
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MAN'S DESTINY.

IMMORTALITY:

THE ARGUMENTS

FROM

NATURE AND SCRIPTURE,

BY REV. T. M. POST, D.D.,

OF ST. LOUIS MO.,

REVIEWED

BY GEORGE STORRS,

EDITOR OF BIBLE EXAMINER, NEW YORK.

NEW-YORK:
PUBLISHED AT 109 NASSAU STREET.
1856.

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PUBLISHER'S PREFACE.

Rev. T. M. Post, D.D., of *St. Louis, Mo.*, a well known and talented clergyman, was selected by certain ministers and others, in New England, to write a *Prize Essay* on Immortality, for which a gentleman in New York paid $150. It was intended to have it the best that could be said or written in favor of the immortality of all men, without regard to their moral character; that is, of their *inherent* immortality.

Dr. Post took up the subject under two heads of argument. First, "*The Argument from Nature;*" and second—"*The Argument from Scripture.*" The first of these appeared in *The New Englander* of February, and the other in May.

The Reviewer has followed these Arguments in their order. The Review of the Argument from Nature was written before that from Scripture appeared.

The Author of the Review wrote it by request, and with the expectation that it would be published with a reprint of the *Essay* in one volume; but before completing it, circumstances occurred which led the Reviewer to decline furnishing it for that purpose, and he concluded to let it be issued in its present form. This statement was deemed necessary to explain its appearance at all, and to account for some expressions to be found in it, as also for not referring to the pages in the Essay from which the extracts are taken.

Publisher.

New York, July, 1856.

IMMORTALITY:

REVIEW OF THE ARGUMENT FROM NATURE.

BY GEO. STORRS, EDITOR BIBLE EXAMINER, NEW YORK.

We would have been glad if our author had, at the outset, given us the argument from *nature* that man is a double entity, or a *dual being*. He speaks of "the soul" and its "material *companion*," thus giving us to understand that man is not *one*—or a unit—but *dual*. If nature teaches this, where is its utterance? Instead of any attempt to show from nature that man is dual he assumes it; and upon that assumption he builds an argument for "the immortality of the soul." Having begun with assumption we can look for nothing but endless "conjectures" as he proceeds.

We are glad to find him frankly dismissing "all arguments from the essence of the soul as impracticable and irrelevant." He says—"*Assuming* that it is of an essence not to be affected by forces and agents which slay the body," &c.

This is an assumption unsustained by any revelation of *nature*. Nature proclaims when the body is slain *the man* is dead, and gives us no hint that there is any conscious survivance of him. He admits that even supposing the soul to survive the body, "agencies *may* await it, somewhere in the endless future, before which it *may* at last fall." Hence he dismisses "also all arguments from the phenomena of the soul" [why not say *the mind*?] "at or near the death of the body." That is—At the death of *the man*: for nature uses no such language as our author employs; and we protest it is irrelevent till he shall show that nature reveals man as a

dual being. He admits that "mortal vision cannot follow" the soul when death "has conquered its material companion;" and hence, "our argument to God, as alone possessing the key to the mighty secret." This is, in fact, an admission that *nature* can give no knowledge about immortality for man, or "the soul." Why then shall we spend time in speculating from nature which can give no more help in favor of immortality than Baal himself? But he proceeds thus:—

"Our present argument supposes us to be standing *alone with nature,* and in her revelations of God we have to read our answers." He adds, "That answer she gives us in her discourse of a God of Reason, Justice and Love."

Taking this position, we are compelled to put aside the Scriptures and walk by the light of nature alone, in the argument from nature: we must consider ourselves without any positive knowledge that the moral or physical world ever were any better than now, or that they ever will be; or that any other world exists where men will be compensated for the evil and sufferings of this. We are not to allow a ray of light to shine on our path from revelation proper; otherwise we are not "standing alone with nature and her revelations of God."

Our author says, nature "discourses of a God of Reason, Justice and Love;" and adds, "a God is revealed to the soul in its own being and constitution." He then says—"The power that is to determine the question of the soul's continuance, is reasonable, just and benevolent. How will these attributes require him to determine it? In answering this question he says:—"First, the aptitude and capacities of the soul, and its culture and discipline to ends not attained in this life, foretoken, under the rule of a God of *reason,* a future in which these aptitudes and capacities shall find their object, and those ends shall be fully accomplished."

In reply, we ask, if nature in her *reasoning*, or actings, sustains such an idea? Does nature *now* testify that life must be continued till the greatest possible perfection is attained? Do not multitudes die before attaining even a tolerable maturity? yea, many before they have discovered at all,

their aptitudes and capacities, and without any culture or discipline? If nature thus deals with men now, what ground is there for *reasoning* that they might not be dealt with in the same manner in a future life? Indeed, what ground for an assumption, judging from nature alone, that there is or can be any future life at all? Look at nature in the man who is in a course of cultivation, and has arrived at that maturity which fits him for years of usefulness. He is cut down in the midst of usefulness and passes away into the silence of death. *Reason* is utterly bewildered by such an event for all that nature can help her. What right, what ground, has *reason* to conclude that if nature thus acts *now* she will ever alter her course in another life, or that another life could be expected when nature deprives the man of this at a period best suited for his usefulness? And how does *reason* know, from nature, but that the soul did attain all the ends designed for it, before death?

