Golden Age, October 26, 1921

Download: PDF — Golden Age, October 26, 1921

Oct 26, 1921, Vol. m, No.55 every other Im week at 35 Myrtle Arenua, ■^5r Brooklyn, N. F.. 17. S. X

■( Ten Cent* a Copy—*2.00 a Year Canada and Foralga Countriaa, *2.00

' V

mm t wnwcsDAT, acron m, on wbebb m - -

CONTENTS <f the GOLDEN AGE

LABOR AND BCONOMKB

Anew n /tom i?»i o> mr cwt amm km

iWnira — II I >S| {■nDm PNMN *7 toa Bpass _»40

reran era tobtatas - .-------X .Mm fcraM tae UM Brawn 41

A *tatUmi SMfc-AhiaiM M -A BatiMd Wmi--,,----------

Karaiap Mt »q Imp — M .Iha Bmeaia

K«t VefrinOr ^e Fwnwi—_~*r. DtoarfctoaM palaat BMU Banfel

Mpirrtw ^Martes - —- *n <••• to ntaratra

NtauMCMraflt with* Mind ’8M« MM LMrtB BM _.43

Bawm Sjracra ----------------■ *■ tartera lua Kitraraprtf

ipra Mehta toe CaMtry Baahs 39, Ul to Ben Itraff ------

Dm DM net toK Prapeto ..All Mm toran <M Mhtafcra ,

Mwr AM fra Travers ..... ,, m a to ntoairrr .. - - *'

POLITICAL—DOMESTIC AND foreign

Ararafcu taW-lUUtoMfew _~...4S lilietnath! tf Be QW * Ifc Deie’a Beat .......-.......,.,CT Kra let.......

AGRICULTURE AND HUSBANDRY

Ami Aaericu Dasrat .............- — --------

HOME AND HEALTH iBOMiog Dm at Badtara 47 fcHra «r Drap -

atopnetfe Mull* , „, .„B1 fctopMNi OKprteMM . ,. ... BT

tab Ara Mat CM---------« WW Mra A to Caihp

Oto 9t Drop - ■ !,..■■ । W

• RELIGION AND"PHILOSOPHY

Massed RMe Btatfn n.mM Itomn to braMp W8> PsM •----> MtoKta M UtiBMiO Che MM twra ZratAto 91

to (toraiar Beds Opd9 BB Wbei ths Mm tf hat BhaB Bar.

Brad FyraaM • «* Amm ' "M Ba Btffl". a tom Qato

■m to Bast Uni BBatotato wm BbbB 11

af Mp - -- - x Spirtt asB Btoraa tom Bpento

IB to» Ttoa < the BsB Krawrliitp aid DMsto — •*

M Be JBDMaH ......W* h—III Btole -- -

fxrKsLsriPT. “Dwt Tw CWTS^ Con — >340 a Ybbb vounow onicsfl: BHHeB: M Cnran Tames, Lancaster Gate, London W. 2; Osaasdirara: 270 Dmdaa Bt. Wa Toronto. Ontario: Aiaetralaeirm: 493 ColHar St, Mafcmmt, Australia* Maks mUttsar— M TBs flalito A«fc

The Golden Age

Triue III Brooklyn, N. Y., Wednesday, October M, Im Number H

Management of the Federal Reserve System

By Robert F. GrosseU (U. 8. Treasury)

THE decline in the value of our foreign trade, J- especially of the excess of exports over imports, which from $454,000,000 in December, 1920, dropped to $85,000,000 in April of this year, has had a most important bearing on our economic condition. Unless our surplus manufactured articles and agricultural products can be disposed of in the world’s markets, the effect is sure to react in the form of depression on the economic fabric of the country.

' It is claimed that there is in the world at the present time a surplus of cotton sufficient for its needs for two years. Certainly ths condition of the cotton growers of the South is serious. During the war the price of cotton rose to 40c a pound, a rate which the cotton growers had never before dreamed of receiving. The money received by the grower for his crop at this price ■was in most cases promptly spent for automobiles, farm machinery, improvement of farms, or otherwise. When the time came for the cultivation of the next crop loans were usually secured from the banks for that purpose. The 1919 and 1920 crops were raised while prices for labor and other things were at their peak; and when the price of cotton declined to 15c and 12c a pound, the cotton grower found himself faced with the situation of disposing of his product at a price lower than that which it cost him to produce, and with very little demand for it. England has in the past purchased large quantities, of our cotton, but since cotton has been raised so successfully in Egypt, a large part of that country’s production finds its way to England, thus diminishing the need for cotton from the United States. Poland, Germany, and Czechoslovakia need our cotton, but have neither the money nor the credit to secure it. The result is that the farmers of the South are in many cases not able to meet the loans secured from banks on their crops.

To meet this situation the Federal Reserve Banks increased the time limit of agricultural paper from the ninety-day limit to six months, which of course could be renewed at the expiration of that period. In addition to this the War Finance Corporation has undertaken to furnish , credit for the exportation of cotton to the.value of several millions of dollars.

FARMERS ARE MISTAKEN

Undoubtedly the lot of the farmer at the present time is a hard one, and unquestionably they have grievances against banks, but the fault does not lie where they appear to place it. The special object of their attack is the Federal Reserve Banks. They want the Federal Reserve System reorganized with representation of farmers’ interest on the Board. Their ideas have been expressed by the President of the American Farm Bureau Federation as follows:

‘Ht is incumbent upon the bankers of this country so to adjust their business that the farmers may have opportunity to carry on without forced liquidation until. the other fellow comes to his level .of credit and income^ or the farmer is again restored to his proportion in all adjustments.”

Ideas of a similar nature seem to prevail in other quarters, that the banks so proportion their credits to prevailing prices as to stabilize markets, thus preventing the rise and fall of prices. The idea is harmful, as no body of men is able to fix prices of commodities, and especially with respect to their relation to each other. The bank which attempted this, practice would soon find itself loaded v'ith credits' which it could not liquidate, and thus would be forced to close its doors as being unable to transact its normal business for lack of available funds.

The last three months of 1919 witnessed a very rapid expansion of credit, accompanied by a decline in the cash reserves of the Federal Reserve Banks, due largely to the export of gold in settlement of balances accumulated during the war by South America and the Orient Much of this undue expansion of bank credit was used

for speculative purposes; and in November, as by Swiss, Belgian, and other central banks.

