is dead wrong. We think its decision is a violation of American principle. We think it is a surrender to popular hysteria. If patriotism depends on such things as this—on violation of the fundamental right of religious freedom, then it becomes not a noble emotion of love for country, but something to be rammed down our throats by the law.
We honor Justice Stone, who refused to lend himself to it.—St. Louis Post-Dispatch.
RIGHTEOUS RULER
THE NEW GOVERNMENT
The Witness in Eire
◆ The company at Dublin is now getting well into its stride. Meetings are held regularly each Sunday in a smart room over the Broadway Café, O’Connell Street—this is the main street of Dublin and is one of the finest streets in the whole of the British Isles. An attendance of between 15 and 20 is recorded each Sunday. The first meeting is divided up into half an hour Salvation study and half an hour Service meeting. Then an hour later The Watchtower is studied. The work in Dublin has to be done chiefly amongst the Protestants,—if it is to be done at all. However, many Roman Catholics are hearing of the truth for the first time, through their Protestant friends, as shown by the following experiences:
One publisher reports: “A person of good will possessing a radio-gram received a set of records on loan. When I called back to collect them I was told that 14 people who had come to a party gathering had heard the lecture through. Seven of the party were Roman Catholics, and it was they who asked to have the lecture run over again as they had never heard anything like it before in their lives.”
Another person who owned a radio-gram was loaned a set and reported with enthusiasm that 16 friends and relatives had heard it at one sitting. Still another person reported 22 listeners in one week.
Many people of good will who have radio-grams are pleased to know that they can have the recordings on loan, and we try to accommodate as many as possible by making a round and exchanging them weekly.
Another publisher reports: “I contacted a member of the Communist party here in Dublin, and in the course of conversation I informed him that the Roman Catholic Hierarchy was at the back of Communism. To my surprise he said, ‘I did not know that, but it doesn’t matter so long as they uphold our cause’; proving that all the ‘isms do not mind what rotten racket is back of them so long as their cause is upheld. This particular man was arrested last week for taking part in demonstrations. I wonder if he realizes that it is the same racket that is at the back of his being arrested.”
A Roman Catholic person in Dublin is showing good interest in the truth since a pioneer—who is lodging with her—has brought the message to her attention. This particular person tells of an experience she had recently when attending “mass”. She usually went into the church at a certain door where the members paid 2d on entering. This particular morning she went to a different door, but was stopped by the priest, who demanded 6d before letting her in. She indignantly refused, and said she was not going to pay 6d just to enter the house of God by a different door, and she walked inside in spite of the priest. This opened her eyes further to the hypocrisy of religion, and when the priest later called at her home he got more than he bargained for. She demanded to know where the Scriptures mentioned “Purgatory”, etc. The priest was beaten hands down, and was told that this person was now finished with their racket. She now attends the meetings of Jehovah’s witnesses.—Robert Anderson, Zone servant.
Mus Decumanus at Skewen
◆ Two elderly publishers had completed witnessing a dead-end Catholic street and were commencing to walk towards the remaining open end, when they heard a number of loud and harsh voices just round the corner.
“Where are they?” shouted someone.
“Round the corner,” shrieked some women.
“How many are there?” demanded another.
“Two,” again responded the shrill voices of women.
"Watch them coming into sight," "Get them, whatever you do," etc., etc.
At hearing this the eyebrows of the two friends lowered as never before. What could they do? go back? No, that was impossible; there was no means of escape; it was a dead end.
Mustering all available courage they decided to "grin and bear it" and go forward.
"What cruel men there are on the earth! But what can we expect? the Devil is in control; 'in the midst of life we are in death,'" they muttered, resigned for the worst.
They were getting round the corner when the threatening crowd came into sight. There they stood, armed with upraised long staves.
The two friends shuddered; their end had come—when all at once two rats burst out from under the floor of an old wooden shed.
No sooner had the rats come into sight than the staves crashed down upon them; they moved no more.
Immediately it dawned upon the minds of our heroes that the unfortunate creatures were the real objects of the wrath of the crowd. Soon their eyebrows commenced to resume their former position, and their hearts resumed normal heartbeat.
THEOCRACY magazine distributors, Enfield, London, April, 1940
Not a Sheep Will Be Missed
◆ Proof that the King provides for those who first seek His kingdom is found in the case of the Beitler family. As Russian citizens of German descent, they were exiled to Siberia during the World War while others like them but (please note) of Catholic faith were not so exiled. Upon return to their old home after the war they found it impossible there to serve their God as they felt they should; so, like another of great faith, they got themselves and three children out of their country and from their father's house to another land where the Lord led them, finally landing here in America, near Pontiac, on a small farm. Ere long a witness for Jehovah found them. The Kingdom message fell on hungry ears and today mother and father and four children are all happy in active service under the great THEOCRAT. For many years they sought the Kingdom, and the Lord led them to that haven of refuge. It is a pleasure to know them. In spite of hardships which only stout hearts and sturdy characters could withstand, their faces are shining with the everlasting joy their hearts longed for and which they have found. The Lord sometimes gathers His sheep from a long way off.—Wm. P. Strong.
Kingdom Publishers in Sweden
◆ I send a small photograph of the boat that my husband, Carl Gustav Olsson, and I are using in the work, visiting the isles and parts of the coast of Sweden. Two years ago we worked in the East Sea and visited between 200 and 300 isles in a few months. The last two years we have been working at the west coast of Sweden, some places very priest-ridden. But even here some come out and hail the King of kings. Everything seems so uncertain now, because of the war, but if it be possible we hope to go to the East Sea again before the close of 1940.
It pleased the Lord to give us this boat, putting it into the minds of some friends that we needed a better boat than the old one that we had previously. And really it was an answer to a prayer and need, as the old one sank shortly after we got this one. It is more expensive to use this boat, but it represents the work better and we can get along more speedily. It is thirty-three feet in length and has a 25-horsepower motor. We use crude oil instead of gasoline. We also have a small sail to use at certain times. We need the Lord's protection and care at all times, like all of His people.
I must tell you of a woman eighty-four years of age in Göteborg who symbolized by water baptism her consecration some time ago. I had the privilege of being present and seeing and hearing her expressions of joy. She could hardly hear and hardly move, but had received the truth by reading the literature and wanted but one thing, and that was that she might be able to go out with the Kingdom message.
Also, one little girl ten years of age, out in the witness work, came to a door with the booklet Warning. "What is this warning?" someone asked her; and the child answered in one word, "Religion."
"Dorie," Sweden, in the King's service
Louisville, Kentucky: Base supports (four vacuum cups) cost $1.17; a support on each side makes the sign reversible; the sign is of 3/8-inch plywood, ducoed and varnished; thumbscrews make the sign readily removable.
Another little girl came to a door with the booklet Cause of Death. Someone saw the trinity picture found therein and said "Ysch-i-ana-mej"—that you will go with such things! and the little girl responded, "And such things you believe in!"
A lady in Stockholm was visited by a witness who asked if she would renew her Consolation. She said she had not even read it, and shut the door. The witness knocked again, engaged her in further conversation, and after a while she decided to renew. As soon as the publisher had left she knelt before the Lord and gave herself and her all to serve Him henceforth. She had been moving in high circles of society, together with her husband, but she now took a firm stand for Jehovah, went to the studies, went out with the Message and witnessed boldly to her former friends.
She has two little boys and teaches them the truth. The father tells them there is something wrong with the mother's head. One day she brought her boys to a meeting and afterwards asked them if they could understand anything of what was said. "Ah, yes!" they replied, "we see now, mother, that you are a locust!"
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