But, saith our author—"The moral inequalities of the present world are assurances, under the rule of *justice*, of a world where these shall be rectified, and where guilt escaping punishment here, shall find retribution."

In reply, we say, the God of this world *does now* suffer these inequalities and does not rectify them: and the present prevalence of triumphant *injustice* does not *in itself* bear witness to the *justice* of God or give ground to expect that a future administration will be introduced when the principles of government are to be directly the opposite to those now acted upon. If the *justice* of God allows men to go unpunished into another life, that same *justice* may allow them to go unpunished forever, for all nature can inform us to the contrary. Justice is justice in one life as well as in another; and if there are reasons in the divine mind—and how can our author tell but there may be—that, under the present administration, lets guilt escape punishment, how does nature reveal that it may not be so, if the sinner enters on another life? If *justice* is not impeached by letting it escape in this

world, what *reason* is there in nature to assure us it may not let it escape in another?

Besides, if "the soul in its own being and moral constitution reveals that of its Author"—and if "it feels the Father of its reason and conscience must be reasonable and just," then the conclusion is inevitable, from nature, that when a wicked and guilty man is dead—ceases from life—he shall remain dead, and not be revived into life. Natural reason and conscience agree that *justice* can ask no more than that the guilty shall by some means be placed where they shall no longer injure others; or, at the most, be incapacitated—as they would be when dead—from repeating their crimes. Such is the voice of reason and conscience, and both revolt at the idea of the infliction of protracted *pain*, in punishment, unless designed as corrective. Hence the argument for a future life, for the wicked and incorrigible, is adverse to such a life, if drawn from *reason* and *justice*, which always condemn following a man, however wicked, to any worse infliction than *death*.

"In like manner," if "a capacity and faculty for virtue and happiness, cultivated and disciplined to the very close of life," are not fully rewarded in the happiness of well doing in this life, how are they "prophetic" that "a God delighting in happiness and virtue" will give "another life" for such end, or any other ends? Does nature teach God will be more favorably disposed to the happiness of the virtuous in another life than in this? And if His justice can let them suffer now, and fail of attaining their full desires, how can nature show it may not always be so, supposing another life given?

Says our author, "A *benevolent* God would not quench a being at a time when beyond any former period it was fitted to attain higher moral excellence and bliss."

But, nature declares that its God does often thus "quench a being" by death, and cut him off from life "at a time when beyond any former period," he "was fitted" not

only "to attain higher moral excellence and bliss," but to be useful to an extent, among men, that he never was before. How then is nature to decide that that cutting off is not final and eternal? or, if it decides for another life, what ground has it to affirm that life immortal, more than this?

"We think the argument from nature," presented by our author for "the immortality of the good," is far from being "conclusive;" by no means, not "*perfectly*" so. And when he adds, "If there be a good, wise, just and true God on the throne of being, such souls shall never die," we think he has made a fearful hazard to stake such perfections on nature's revelations; for "the good" do *die*, nature affirms; and it gives us no evidence that they shall ever rise from the dead.

Our author next proceeds to the argument from nature for the immortality of the wicked; and here, at the outset, he states the "difficulties that start on nature at the question of Immortality, in view of that monstrous and dreadful anomaly, a spiritual intelligence implacably and irrevocably at war with God and virtue." We shall spend no time in remarks on that statement at present, but hope the reader will carefully examine those difficulties, and bear them in mind as we proceed.* He admits that "*Nature* shudders at" the idea of the immortality of the wicked, and yet says, "the analogies of nature will not permit us to reject the doctrine of the reality" of "a lost soul under the reign of a God of love, because of its painfulness and terror:" he adds—"The mystery of evil which we know to be here, equally oppresses and overwhelms us."

Here we think our author is entirely mistaken. This life is a *mixture*—to every individual—of good and evil; and in no case without termination. If it terminates in no other way it does by death. Even while life is protracted, in a large portion of cases, the experience of each individual is, that the enjoyment of life overbalances by far its infelicities; so that with all the sufferings incident to this life men love

* See Appendix, No. 1.

it and cleave to it as long as possible. The idea of unmixed, unmitigated, and interminable evil, has no analogy in nature. Such an idea can find nothing in nature that can "equally oppress and overwhelm us." Nature though not always able to account for the evils of this life, looks upon them as having a certain termination, by being removed, or the subject of them resting in death. Immortality in sin and unmitigated misery, has no such alleviating circumstances. "The mystery of" *such* "evil" has no analogy in nature; nor is it possible that any "mystery of evil which we know to be here," can "*equally* oppress and overwhelm us."

Our author says, "It is the purpose of this article to show that while admitting these difficulties, we cannot, even in the light of nature, build on them a valid presumption or argument against the truth of the doctrine embarrassed by them;" that is, against the doctrine of the endless conscious existence of the wicked in a state of unmitigated torture, where no means are ever to be employed to reform them, and where no hope is held out for any alleviation to their woe, even if a desire should ever arise in their minds to reform! If "the soul" is "constituted so that its moral sense instinctively and irresistibly loves and approves benevolence and hates and condemns malignity"—as our author said at the commencement of his argument—then nature's God must abhor and "loathe Himself" or abhor and loathe the doctrine of the unmitigated and remediless torture of the work of His hands; otherwise He is out of harmony with the moral sense He has created in man.