1919, an advance in the discount rate was made. But the expansion continued. In January, 1920, another advance in rate was made; and in May, 1920, the rate on commercial paper was advanced to 7 percent at four of the Federal Reserve Banks. These steps were successful in checking the rate of credit expansion in spite of the fact that gold began to come into this country as the result of European countries trying to maintain their credit in America and ’ of the high premium commanded by the dollar in the money markets of the world.

In May, 1920, prices had reached a high level, but early in 1920 the collapse of the Japanese silk market indicated the coming of a turn in events. The public was no longer willing or able to pay the high prices demanded; and a dedine in prices set in, at first gradual, later more rapid, affecting chiefly raw materials and farm products.

A NATIONAL SHOCK-ABSORBER

During the period of expansion, contraction, and depression the Federal Reserve System has acted as a moderator and shock-absorber, checking the rate of expansion in 1920, yet continuing to issue notes and to grant credits required by the business needs of the country, and later preventing the occurrence of a crisis by making gradual liquidations possible.

The experience of the last two years has demonstrated that the Federal Reserve System can stand up under a terrific strain, that it can moderate the impact of economic forces and make possible a transition from a period of reckless expansion to one of liquidation without a disastrous crash. At the same time events emphasize the fact that the Federal Reserve System can neither produce nor neutralize economic forces, but can only endeavor to moderate their ruthless effect on the economic structure of the country.

The d&couht rate of the Federal Reserve Banka generally six months ago was 7 percent; and the same rate was maintained by the Bank of England chiefly, no doubt, because of the dominating influence of this country in world finance. Within the last sot months the discount rate has been lowered to 6} percent, 6 percent, , and recently to 5| percent; and this change was followed by the Bank of England, the Bank of : France, some of the Scandinavian banks, as well i

fe.

Of course, this lowering of the interest rate makes for easier credits available for industrial enterprises and the speeding np of the business of the world.

BARRINGS NOT TOO LARGS

An erroneous impression exists in soma quarters as to the earnings of the Federal . ’ Reserve Banks. Those earnings depend largely -on the volume of their discounts with member banks and on the discount rate charged. The. -discount rates are determined by the banks, with the approval of the Federal Reserve Board, in accordance with credit conditions that prevail, while the volume of operations of the i Federal Reserve Banks depends on the magni- . fade of the demand for accommodation by member banks, and the amount of credit available to satisfy the demand. The earnings of the banks should be considered in relation to the available funds at their disposal. The present paid in capital of the twelve Federal Reserve Banks is $102/263,000, and surplus $213,824^)00. On the basis of capital alone the earnings for , 1920 were 158.4 percent But those rates of return are practically without meaning, for the Reserve Banks have at tlieir disposal much larger funds on which they pay no interest and । which practically cannot be withdrawn, that is, the reserve deposits of member banks. Those deposits, amounting on the average to $1,835,000,000 in 1920, represent the lawful reserves of the member banks and may not be reduced, except as the member bank's own deposits decline. When these deposits are added to the capital and surplus, the rate of return of the Reserve Banks on their operating funds is 7 percent.

But Federal Reserve Banks have .another source of loanable funds, namely, Federal Reserve notes, which are obligations of the United States Government, and are issued to Federal Reserve Banks against gold or eligible paper, with the limitation that the Banks must keep ’ 40 percent in gold against their note circulation. The franchise tax paid by the Banks may he .. considered as a return io the Government fbr i

lending its credit to the Banks by guaranteeing : the note issues. As related to the notes, net earnings of the Reserve Banks in 1920 constituted 4.7 percent. When all the Banks' loanable funds—capital, surplus, reserve deposits, and notes—are added, it is seen that their earnings constitute but 2.9 percent of the total.

In view of the public character of the Federal Reserve Banks, Congress provided that net earnings of the Banks in excess of 6 percent should be turned over to the Government as a franchise tax. Since Reserve Bank earnings are augmented by an increase in discount rates, and since these rates are determined by public policy, it is but fitting that the earnings above a moderate return on the capital invested should be turned over to the Government; and that is what is done. In 1920 $60,000,000 were paid by the Reserve Banks to the Treasury as a ■ franchise tax. ■

NOT UNFRIENDLY TO FARMERS

Criticism has become quite general, among agricultural interests, of the Federal Reserve Banks that they are unfriendly to agriculture. It might be stated in connection with that view that the Federal Reserve Act provides for a limitation of discount of three months upon maturity of eligible paper, with the exception, however, that notes, drafts, and bills drawn or issued for agricultural purposes or based on livestock having a maturity not exceeding six months, may be discounted in an amount to be limited to the percentage of the assets of the Federal Reserve Bank to be ascertained and fixed by the Federal Reserve Board. Were the criticism above true, the Federal Reserve Board could easily have limited the amount of six months’ agricultural paper which could be discounted by a Federal Reserve Bank to a very small percentage of its total assets. But on the contrary some years ago they fixed the percentage at 99 percent, which offers the fullest possible ae&ommodation to agriculture; and the Board has never changed that percentage.

That heavy loans have been made to agricultural interests in the South is shown by the fact that tl\e Federal Reserve Banks of Atlanta and Richmond’ were both heavy borrowers < during the-latter part of 1920 from other Federal Reserve Banks, and the Federal Re- serve Bank of Richmond has shown loans as high as $25,000,000 from the Federal Reserve

Bank of New York. The total rediscounts during the latter part of April, 1921, with the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond by National Banks in South Carolina were $12,506,000. They had also borrowed $6,759,000 from the Federal Be-serve Bank on their own collateral, so that the total accommodation granted to National Banks -in South Carolina during the latter part of April, 1921, was $19,265,000, and the total amount loaned by the Federal Reserve Bank to all member banks in that state was on June 30, 1921, $21,105,000. ’

PERPLEXING SITUATION J

Another factor of prime importance to consider in connection with the industrial depres- . sion at the present time is that of the breakdown of foreign exchange. The situation is perplex- ’ ing and uncomfortable, and unless some remedy ' is devised to stabilize the foreign exchange market disaster may come in respect to inter- ; national trade. At the present time the situation is working very favorably for the German j merchant in that the German Reichsmark, nor- I

mally worth .2382 in U. S. money, has now an

exchange value of slightly over 1c, but its pur- . 1 chasing power in Germany is much more than ;

that. This situation enables the German manu- ,

facturer to produce goods at a smaller cost than

the same goods can lie made in England, United '

States, or elsewhere. England herself is con- . fronted with a threatened invasion of her own :

soil by German goods and is unable to make ■ headway abroad against German competition. ; The situation has been stated in the words of _ an English manufacturer as follows:

“The astounding fact remains that America and Great ■; Britain are the two countries now starving for orders, with millions of unemployed, while Germany, in which ' costs increased more Ilian almost any other country, has , order books filled to overflowing. America, with -mountains of gold, is idle; Germany, with virtually no » gold and with huge debt.-, is getting the trade of the : world.” ’ ■

Until under some approved method the ex- •

change question is settled satisfactorily, it is J, useless to hope for a resumption of internation- '

al trade on the large scale which present world ! conditions demand and which a steady money -

market would be certain to insure. But the fe exchange question at the present time is a very t . large one and cannot be entered into in detail j here. ..."