But our author goes on to say, the difficulties which appear against the doctrine of the endless being and sufferings of the wicked "do not entitle man to prejudge the question under discussion;" and adds, "they leave it open and uncommitted for revelation, and leave us in interpreting revelation, to the natural and obvious import of language." This last sentiment we concur in; but we do not concur in the idea that any revelation from the Author of our being can do vio-

lence to our "moral sense" with which He has endowed us. Any communication, professing to be a revelation from Him, doing this, cannot be received as truthful—it must be an imposition—and cannot but be rejected, or else it must admit that "the Father of its reason and conscience" is neither "reasonable" nor "just."

Our author says, "We do not attempt positively to refute these objections" [against the endless sufferings of the wicked] "by evidence from nature or to obviate them by the resolution of the difficulties presented, or to demonstrate the truth of the doctrine against which they are leveled."

It was well he made this announcement; otherwise some might have prejudged the case, and have supposed that he was about to give satisfaction, from nature, that all nature's horror at, and abhorrence of such unparalleled injustice, as the idea of eternal sufferings for the sins of this life, was only imaginary, and not real; or, that by this horror nature contradicted the "moral sense" its Author had endowed it with. He adds—

"We shall not contend that the argument from nature for the immortality of the wicked, is positive or demonstrative, or is of itself sufficient."

What then is to become of the millions that never had anything but nature to instruct them on this subject? Are they to dwell in eternal fire, unmitigated pain, and sink in remediless woe, of which the Author of their being never gave "sufficient" evidence, or "positive demonstration?"—These questions are not to be put aside by the "endless" *conjectures* upon which our author now enters. To pursue this subject then with imaginary "possibilities," or mere "*hypothetical*" conjectures, and tell us that they are "not capable of disproof," is, to us, to "*beat the air*." He tells us—the "difficulties"—he has to encounter in the establishing the idea of the perpetuation of sin and the eternal sufferings of the wicked,

"Most of them have their counterpart in the course of nature and

the actual administration of God, under which we find ourselves; and as they actually do cohere with the Divine Government in one case, so we cannot be competent to affirm they may not cohere with it in the other."

It is well our author put in the saving clause, "most of them." We claim the benefit of that clause, and affirm there is nothing in "nature and the actual administration of God, under which we find ourselves," that has any "counterpart" to the idea of unmitigated torture in a remediless state of sin and woe. This is the very point our author is bound to demonstrate, and which he must prove, or all his labor is lost; nor can he hide the nakedness of the field of nature, he is exploring for help, by saying his "hypothesis" of "possibilities" are "not capable of disproof." A man might, it seems to us, as well tell us that Moloch is possibly the God of nature; and conclude it is "not capable of disproof" because so many and so great sorrows and sufferings are manifest under the administration of the God of nature.

Our author would forestall us in subverting his argument on possibilities, by asking us to

"Let it be remembered that it is to be met, not by calling for positive proof where none is attempted."

Here then is a frank acknowledgment that he has no positive proof from nature on which to sustain an argument for the "endless existence of the wicked," and their unending torment and woe. His object in his possible hypothesis is,

"To clear the way for an unbiassed interpretation of the Scripture, and to show that nature at least does not prejudge this question against revelation."

If we understand this paragraph, it *assumes* that revelation *does* teach the endless being, or immortality and unmitigated sufferings of the wicked; and hence our author's desperate effort to harmonize the teaching of nature with what he regards as the teachings of revelation. In other words, it is a mighty effort, by possible "conjectures," to satisfy man's "moral sense" with the "interpretation of the Scrip-

ture" he designs to give in support of endless sin and suffering. It seems his own "moral sense" needs this kind of support to embolden him to construe the words of the Most High God—who has sworn by Himself that He has no pleasure in the *death* of the wicked—to mean that death does not truly mean *death*, but endless, irremediable sufferings and woe; or immortality in sin and misery. We cannot blame him for an attempt to cover himself by "conjectures" of possibilities, that shall seem to give some show of reason for his interpretation of Scripture. How else could he stand forth as the advocate of the doctrine he is to attempt to sustain from that volume which reveals *life*, future and eternal, as the *gift* of God; and not as an *infliction* upon men?—"The *wages* of sin is *death;* but the *gift* of God is *eternal life*, through Jesus Christ our Lord." Our author proceeds to say—

"Let us then approach this question in full view of the difficulties it presents, and see if in the light of Nature, they absolutely shut up the avenues of endless existence to the wicked; and if those difficulties would not, in many cases, as much preclude them from the present as from a future being; and as much from a life after death at all, as from one endlessly prolonged."