Cb

Mismanagement of the Federal Reserve System

By John Skelton Williams, Ex-Comptroller of the Currency.

MY PURPOSE is to expose the errors that have been made in the administration and use of the Federal Reserve System and to demonstrate the consequences of them that those errors may be avoided hereafter, the operations of the System perfected, and its great purposes fulfilled.

The most important of these purposes is to assure equable and equitable distribution of the money supply of the country that it may be available where and when needed for actual production and legitimate commercial purposes and not accumulated in places and for purposes where it is not needed for legitimate uses, or ‘ is misused either to extort inordinate gain from need or to promote speculation^ destructive to some, and adding nothing to the country's real growth apd progress.

Fortunately, the facts and statements from both sides are of public.record now, and will be printed in tl*e proceedings of the Joint Committee of Congress investigating—especially from the standpoint of Agriculture—the administration of the Federal Reserve System.

try” national lianks in the United States owed . on September 8,1920.

If that additional amount of credit, $1,084,-. j 000,000, had been supplied to them up to that ; u time or during the ensuing twelve months, it p

SYSTEM DESPISES THE COUNTRY BANKS |

The record shows that a year ago, in Septem-her, 1920, when agricultural sections were earnestly pleading for additional help, the national banks of the three big cities of New York, Chicago an<l St. Louis had received accommo-datums (nearly all from the Federal Reserve Banks) through rediscounts and bills payable, to the extent of 24 percent of their total loans and discounts. '

‘ At the same time the national banks known as the '‘country banks", that is to say, the banks outside of the Reserve and Central Reserve cities, had received accommodations in the shap:s’tt£ rediscounts and bills payable for only 10 percent of their total loans and rediscounts.

If the ‘country” banks had been granted accommodations for the same proportion of their tidal assets (excluding rediscounts) as the national Iwtnkh inMie three big cities, they would

is a fair assumption that our country might have been saved billions of the losses we have . suffered, not only from shrinkage of values, but from the violent and sudden collapse, resuiting in disturbance and disaster to producers, fanners and manufacturers without compensation and corresponding • advantage to consumers.

SYSTEM DID NOT ASSIST PROPERLY

I will now submit certain official figures from the annual report of the comptroller of the currency, submitted to the Joint Committee of Congress by me on the 2nd and 3rd ultimo ' (Page 222, Comptroller’s report for 1920) Comparison of the loans and discounts and of money borrowed by rediscounts and bills payable on September 8, 1920, by the National banks of the three cities of New York, Chicago and St. Louis, as compared with the “country” ! National banks; that is to say, all National r

[ banks outside of the Central Reserve and Re-17 serve cities.

tad dtamts toaMewlMa ndlcoaoto> (IndndlRC

New York, Chicago and St. Louis__$3,695,000,000

"country” banks 5,853,000,000

oiuiMjtr dhcoont* and UQaw^Oto

$896,000,000 596,000,000

20%

10.2%

l ave ncrivetl at least instead of..........

$l,630.u00.000

.’w.imooo

which was the total amount of all the "rediscounts and bills payable” which all the “eoun-

These figures show that, although the “conn-try” banks were carrying $2,158,000,000 mon of “loans and discounts" than the national banka in the three big cities, yet the accommodation which they had been able to get from the Federal Reserve Banks whose principal function ■ is to extend aid In times of emergency and : stress, was actually about $300,000,000 less than the accommodation granted to the national ' banks in the three big cities.

Ven rly all the money borrowed by all national banks was obtained from the Federal Reserve Banks, and in making this comparison, I am assuming that the proportion of their total borrowings obtained by the “country" banks from their Federal Reserve Banks was the same as , the proportion of their total borrowings which "■

'■"is

kJ

the hanks in the three big cities got from their - Federal Reserve Banks.

•- ... The official figures also prove that the accom-■ modations obtained by the "country” banks ‘ . (nearly all of which were obtained from the : Federal Reserve Banks) in September, 1919, * were $60,000,000 less than the accommodations obtained by the national banks in the three big cities at the same time.

By September, 1920, the 45 national banks in ■ New York, Chicago and St. Louis were being - accommodated (nearly all from Reserve Banks) .. with $300,000,000 more than all the 7,673 “coun, national banks throughout the IJ. S.

. Comptroller of the Currency Crissinger’s offi-. dal statements show that as late as April 28, 1821, the Federal Reserve System was still actually lending to the 45 national banks in New York, Chicago and St. Louis (over 96 percent going to the banks in New York city and Chicago) on bills payable and rediscounts, in pro-portion.to their total resources approximately twice as much as the System was lending at that . time to aU the "country" national banks, then aggregating 7,732.

I appeal to the same record to furnish, if ■?. desired, further convincing proof of my charges against the Federal Reserve Board and some of the Federal Reserve Banks that the resources of the System were distributed unequa-bly and improvidently, so that great banks at . the financial centers were lavishly supplied with money for use as they saw fit, while “country” banks and their producing customers were cramped and crippled.

- In my testimony before the Congressional . Committee I showed that four or five large banks in New York city were borrowing at one time from the Federal Reserve Bank as much as four or five thousand banks, including both country banks and the larger banks in important western and southern cities, were borrowing fromMjye Federal Reserve Banks, embracing in their respective districts twenty-one ■ great states.