If we confine our inquiry to nature *alone*, it reveals no "life after death at all." Nature reveals a present life, and reveals it as a mixture of good and evil to each individual; not unmixed evil, in any case of mental development. It is not to be forgotten or overlooked that the future and endless life of the wicked, for which our author is endeavoring to put in a plea, is that of unmixed evil, suffering and woe; into which no ray of hope is ever to enter and no intermission of their anguish can ever take place. For such a state there is no analogy in nature, nor will our author pretend he can find any. Hence his resort to conjectures of possible reasons, all of which are a violation of our "moral sense" of justice, and irreconcilable with any known administration of God. While our author proceeds on his course, he speaks of "this

conscious *being within us.*" Who is the "*us?*" Does the body constitute "us?" If so, the supposed soul is no part of *us*, and must be something distinct from the *personality* called *man.* Certainly, this ideal soul is no part of "us;" and it yet remains to be shown that any such "being" exists "within us." Nature gives no evidence of it; hence "possibly' our author is making "conjectures" about a nonentity; it is "not capable of disproof" that he is not doing so. Our author goes on:

"With terror and awe then, we approach the gulf of night that yawns for the evil on the limit of this earthly life; and strain our gaze, far as we may, by nature's dim light, into its darkness; inquiring whether it may not be, that under the vestment of eternal night, there may beat the heart of eternal woe. We apply the ear to the infinite gloom to see whether we may not perchance catch, coming up through its mystery and silence, the accents of immortal sorrow."

Nature's God must be a most unfeeling and unsympathetic being to leave the children of men to strain their eyes and ears so dreadfully in unavailing conjectures about the future, if such a future is in store for men as our author is striving to find. How easy to have made it known, if true; and how would benevolence have prompted him to make it fully manifest so as to have made it highly probable, if not absolutely certain, unless He designed the eternal misery of a large portion of the work of His hands, and so kept them ignorant of their awful danger, as a fowler hides his snare, or a hunter conceals his trap. No wonder our author approaches his subject with "terror and awe;" but, alas, how manifest is it that his great anxiety is to "conjecture" something in the matter that shall give some ground of support for his theological conclusions from Scripture. But Nature is an incorrigible enemy to all his inquiries of her, and he plunges into "the gulf of night" in search of light, but finds himself in "infinite gloom," and in his zeal tries to conjecture "accents of immortal sorrow," and labors to find some

"probable" reason for believing it *may* be so. He says—

"Leaving out of view for the present the claims of justice, we look now simply at those of infinite wisdom, administering a universal and eternal system; and we inquire whether there may be, or rather whether *we are sure there may not be*, in the infinite and eternal economy of God, fitting and adequate uses demanding everlastingly the continued existence of even morally lost beings?"

That is, the eternal conscious existence, in hopeless and unmitigated torture, of some of the children of men. He proceeds to say—

"In the first place, could we not see, could we not even conjecture such uses, it by no means necessarily follows that we *should be entitled to affirm there are none.*"

But we are "entitled to affirm" that nature reveals none; and the "conjecture" of an existence of unmitigated and unending woe, where no revelation of such a state had previously been made known to the subject liable to it, would be an eternal blot on *wisdom*, to say nothing of honesty, justice, or benevolence; and some imaginary use to result from such a state, could never wipe out the stain; it would be more unchangeable than the "leopard's spots."

Our author must know that by far the largest portion of the race of Adam never heard of a liability to eternal sufferings; and he does not pretend to find, aside from Scripture, —which most men never had—"positive proof" of such an endless state of torment and woe as he is striving by "conjectures," to prepare our minds for. We cannot but regard "infinite wisdom" as highly impeached by the suggestion of such a "possible" state for millions to whom that wisdom never manifested their liability till they are hopelessly involved in it. If such be "infinite wisdom" it looks like the wisdom of the serpent, seeking to ruin by keeping its victims in the dark.

Nor is our author to satisfy our minds by talking about

"the administration of an empire whose measures are the universe and eternity."

As if that fact—of which *nature* does not inform us—is conclusive, that infinite wisdom may make vast multitudes endlessly and hopelessly miserable without ever having informed them of its design to do so. We have to do with nature in the government of *this world*, and not of some real or imaginary one somewhere else; of which nature gives us no information, for the obvious reason, it does not concern us; and with its laws and government we have nothing to do; such laws and government—if they exist—have no claims on us; nor are we to regulate our conduct or form our opinions with any regard to "possibilities" existing there.

"Our inability to discover uses" [for endless existence in "immortal sorrow"] "does not authorize us to deny that there are any," saith our author.

If there are any "uses" in it, we are authorized to deny that nature has revealed any such state or its uses; and as we are now only on "the argument from nature" we will not attempt "universal negatives," but wait and see if our author finds "clear positive revelation" to sustain the idea of "immortal sorrow."

"The existence of the wicked even here presents, in many of its aspects, a mystery as difficult of complete solution as their existence hereafter; and their existence beyond the grave at all, a mystery as difficult as an existence forever," adds our author.

The existence of the wicked here, in a state of trial and discipline, where reformation may better their condition, and where their counsel and aid, in many things, often is a benefit to the community, is not "a mystery as difficult of complete solution as their existence" in a state of eternal and hopeless torment; where there is no design of their reformation, and where their counsel and work is eternally against all good. As to "their existence beyond the grave at all," nature makes no such revelation; and in the argument from nature we admit of no such existence; death eternally closes their existence, so far as nature is our teacher.

"Manifestly until we know fully the reason why God permits the existence of moral evil and of wicked men now, we are not competent to affirm that they will not exist eternally," saith our author.