MEAGEB ATO FOB FARMEES -

The Federal Reserve official bulletin of De-1 eember, 192(7, throws light upon the extent to j- which the Federal Reserve Banks were accom-■ modating the agricultural interests of the country in crop-moving time in 1920. Page 1346 of : Jhe bulletin referred to shows that at the end

of October, 1920, the 12 Federal Reserve Banks held of “discounted and of purchased paper” a grand total of ..............$3,100,000,000

of which the “purchased” paper was 299,000,000 nearly all “bankers' acceptances” it is understood mainly New York city banks. But of the aggregate of $3,100,000,000, the total of “agricultural paper” and of "livestock paper” held by all the twelve Federal Reserve Banks, was only ...................... $240,000,000

which is less than.8 percent of the total accommodations granted by the Federal Reserve Banks.

The 8 percent of the total accommodations , granted by the Reserve Banks upon “agricultural and livestock paper” seems very small when we consider that the farmers now represent about 43 percent of our population and when the aggregate value of farm property, according to the last census, is about $77,000,000,000.

From October, 1919, to October, 1920—be-tween these particular dates—the twelve Federal Reserve Banks did INCREASE the amount of their discounts and bills payable with the member banks. The total increase in the average amount of all discounted paper held by the Reserve Banks in the 12 months from October, * 1919, to October,1920, was......$712,000,000

But an analysis shows that 72 percent of this increase, or say...... 512.000,000

was dispensed by the Federal Reserve Banks of Neiv York, Chicago and Cleveland, while the total increase granted in that period by the Federal Reserve Banks to all member banks in nine other great districts, embracing over 90 percent of the total area of the continental United States was only......................$200,000,000,

or 28 percent of the total increase; 72 percent of the increase being dispensed by Reserve banks in the three districts covering less than 10 percent of the territory . ____

The official figures also show that one time' last year the Federal Reserve System waa lending to four banking institutions in New York city an aggregate of about.......$480,000,000.

The loans made to these four banks in New York city amounted to approximately twice as much as the maximum amount loaned at any time during the year 1920 vn "agricultural and livestock paper" by all twelve Federal Reserve Banks.

And yet in the faoe of these facts we find officials of the Federal Reserve System giving the most solemn assurances that the resources of the System have been equitably and impartially distributed!

SYSTEM PLEADED WITH IN VAIN

• In September and October, 19*20, farm organizations and cotton growers, other business men -and Senators and Congressmen held repeated conferences with the Federal Reserve Board and pointed out the disastrous consequences of their policies and urged a relaxation of the pressure which was being exerted. I besought my colleagues to listen to the arguments which were * so forcefully presented to them, and to revise their policies before it should be too late. 1

In a letter to the governor of the Board of October 18.19*20,1 said:

The plans and. policies wliich have aided in bringing about deflation in the great staple commodities should he at onee taken up for consideration and revised as far as may be necessary to meet present and changed conditions. If this is not done speedily, I am fearful as to the consequences wKioh may ensue.

Three days later, in a letter to the Secretary of the Treasury, who was the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, I said:

The strain upon the business fabric of the country ia, ' in some respects, unparalleled, and I do feel that ths time has come for the eaercise of such salutary and constructive powers as may be at our command. • * •

The sitnation • • * has become more aggravated of late, and unless relief can be found, an increase in hank failures, I believe, will be inevitable.

The revival of the War Finance Corporation would provide, in my judgment, a much-needed steadying influence at this time.

I continued to remonstrate against the Board’s unwise policies, both in Board meetings and in written communications. In a letter to the Governor of the Board, January 17,1921,1 said;

It is entirely true that I wish to go on record. • • • I wfcfli to be recorded definitely as having done my utmost to urge our Board to saving or palliative action and ’consideration for the troubles of the public and thereby at lea-"t free myself from the censure that will fall on us with crushing force if ve emit any possible effort to mitigate present and real suffering or to avert disaster, although the consideration of personal exculpation is, of course, slight and negligible in comparison with my main purple and hope, which are to obtain from the Board xonie^rompt and effective action for relief.

MERCILESS PRESSURE BY THB SYSTEM

I now ask your attention to the manner in

which the Federal Reserve Board responded to S the earnest pleas for relief and a revision at '■ ■ their contraction policies, which were made to , theiu September and October last. You will sea . that their answer was practically—more pres-s-ave—contraction—diffnlion! '4 <

On October 15,1920. the total amount of “bills -discounted and paper purchased” by all twelve > Federal Reserve Banks amounted to..................$3,092,000300

By November 19,1920, this amount :

had been contracted by......... 145,000,000

leaving the total................. 2,947,000,000

By December 17, 1920, the reducturn as compared with October 15, 1920, amounted to.............. 263,000,000

the Reserve System continuing to • .

call in loans. By January 21, 1921,

the total amount of discounts and -purchased paper which the-Be-

serve Banks had outstanding had

been reduced as compared with .

October 15 by............ 443,000,000

By February 18, 1921, this con- ' traction amounted to............ 562,000,000

By March 18,1821, the Board’s policies had caused a reduction in discounted and bought paper . amounting to............ 746,000,000

On April 29, 1921, the Board in >

reporting the complete “success” of the policy of deflation and contraction showed that the total amount o f hills discounted and paper purchased had been reduced to ............................ 2,167,000,000

which was an actual contraction since October 15, 1920, of........$925,060,000

During the 5J mouths between November 17, ‘ 1920, and April 28, 1921, while the R.-^erve System was forcing im-iubtr hanks at ruinous costs to pay up or it-diwe their loai-s with the ■’ Reserve Banks In* the sum of $720,000,000, the withdrawals of deposits which the itatkMutl banks alone Lad to meet, in that particular pe-nod, was $2.110300300, in addition to the shrinkage in deposits of $905,000,000 which had ., already occurred, during “deflation”, in the 10J . . months from January 1,1920, to November 17, and the agricultural and business interests of the country, as a natural consequence of such -drastic and destructive pressure, had been dragged into the depths of the greatest depression Ulis country has ever seen.

The morning papers tell us that according to Government estimates about six million unemployed and hungry men and women are now walking the streets looking for work.

These may be ascribed as some results of the Federal Reserve Board’s “successful” policies.

On January 1, 1920, the total deposits of all national banks in the United States amounted to $17,866,000,000 At the time of the call, April 28,1921, the total deposits of all national banks were..'......... 14,851,000,000

This shows the terrific shrinkage in sixteen months of...... 3,015,000,000

On January 2, 1920, the total amount of “rediscounted and purchased paper” held by the twelve Federal Reserve Banks ‘

was .............. 2,805,000,000

On April 28, 1921, the total amount of bills discounted and purchased paper held by all the twelve Federal Reserve Banks was ......................... 2,167,000,000

These figures prove that in the “deflation” period from January 1, 1920, to April 28, 1921, the national banks of the United States were required to meet a withdrawal of deposits amounting to the huge sum of........ 3,015,000,000

The only means they had for meeting these huge withdrawals without drawing down their reserves, was, first, by selling their Liberty Bonds and other securities; second, by enforcing the payment and collection of loans; third, by borrowing money, practically the only source to look to being the Federal Reserve Banks.

SYSTEM SHOULD HAVE AIDED BORROWERS

It was the purpose and theory of the framers of the. Federal Reserve Act that in such a crisis as that through which we have passed the Reserve Banks should aid by extending the needed credits and prevent the slaughter of Liberty Bonds and other securities, and the wholesale calling ih of ^oans. But we find here that during this precise period, the twelve Federal Reserve Banks instead of increasing accommodation to enable banks to meet the enormous withdrawals of deposits without forcing borrowers to the wall, and without exacting the payment of loans, not only refused to grant the increased accommodations so obviously needed, but called in their outstanding loans and discounts to the extent of $638,000,000 net, between January 1, 1920, and April 28, 1921. These are cold historical facts which the Federal Reserve Board cannot deny or shake.

It should be noted that the withdrawals of deposits to which I have referred, of $3,015,000,000, applies only to the national banks. It ia quite probable that the reduction in the deposits of state banks and trust companies amount to as much again, making the total probable reduction of deposits in the period named about Six Billion Dollars; and while this huge reduction in deposits was straining the banks, the Federal Reserve System instead of easing the situation by at least refraining from calling in loans, actually contracted its advances to both national and state banks and trust companies from $2,805,000,000 in January, 1920, to $2,167,000,000 in April, 1921.

A NATIONAL SCANDAL

I am told that a member of Congress recently described the attitude of the Federal Reserve Board succinctly as follows:

“If you accuse the Board of having brought about this great debacle, the member* deny that they are in any way responsible, but if you congratulate the Board on having knocked the bottom out of the markets and oa having raised the gold ratio to a point that is in itself a national scandal, they one and all take off their hata, bow solemnly and say: *We thank you. We did it’ ”

In two speeches, one on April 15,1921, before the People’s Reconstruction League at Washington, and the other at Augusta, Ga., on July 14, before the Board of Commerce, I made public certain facts in regard to the methods and . policies of the Federal Reserve Board and the operations of the Federal Reserve Banks, which resulted in the prompt introduction in both Houses of Congress of resolutions calling for an investigation of the Federal Reserve Board.

The Board then got busy.. Oa the night of July 19, 1921, the Board gave to the press a six-hundred word statement in which, in expressing their tender sympathy for the people in the crushing losses which had been sustained, following the carrying out of the policies of "Deflation” they said:

"The Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Reserve bank* recognize the urgency for rendering all proper assistance to these important interests (cotton producers and dealers) during such abnormal times," and made the much belated announcement, that effective at once:

“The Federal Reserve banks, in addition to credits already extended, are able and stand ready to extend further credit for the purpose of harvesting and mar-hating the coming crop in whatever amount may legitimately be required.” -

Thereupon about July 31, rates on agricultural and commercial paper were reduced from 6 to 5} percent in four Federal Reserve Districts including Boston, New York, Philadelphia and San Francisco.

On July 29th, 1921, the President issued a statement from the White House regarding measures which had been taken for the relief of the financial and business situation in which he said:,

••Perhaps the most important development has been the action taken by the Federal Reserve banks in reduc-ing'discount rates. This action is calculated to relieve the stagnation of business.” * * ♦

■ THE SYSTEM RETREATS

July 26 had been set by the Joint Congressional Commission as the day for me to appear before them in connection with the criticisms which I had made against the Board's policies, in my Augusta, Ga., speech, but at the last moment and after .1 had arrived in Washington for the purpose of going before the Joint Committee, the hearing was adjourned for one week —as I am informed, at the urgent request of the Reserve Board. Commenting upon my invitation to attend and the adjournment for a week, the Manufacturers Record of August 11, 1921, said, editorially:

“Instantly, we may say, following news that there would be a Congressional investigation, the Board drew over its lien’s skin the mantle of a lamb.

“Ijt would not be able to answer Hr. Williams on the date originally set for the hearing, it averred, but it could a week later. ’

“This significant fact stands out: Mr. Williams, reinforced by public opinion from all over the United States, had Scored a tremendous victory before he even took the witness^ stand. His Augusta speech had forced the issue. A

“Rather than meet it, the Board hurriedly and drastically reversed itself ail along the line. It (a) saw that rediscount rates were cut; (b) abandoned the system of graduated rates; (c) recoded from drastic liquidation of farm products, urging the various Reserve banks to be liberal hereafter and not to force on the market commodities for which only ruinous prices could be got.”

I could go into detail indefinitely with instances and incidents involving tens and hundreds of millions of dollars, ail cumulative evidence of the truth of my accusations. It is not necessary, I think, to do this. I will content myself with the general statement that each of • the specific instances heretofore cited by me in support of the charge of discrimination, harmful in the end to those in whose favor it was exercised, as well as to those who suffered more immediately by having it directed against them, is a demonstrated, incontestible fact, and that the records show it. ,

It may be worth while, however, to include in this statement a brief summary of a few of the specific criticisms which I have made against the administration of the Federal Reserve System, the absolute correctness of which the official records prove. .

DISCRIMINATES AGAINST SMALL BANKS

The records establish, among others, the fol- • lowing facts:

1. While certain big banks were favored with huge loans at low interest rates, small country banks were charged extravagant and usurious rates—an instance being given of the exaction . of an average of 45 percent interest from a small country bank for a two-weeks loan of $112,000 in September, 1920, the interest charged on part of that loan by a Federal Reserve Bank having been actually as high 87} percent per annum.

2. 'Che Board, after seeing the hardships imposed by the so-called “progressive” interest rate, voted down my resolution to limit interest to 6 percent and also defeated another resolution which I offered to limit interest to 10 percent.

3. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York ■ made its biggest loans to institutions, some of whose executive officers were large borrowers, not only from their own banks, but from other banks which were also big borrowers of the Reserve System. I cited one case where the chief executive officer of a certain banking institution, a heavy debtor of the Reserve Bank, was borrowing for the benefit of himself and family, largely on speculative securities, .millions of

dollars, or more than his hank was lending to all of its national bank correspondents through-but the country. In my annual report to Con. gress I have recommended that banks l>e prohibited from lending to their own active officers.