Because we cannot fully solve the mystery of the present existence of the wicked, in a state where reformation is possible, and where, at all events, death will close the career of their wickedness, must we believe they may exist eternally where reformation is impossible or useless, and where death is never to put an end to their wickedness? But, our author says, because of our ignorance of the uses of the existence of the wicked now, all the objections against their endless existence, might be

"summarily disposed of" * * * "with the question of the Patriarch of Uz, asked ages ago but never answered, 'Why do the wicked live?' We might then leave all presumptions from nature against their endless existence, to wait an answer to this interrogatory."

We might answer all "possible conjectures" about the "uses of the endless existence of the wicked" with the prayer of the King of Israel and type of Messiah, offered to God "ages ago," and most certainly to be "answered"—"*Oh let the wickedness of the wicked* COME TO AN END." "We might then leave all presumptions from nature"—if there be any—*for* the "endless existence of the wicked;" together with all those possible conjectures of the "uses" of their wickedness *not* coming to an *end*, to sink into their merited oblivion.

Why should we now be called upon to follow our author through his "countless ways" of attempting to show that the "uses" of the wicked and their wickedness may prevent them and it from ever having an "*end*"? To argue from the present state, in which each individual—righteous or wicked—has a mixture of good and evil, of joy and pain; and where their condition may be improved, or life end, to a state where unmixed evil and sorrow shall eternally continue and increase, is to argue, it seems to us, without any analogy, and

without any tendency to produce conviction on the thoughtful mind. Our author proceeds:

"Judging from the methods God has taken to instruct human minds in this world, we have reason to believe that created mind *must* be taught—can only be taught effectually—that knowledge of the Creator requisite as a power of moral government, *by experience* and *practical illustration.* It is upon this principle, and with this mode of education flowing from it, that the government of *this world* is conducted. And we have no reason, inferring from the nature of mind, to doubt it will be the same in *all worlds;* that it may be the same with new orders and new stages of being which shall emerge in the light of a million of æons hence, just as much as in this mortal life, and beneath these heavens."

If this reason is correct, then sin and wickedness are just as necessary and essential as holiness and virtue. Nor is that all: the first created mind could not possibly "be taught" at all; for it is not to be supposed that that mind had a "practical illustration" and "experience" of the "power of moral government" over wicked beings which had no existence; unless the Creator himself be supposed to be that wicked being; which is a blasphemy not to be admitted.

Furthermore, the beings inhabiting "*this world*" have had no "*practical illustration* and *experience*" of unmixed sin and suffering, and where reformation was unavailing and impossible. If the same systen then is to be acted upon "*in all worlds,*" there will be no such state as that of "immortal sorrow;" and there may be suffering and sorrow for the saints themselves, as they do suffer much in "*this world;*" besides, "life" has always been "mortal beneath these heavens;" and if "government" is to be the same in "*all worlds*', life may be, nay *must* be mortal there, to both saints and sinners, so far as our author's argument proves anything. But we stand corrected: he does not design to give "*positive proof*" of his "hypothesis;" and it is well he did not design to do it; for had he succeeded in producing

such proof, all distinction between good and evil would have been abolished forever.

"What ground," asks our author, "have we for assuming that in the infinite march of being there will not always be beginners; always in the universe, a fresh childhood, as well as the rich perfection of maturer culture and experience in the older born sons of God? What reason have we to suppose that the creative energy is not, like the love of God, infinite? Who shall dare prescribe limits to either, or to the number of God's children? Why, then, may we assume that the present order of means requisite to form, guard and perfect virtue in created minds—requisite from the very essential nature of mind itself—to have no place in the coming cycle of being?"

Here our author stumbles at the outset. The question is not whether new-born intelligences will be eternally coming into existence? that may be granted: nor is it, whether "the present order of means" is "to have no place in the" training of those "new born" ones? but whether an entirely new and unheard of system of government for the training of them is to be introduced? viz: the use of a system of torment, woe, and unmitigated sufferings, and hopeless anguish, where reformation is both unavailing and impossible? Is God to train these "new born" ones produced by His creative power by such a system? Has *such* been the "requisite" method of teaching in "*this world?*" And if the system of training for these supposed new born ones, is to be like that of "this world," we ask, if the exhibition of evil and wickedness must not arise from themselves, and not from *seeing* another race of beings, not of themselves, constantly before their eyes, given over to "immortal sorrow?" The fact is, there is no analogy in the system of the government of this world and that *conjectured* by our author: they are as dissimilar as light and darkness: as unlike as justice and revenge. There is no concord, agreement, or likeness between them, that we can discover.

The idea is expressed by our author, that the wicked may be kept in "immortal sorrow," because there may be a

"necessity of experimental lessons and historic illustration" * * * "to the ever rising orders of being; and possibly, also, to those of older date, for the perfection and eternal security of their virtue."

"*Possibly*" those "older" beings are so unbelieving that *history* is wholly unavailing to convince them of the evil of rebellion; and that they have so little confidence in God's word, that they would have no "security of their virtue" if their ears could not hear "the accents of immortal sorrow," and their eyes see the *goblins* of Almighty wrath writhing in eternal pain! and possibly they would need all this for their "*perfection*"! Truly, such must be hard to *perfect!* and we cannot wonder at it, considering in what school our author thinks "possibly" they may be taught. We think it much more probable they would learn rebellion than "virtue" under such teaching. No such teaching has the God of nature allowed in the school of "this world;" and therefore—on our author's own assumption of a corresponding administration in other worlds—no such teaching is to find place elsewhere. He goes on—

"The same difficulty in the existence of souls morally lost, has to be met this instant, that has to be met through the infinite hereafter."