4. The Reserve System loaned at times to big favored ba;As as much as $145,000,000 or more ' to one bank, while small hanks in other parts of the country were being denied accommodation. Small banks in various parts of the country were also required, contrary to the spirit and provisions of the Federal Reserve Aet, to put up a heavy margin as additional security for their discounted paper, the margin exacted amounting sometimes to from 50 to 200 percent. I directed attention to the case of one eonntry bank which claims to have l»evn compelled to suspend by its Reserve Bank. After paying exorbitant interest rates as long as it could, and after it had been stripped of its assets by the Reserve Bank’s demand for "excess security’*, the Imnk was forced to close and is now demanding that the Federal Reserve System pay its depositors in full. The official records also contain instances of two other national banks in another reserve district closed by the highhanded action, as I was reliably informed, of a certain Reserve Bank official.

LOAN TO SYSTEM DIRECTOR

5. Not only were the funds of the Federal Reserve System extensively loaned to banks whose executive officers and directors were big borrowers, but the recon Is show that one of the banks borrowing most heavily front its Reserve Bank was lending last autumn to a certain large borrower, who at that very time was also a director of the Federal Reserve Bank of Neto York, over fire million dollars (including a dummy loan of over $3.000,000)— mostly on highly speculative securities, while farmers and the "country” banks were even then begging for relief and enduring ruinous losses because of the credit restrictions of the Reserve System.

6. The official figures -how that in September, 1920, the Reserve System was actually lending to the 45 national banks in the three big cities of New York, Chicago and St. Louis about three hundred million dollars ($300,000,000) more than the System was lending at the same time to the 7,673 "country” banks in all the 48 States of the Union.

7. Ai the beginning of August, 1920, national banks in New York city which were borrowing heavily from the Federal Reserve Bank were leiuling for correspondents on so-called Wall Street Loans, largely for stock speculations, over $500,000,000 coaxed thither largely by ths high rates speculators would pay.

8. In addition to the money the New York national banks, members of the Reserve System, exclusive of the state banks and trust companies, were lending on call for their correspondents and customers they also had on deposit to the credit of their correspondent banks in all parts of the country approximately $900,000,000 more, although the total sum which the Naw York national banks were lending to all other banks throughout the country was considerably less thaw one-fourth of that sum.

9. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York in the summer of 1920 loaned at 6 percent or less to a member bank, which about the sama time loaned a customer, the head of a large manufacturing company, on his personal note, well-secured by the stock of his company, several hundred thousand dollars for which accommodation the member bank exacted in interest and commission the equivalent of about 200 percent per annum on the net amount loaned by it. The loans were paid within six months.

SYSTEM "deflates” LIBERTY BONDS

10. Contraction policies of the Reserve Board have been largely responsible, for the forced sales of Liberty Bonds and Vk-tory Notes and the ensuing depreciation in their market value. The shrinkage in value of these securities since the Board put into effect- its deflation policies is estimated at more than a thousand million dollars ($1.000,000,000) and has caused ruinous losses to many of the twenty million patriotic men. women and children who suhscri'oed to the bonds upon the understanding that they would be an acceptable collateral at banks for loans at low interest rates.

11. In November, 1915, a deliberate effort was made by certain members of the Federal ‘ Reserve Board to close up or remove the ■ Federal Reserve Banks in three or four important districts, but the execution of this scheme was prevented by the prompt action of President Wilson. Secretary McAdoo and the Department of Justice. -

12. About January 1, 1920, the New York Reserve Bank was lending an amount equal to

nearly six times its own capital— that is, six times the capital of the Reserve Bank of New York, to one member institution. This one borrower was thus getting nearly twice as much from the Reserve System as the aggregate amount of loans and discounts wliich the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas at that time was lending to all of its member banks in that great district, including Texas and parts of Louisiana, Okla-■ homa, New Mexico and Arizona.

The newspapers say that Governor Strong of the Reserve Bank of New York tried, before the Congressional Committee, to explain the loan of $130,000,000 to this institution on the ground • that the borrower held $112,000,000 Government | securities, but this excuse won’t do, for in my J letter to the Governor of the Federal Reserve * Board of January 28, 1920, I pointed out that , according to the bank's own sworn report, the total amount of Liberty Bonds and United States ■ Certificates owned by that institution was less than $26,000,000.

The Ioans to a bank's officers are sometimes made at reduced or “family” interest rates, carried indefinitely and not “called”, while other borrowers engaged in legitimate and productive business are required to make peremptory payments, regardless of the sacrifice and sometimes . the ruin which the compliance with the bank - demands may involve.

If the officers of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York granted these huge accommodations knowing the use to which certain, of : these institutions were putting the funds under • their command, their officers ice re culpable for aiding and abetting in a misuse of Federal Reserve money. If they made these enormous and exceptional loans without being informed ' as to the use which was being made of the money, and without an independent examination ; of the borrower, after the repeated warnings ■ which the Comptroller of the Currency had given to the Federal Reserve Board that such an examination ought to be made, they are ■ guilty of gross negligence. There is no escape from these conclusions.

SYSTEM BUN EXTRAVAGANTLY

The record? also show, I believe, most indisputably^ that the Federal Reserve Bank of New York has been and is being ran on an extravagant basis. The newspapers recently reported plans submitted by the New York

Reserve Bank for the construction of a new and sumptuous bank building, estimated to cost • ’ $16,000.000—probably more than the total cost . \ of the White House at Washington, the Treas- . ? j ury Building and a half a dozen of our State . ;

Capitols. As an indication of the extravagance . ’ with which the Federal Reserve Bank of New . , York is being run, I showed that the salaries <4 paid to its “officers” alone, exclusive of other : employes, were increased from $93,000 in 1916 '

to over $400,000 in 1920. The salary roll of the ■ New York Reserve Bank from 1919 to 1920 i actually increased $773,000, despite the "deflation" in business. ' .

It appears that the salaries paid by the New . ; York Reserve Bank to two dozen of its “officers” (including its high-priced "publicity” officers) -

aggregate about $400,000 or more than the ’

aggregate salaries paid by the Government to fifty-two United States Senators from all the States east of the Mississippi River. I have been told that a large majority of these "officers” . never got over $1,500 to $2,000 until they came to the Reserve Bank, and their salaries have been raised rapidly from 100 to 500 percent out j of public moneys. . >

To make a further comparison, the aggregate salaries now being paid to twelve, or say one- ..}

half of these two dozen officials, exceed the total ."'1

salaries of the President of the United States, ’ i the Vice-President of the United States, the . v Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, all ten . ' members of the Cabinet and seven United States . ■; Senators—all combined. '

- ’■ LEFT TO RUN ITSELF

Governor Strong, who appeared before the • Congressional Committee as an expositor of the policies followed by the Federal Reserve Board and the New York Bank during 1920 was : abroad nearly the whole of that fateful year.

He left in March or April, 1920, and did not i return until January, 1921. His statements as . to what was happening in his bank during that period must, therefore, he second-hand, as he ' could have had no personal knowledge of the practices followed. . ■

He promised the Congressional Committee nevertheless to "dispose of the charges finally ■ and conclusively” and I am content to have a ■' "i discerning public decide how far he has succeed- ' ed in reconciling the’clearly established facts ‘ with a sound, impartial and sagacious policy.

. In connection with the mismanagement of certain banking institutions, and the operations of their officers, which it became my duty as ' Comptroller of the Currency and member of the Federal Reserve Board to criticize and endeavor to correct, I beg leave to quote here the following extract from my recent address at Augusta, Ga.: .

I have no hesitation in telling yen that as far aa I am able to see, the decent and conservative banking element in New York City, as everywhere else, regards just as I do, and as I know yon do, the operations and methods of certain big speculators, all the more dangerous because of the prestige given them by their official positions, who have made playthings of the funds of other people, and the performances of accidents, and sens of somebody who have used the wealth and power intrusted to them to defy the moralities and decencies. When the stockholders understand how their confidence has been abused, there will be radical changes in the personnel of some of our big banking institutions.

‘ SERIOUS ERRORS AMO MISTAKES

The record has been made and I stand upon it My object in pointing out the serious errors and mistakes for which the present administration is, in my opinion, responsible has been to prevent their recurrence, for no one can believe more earnestly than I do in the value of the Federal Reserve System if it is managed in the interest of all of the people all the time. .

As to the past, the big and general fact ia _ J that the System failed to function as it should have done and could have done with proper ■ guidance at a critical time, and this failure— not of the System but of ite administration—I ’ ' believe, has caused fearful losses and great suffering. ?

When I was before the Joint Congressional : ' Committee a month ago, Representative Ogden ■ Mills of New York, a member of the Com- I mission, asked me about certain facts in con. ।

nection with one of my charges, but as soon aa ;

he found that a reply would incriminate certain f persons, he shouted: "I withdraw the question**. Someone in the audience called out: “What ’’ about the publicf” But the question was not , permitted to be answered. .»■ *

Let me say in conclusion that I challenge the ; Federal Reserve Board or any member of the H Board to deny specifically any one of these -charges and to support such denial I am pre- ’' pared to point to the proof of them. i ’

I also submitted to the Joint Congressional I Committee certain constructive suggestions for • legislation which I believe would be distinctly | helpful to the country if favorably acted on by ; -Congress. ‘

American Multi-Millionaires

TNFORMATION which has been long desired * by persons seeking to be informed on economic topics — especially the distribution of wealth among the American people — is at last available In a work recently published.

The authority who vouches for the reliability of the information is Henry H. Klein, who held the position of first deputy commissioner of ac-eounta of the city of New York. Mr. Klein has, by reason of his position and his occupation of public accountant, been in a position to acquire what may be considered as nearly first-hand information on the topic of which he treats as anyone who has brought his information to the attention of the public.

The foreword to "Dynastic America and Those Who Own It" runs:

"During the past quarter of a century, in fact since the Civile War, a power has grown up in this country that is greater than the government. It is the power that Abraham Lincoln warned against and that Theodore Roosevelt called the Invisible Government*. It

is the power of great Wealth, lodged in the hands at ; the Few, wielded for their benefit and against the inter- । e«t of ALL the people. ' ■ • ,

“Here for the first time is told who constitutes that | ' Great Power. Here is shown who those individuals axe i. and of what their wealth consists. Here are shown the ’ details of their possessions, and the fact that uii'nmive i ,, private fortunes are in the hands of the second, third, : *i fourth and fifth generations, who exerted little er no ” ’ effort to obtain them."

According to the analysis made by Mr. Klein America is ruled now by certain dynasties. These are dynasties of enormous wealth, which * are now seen to descend from father to son.

The analysis shows the following dynasties, in this country: The Dynasty of OiL The Steel Dynasty. The Coal Dynasty. The Beef Dynasty. The Copper Dynasty.

The Railroad Dynasty. The Dynasty of Ship*, The Dynasty of Tobacco, fte Dynasty of Rubbw. The Dynasty of Sugar.

The Dynasty of Gas, Electric Light and Traction. The Dynasty of Telephone and Teiegraph

The Dynasty of Gunpowder and Firearms.

‘’There are scores of lesser dynastic rulers/’ adds Mr. Klein, “whose wealth is estimated in the tens of millitas, but whose rulership is only subordinate to those of greater fortune.”

In the section on the estimated wealth of the richest families some interesting and important information is brought out for the first time. The estimates are made, not on individuals in families, but on the families. Some of them are:

$2.500.000,000—Rockefeller, John D.

$500,000,000 each—Astor, DuPont, Guggenheim. Vanderbilt.

$400,000,000 each—Harkness. .

$300,000,000 each—Hollon, Pratt, Weyerhauser. $200,000,000 each—Armour, Ford, Goelet, Morgan, Payne-Whitney, Rockefeller, (Wm.).

$150,000,000 each—Baker, Brady, Carneigie, Clark, Field, Frick, Gould, . Harriman, Hill, Swift, Tay

lor-Pyne.

In addition are shown 14 families owning SOO,000,000 each; 21 owning $75,000,000 each;

owning $50,000,000 each; and 361 owning $20,000,000 each. The multitude of small fry owning under$20,000,000each is not even shown, but a recent government report states that the total number of millionaires is now over 50,000.

A detailed schedule is given of each of the largest estates which have been inherited, and of the ramifications of the control of the steel, copper, oil and many other industries. It is made plain how the banks are controlled and by whom. Chapters appear showing the great fortunes engaged in foreign trade, how the politics of the country are controlled by those of excessive fortune,and giving statements by prominent men to the effect that private fortunes of such magnitude are an injury to the country.