Does our author know that any soul is morally and hopelessly lost while it exists here? How does he know but that the moment of the wicked man's death is the point where he was hopelessly lost in moral pollution? And how does he know that that fact, known only to the Divine mind, was not the true reason why his death occurred at that very point?

"The present moment is a part of eternity, and is subject to its logic and its laws; and what that logic and those laws permit here, they may permit forever," saith our author.

If so, then the sinner—if his living existence is to be end-

lessly continued—may expect God will give him a great many blessings and comforts in hell: yea, a much larger share of pleasure than pain; for the laws of this life did not forbid it; and what "those laws permit here, they may permit forever," we are told; and as a matter of *experience*, the sinner had a large share of enjoyment here; hence he may expect it hereafter: and then what becomes of the "possibility" of eternal and unmitigated pain? It has vanished "like the baseless fabric of a vision."

Our author goes on thus—"The wicked *may* therefore endure, to exhibit the eternal discomfiture and the hopeless impotency of sin. For aught we know, certainly, it *may be requisite* they should do so. And the greater and mightier and more cunning and desperate, may be the malignant power baffled and coerced into the service of Divine wisdom, the more strikingly and impressively will this lesson be exhibited; and the more will God's glory of strength and knowledge and goodness shine forth to the educating and strengthening of virtue in the elder or future orders of the saved."

Why should such an exhibition of "Divine wisdom," &c., not have been made to the human race at the outset? Why not have given them a manifestation of the awful sufferings of some previous race of sinners, and so kept our "new born" race back from sin? or were there no sinners in all eternity past? If not, how did "new born" beings ever maintain holiness in that infinite duration behind us? How happens it that sin and sufferings were *not necessary* to keep "new born" beings, then, in the paths of virtue and obedidience? It is singular, truly, that sin and giant sinners, with their giant torments, and the giant "coercion" of them "into the service of Divine wisdom," should be reserved for the race of Adam: and this race should be the manufacturing establishment to produce giant sinners to keep *after* "*born*" being in the ways of virtue, and to "perfect elder" ones.

But it so happens, after all, that in "the present part of eternity," which is "subject to" the "logic and laws" of

"the infinite hereafter," that no giant sinners are suffered to live long; and all of them meet death, or are cut off by violence, sooner or later; so that if the "Divine administration now" is evidence of what it will be "through the infinite hereafter," we need no stronger proof that "*all the wicked will God destroy;*" and that "the wickedness of the wicked" shall "*come to an end.*"

Our author saith—"To breed the requisite horror and fear of sin, it *may* be, that nothing else will suffice, than the spectacle of its final, complete, and everlasting perdition—nothing less than the frightful examplar of an immortal soul in immortal ruin." "One example," he says, "of a being in the terrible maturity of evil, may be equivalent to innumerable ones of lesser date! so that in truth, benevolence may require its continuance, instead of multiplied cases of more recent fall from virtue."

Unfortunately for our author, the laws of *this* "part of eternity"—or, "the present moment"—and the "Divine administration" under them, with "its logic," are all adverse to his "*may* be" in the "infinite hereafter." The mightiest sinners under the present administration sooner or later *die.* Must the poor race of Adam—though without a precedent—furnish "examples" of endless, or "immortal sorrows" for all other created beings, past and future? while they, themselves, are denied a solitary "example" of "an immortal soul in immortal ruin"—i. e. in "immortal" torments—for their own benefit? no such "example" ever having been given them! If such examples are so potent, what becomes of that "benevolence" that has so constantly, for six thousand years, withheld the "*one* example" that is so effectually to stimulate to virtue and keep back from sin? "Benevolence" is profaned by the thought; and a voice comes up on the ear, saying—"If they hear not the teachings now granted them, neither would they be persuaded though one rose from the dead." Any pretence that such an "example"—as our author supposes—would be effectual in leading men to virtue, or preserving them therein is without even the sem-

blace of a "may be." Base and servile indeed must be that mind that could be drawn to virtue, or be made to continue therein by such a horrible exhibition of wrath on a powerless enemy. Then to suppose, infinite and Divine wisdom could find no other way to secure obedience and virtue, in the souls He had made, than to exercise His almighty power in holding in eternal being and torment a worm of the dust —such is man—is an impeachment of His character which we dare not allow even to come within the range of a "*may* be." What! so abhor sin as to eternally perpetuate it! and never let it "*come to an end!*" The thought is not admissible; and nature has no such voice relating to *individuals.*

Furthermore, the case supposed as "possible," is utterly at variance with any laws in *this* "part of eternity," and in the nature of mind, "*Virtue*"—whatever might be said of *obedience*—must be produced, in created beings, not by the exhibition of evil in so horrible a light as to make it *disgusting.* No: evil must have *charms*, or there can be no temptation in it, nor any virtue in avoiding it. "The *tree*" must be "good for food," or "pleasant to the eye," or "desiable to make one wise," else it is no trial nor virtue to avoid it. The "possible" exhibition, contemplated by our author, suppose evil and sin to be presented in such a horrible manner, and with such awful aspects, with giant tortures, as shall make it in no possible way desirable to share in it. What *virtue* then can there be in avoiding it? Just none at all: and the "*hypothesis*" is stamped with all the characteristics of a manifest "*absurdity.*"

Another "possibility" of our author runs as follows—

"It may be that holiness could wear its proper charm of beauty and bliss, only in contrast with its hideous antithesis. Such a self-exhibition of sin being needful here and now who shall say it may not be so forever?"

Thus "sin is needful!" as necessary as the exhibition of

"holiness" in "its *proper* charm of beauty!" Had it not been for some rebel against the Divine government what an uncharming thing holiness must have been! But we forbear: it was only a "conjecture" of a "possibility" by our author: yet such an exhibition of "sin" if "needful here and now" has never been made in *this* "part of eternity" as that our author contemplates "through the infinite hereafter." No, nothing that has any analogy to it, as we have before shown.

Our author thus proceeds:—"Now apart from all positive affirmance of the perpetuity of the present uses of the wicked, it is clear until one is prepared to *prove a negative* of this,—a universal and eternal negative,—he is not warranted from nature in assuming the annihilation of the wicked; certainly not, in dogmatising on this subject, to the contradiction or wresting of the declarations of Revelation."

No *such* wicked exist on earth, as our author conjectures for the "infinite hereafter:" nor can he show that there is, or can be any "present uses" for *such* wicked, unless he can show that to be true which nature and experience contradict; and surely such an attempt would look very much like an attempt "to *prove a universal*," if not an "eternal *negative*." The fact is, no such exhibition of sin and sinners, of sorrow and torment, of hopelessness and despair, of unmixed evil and destitution of all goodness, and an eternal barrier to reconciliation, as our author's hypothesis contemplate, has ever been made. Nature has no voice to sustain him in such a position; and when we come to "Revelation" we shall see who *wrests* and *contradicts* its *declarations*, the advocates of the immortality of the wicked or those who believe "the wickedness of the wicked" shall "*come to an end*;" and that "*all* the wicked will God destroy;" because "the *soul* that sinneth *it shall die*." We can afford to wait till our author gets to "Revelation" on this part of the subject. But we are "warranted from nature" to believe—not to "assume"—"the annihilation of the wicked:" nature teaches no other

end for them; and we shall yet see, perhaps, that "Revelation" and nature are in harmony, as they must be, if both proceed from an unmixed fountain of wisdom and truth.

Saith our author—"Amid the uses of the wicked here, one, eminently, is to prove, brace, nerve, and animate virtue. May it not *possibly* be so hereafter?"

This idea of "the *uses* of the wicked" seems to haunt our author. According to his theology the wicked seem—of the two classes—to be more *useful*, and to answer better "uses," than the righteous. It would appear as if the virtuous could hardly be proved, braced, nerved, and animated to virtue, if it were not for the useful wicked. Really, we would like to know if our author is a post-millenarian? one who believes the coming of Christ, the second time, is a thousand years *after* "all shall know the Lord from the least to the greatest." If so, and his theory of "the uses of the wicked here" is true, we may expect to see a very inferior race of Christians in the Millennium to those we have now, as they will have none of the *useful* wicked to "prove, brace, nerve, and animate virtue." Alas! that the so called "happy day," when "the millennium shall be ushered in," and which we have heard so highly extolled for the piety and consecration to God then to be manifested, is likely to vanish away into a very inferior race of Christians, because they have not "the uses of the wicked" we have now. Behold and see your millennium, ye post-millenarians, stript of a most important element of its happiness and virtue: there are no wicked there! But *we* are of those who have no faith in these imaginary *uses* of the wicked: "*one sinner destroyeth much good*," was a sentiment recorded three thousand years ago in a Book which our author will look into before he has done with his argument for "immortal sorrow" and "the immortality of the wicked." Till we meet him in that Book we leave our quotation as an offset to his assumption of "the *uses* of the wicked" so often repeated.

Saith our author—"No language could express God's estimate of sin, like visible disease and pain, and the thousand forms of individual death, with occasional more vast and awful expressions of his displeasure in deluge, pestilence and earthquake. The terrors of his abhorrence of sin must, in this life, look out at times on man from a burning Sodom or Jerusalem, or a deluged world, in order to quicken earth's moral consciousness by an outflashing of his own."

There is no likeness or resemblance, in any of these cases with the incessant, unmitigated, hopeless, and eternal pain and anguish, that our author is striving to show may possibly exist "in the infinite hereafter." If pain and sorrow were admitted to exist there, there is no reason in nature why it should exist in the horrible and hopeless form our author anticipates, unless the "elder saints are harder to govern there than here, or the "new born beings"—if such there should be—are more stupid and intractable than is reasonable to suppose infinite wisdom would hereafter create, seeing Adam's race have done no better.