Concerning the activities of the dynasties of wealth in connection with elections and political affairs the new book has this to say:

“TKf--moneyed interests began their-campaign tar President in 1920 with the Congressional election of 1918. They spent more than $2,000,000 to elect a Republican Congress in 1918, and planned to turn the country Republican in 1920. Among the largest contributors to the Congressional fund were the Rockefellers, Armours, DuPont, Deering of the Harvester Trust, Colt of the Rubber Trust, Schiff, Hanna and others of excessive fortune and large corporate connections.

"In anticipation of internal difficulties, they sought the nomination and election of General Leonard Wood.

The shocking campaign fund disclosures before the Na- _ tional Convention, defeated General Wood and Governor ^L

Lowden of Illinois for nomination. The disclosures be- 1

fore the Senate Committee showed that $1,773,000 were' spent to make General Wood the candidate, and that -this money was contributed by William Cooper Proctor of Proctor & Gamble, a director in the Rockefeller- Vj

National City Bank; Edward L. Doheny, the Cali- J

fornia Oil magnate; Ambrose Monell of the Niekel Trust; H. F. Sinclair, oil man; H.'M. Billesby, traction " : magnate; W. B. Thompson, copper magnate; Dan R. i Hanna, E. E. Smathers, A. A. Sprague, John D. Rocks- ' U feller, Jr., William Wrigley, Jr., C. D. Shafter, Wfl-ham Loeb, Jr., and others. Mr. Loeb, who is employed A' by the Guggenheims, contributed $225,000 for others. »

“The Lowden primary campaign fund was $414,000,

most of it contributed by himself. He married a daughter of the late George R. Pullman, who left $30,000,000 to the family.

“The Republicans acknowledged spending $4,000,000

to elect Harding President in 1920, and after election J announced a deficit of $1,300,000, making a total of $3,300,000. They started to collect a campaign fund, of fifteen million dollars, according to Governor Cox, 5 Democratic candidate* for President, and the chances are that at least half that sum was collected. The Dem- ' ■ ocrats acknowledged spending $1,300,000. The chief 1 contributors to the Republican fund wen those who contributed so liberally to the Republican primaries; // besides others, who previously contributed to local, atata / and national campaign funds.

"More than three million dollars were spent in stats ; campaigns in 1920, according to public records; and 'J

$800,000 to elect Congressmen, making a total of $10,- -400,000 for national, state and congressional candidates; ■’ ■ besides $3,000,000 spent in behalf of ambitious candidates who sought the nomination at President, a grand total of $13,400,000 for political purposes in 1920. ,

"It is evident that excessive private fortunes in the hands of the few, are used to elect ‘friendly’ candidates to public office. The conduct of public officials elected with the aid of these funds is open to grave suspicion. . Under the administration of Theodore Roosevelt as President; the trusts came to their fullest development and power. The prosecution of the Standard Oil Company, which resulted in a fine of $29,000,000 which was . never paid, was charged as ‘spite*. .

“The ‘protection* of private monopoly under President McKinley and President Taft was considered a return for campaign expenditures. The same situation is believed to have been true under President Wilson. Cyrus McCormick, head of the Harvester Trust, was ' sent to Russia as a member of the Root Commission at the time Harvester interests were threatened in Bus- ... sia. The appointment of Tenfield and Morgenthau to ambassadorship waa regarded aa return for campaign

? contributions. The brazen 'deportation’ of its own em-j" ploy6»by the Phelps-Dodge Company in Arizona, when the former went on strike, was explained by the friendly . relationship existing between those who own the com-peny and contributed heavily to the Presidential cam-f - paigu fund, and the Administration, though President Wilson caused an investigation and indictments were found.

“It is evident that excessive private fortunes menace republican institutions and debauch elections. Several . years ago a law was passed making it a crime for corporations to contribute to campaign funds. What dif-• ■ ference does it make whether corporations or those who

own them contribute? .

- “In exposing the activities of the Beef Trust in gov-'■ ernmental affairs, the report of the Federal Trade commission in 1918 (page 37) charges that the funds of the packers were used:

‘“To employ lobbyists and pay their unaudited expenses; to influence legislative bodies; to elect candi-• dates who would wink at violations and defeat those pledged to fair enforcement; to control tax officials and . thereby evade taxation; to secure modifications of governmental rules and regulations by devious and im' proper methods; to bias public opinion by the control of the editorial policy through advertising, loans and - subsidies and by the publication and distribution at large expense of false-and misleading statements.’

. “The National Security League, whose political ac' * tivitiea were condemned in a congressional committee

.. report in 1919, collected a fund of $1,000,000 from those who are among the largest contributors to political campaigns. John D. Rockefeller contributed $35,000.”

The last named organization was extremely active during the World War and during the < "red scare’’ for a year or two after the war, publishing the statement repeatedly, to allay popular distrust, that it was governed solely by “patriotic” motives. From reports that filtered in it was charged with responsibility for perse- . cution of harmless religionists who differed in . ~ belief from some of the clergy who become . members of the League. It is not forgotten that when some army officers came back from the .. . war they found a fund of over $250,000 assembled apparently by the efforts of friends in the New York financial district, and that this fond ’ had something to do with the organization of " the American Legion, an organization which . contains many very fine men, but which haa • been charged with no small amount of mob activity directed in the majority of instances . agairist persons for whom Big Business does not entertain friendly feelings.

This book of Mr. Klein’s is one of the few works that should find a place in the working . library of persons that wish to understand tho existing situation. •

Jfr. Klein’s Book

AS SOME readers of the article about Mr. > Klein’s book; "Dynastic America, and Who > Owns It,” may wish to know how to get it, the j book is sold at $2.00 by Henry H. Klein, 158 East 93d St., New York, N. Y. . .

Increasing Use of Radium Appliances

READERS of The Golden Age may be interested to know that the use of radium curative appliances described in our columns from time to time is on the increase, and, as a rule, the results obtained are excellent. -

Dr. Coolidge, of Los Angeles, who was physician to Judge Rutherford during his serious ilhiess,from pneumonia in the spring of 1919, and who used , the radioactive pads upon him with such good results at that time, is our authority for the statement that, in addition to the Radium Appliance Company of Cincinnati, heretofore mentioned in our columns, similar eompanie&Jiave opened headquarters at 1G26 Arch St., Philadelphia, Pa., and in the Mar-bridge Building, at Broadway and 34th Street, New York.

…