In the worst cases, "in this life," our author has produced as his analogies, *death* has terminated the pain and sorrows of the visited sinners, so far as nature can teach us. Why then, if nature and analogy are to guide us, conclude such will not be the result hereafter, supposing the wicked to enter there? Nor even there would nature teach us that they should die again till they had another trial, to see if they might not do better in their new state. What reason then has our author to make the following inquiries?—

"Are we prepared to affirm that Divine displeasure may not find it requisite to write its definition in an everlasting ruin?—that the wrath that here burns below Jerusalem and Sodom, below the foundation of the mountains and the deep, may not burn to the depths of an eternal hell? If such a self-utterance of God be necessary here, can we prove that it *may* not be so hereafter? and if so during one period of the hereafter, may it not be so forever? When can the universe live without a seen and felt God? When can its sentiment of justice stand, except in this vision and feeling? And how shall God be felt and seen, otherwise than as he is thus practically reflected and defined?"

Our author has fallen into the "*infinite gloom*" where he went to "apply the ear"—at the commencement of his argument—to see if he could not hear "the accents of immortal sorrow." The sentiments now uttered have covered, in fact, the eternity past as well as the future. Were there no "new born beings" in the past infinite? If so, did they find beings in an "eternal hell," that they could have a *practical* exhibition of God's "justice?" "*When* can the universe *live* without a seen and felt God?" asks our author. If this question has any application to the question before us, it amounts to this—"When can the universe live without an eternal hell of immortal sorrow, sin and torment?" So that such a hell must have been the abode of some beings from the first moment of the days of the "universe," or it could not "live." But to Adam's race of "new born beings," it seems, Divine wisdom did not see fit to give the "practical and awful expressions of his displeasure," that "eternal hell" of "immortal sorrow;" but left the poor creatures to furnish multitudes more victims for that *useful* state! "If such a self-utterance of God be necessary hereafter," to "new born beings," was it not equally necessary to the new born beings of Adam's line? And if an "eternal hell" of "immortal sorrow" did exist, does it not seem as if Divine wisdom and benevolence would have given *this* "new born" race a practical exhibition of the sorrows and woes of sin, by uncapping that hell to sight, seeing it "*may* be" so effectual hereafter to other "new born beings?" Not to do so would seem to indicate that infinite wisdom was overpowered by the "*uses* of the wicked," so that the number of them should be mightily increased! Alas, for a theory that must plunge into such "infinite gloom" to "conjecture" "possibilities" to reconcile us to the idea of eternal pain and "immortal sorrow!" Our author adds—

"Other modes there *may* be, but if so, they are beyond the present scope of our experience and our faculties. It is for the objector

to prove them before he assumes a change of God's present economy."

This is truly cool—almost refreshing. After all, the multitude of "conjectures" of "possibilities"—our author has labored to impress on our mind—"*may* be" all *fancy*, and without any foundation. And for our comfort we are allowed "to prove," if we can, "a change of God's present economy!" Now, that's just the thing we do not wish to prove; for under the present economy of God sin and suffering end in *death*, and nature reveals nothing beyond.—Under the present economy, the "orthodox" say, as long as there is *life* "the *vilest* sinner may return:" so that sin and suffering may be wiped away, and the sinner become holy and happy. If the wicked go into the "infinite hereafter," as conscious beings, it is for our author "to prove, before" he "assumes, a change of God's present economy:" which if he cannot do he is quite as likely to establish the conversion of sinners in "the infinite hereafter," as that their case is one of "immortal sorrow." Under "God's present economy" neither sin or suffering are perpetual; and the general character of God's dealings—while life lasts—is goodness to the evil and unthankful. "So it *may* be hereafter," *if* the wicked "live beyond the grave;" the evidence for which, if found at all, is not found in *nature*.

Our author adds—"Looking at all these aspects of the case, are we ready to affirm that Divine wisdom requires the annihilation of the wicked? Yea, that it may not eternally forbid it? If it forbids it now, who shall travel down the infinite hereafter, and fix the date when it may let the guilty drop into eternal nothing?"

"Divine wisdom" does *not* "forbid *now*"—under the "present economy"—"the annihilation of the wicked;" as the cases of Sodom and the old world—our author has referred to—abundantly prove: for they were annihilated, so far as nature's testimony can be relied on: and if "Divine wisdom required" their annihilation, "who shall travel down the infinite hereafter, and fix the" sufferings and woe of the

wicked there in "immortal sorrow?" or, affirm "the guilty' shall *not* "drop into eternal nothing?" Very true, our author does not do that! he affirms nothing! but only deals in insinuations and conjectures! But we wait patiently to see if he pursues the same course in his appeals to "Revelation."

Our author proceeds with his argument from nature as follows:

"But even if the above mentioned uses" [those he had dwelt on] "did not require Divine wisdom to perpetuate the existence of the morally lost, yet natural reason might hesitate whether *Divine justice* would not still keep the ruined and guilty soul from annihilation; at least whether it does not leave the question fairly open, and to be determined by the natural and obvious sense of language in Revelation."

We are perfectly willing, and anxious, to have the question "determined by the natural and obvious sense of language in Revelation;" and we sincerely hope our author will not forget this implied *pledge* to adhere to the natural and obvious sense of language when we come to Revelation.

He goes on to inquire—"Are we perfectly sure that the satisfaction to justice, which the wicked actually owe in the present time every moment, and which may be due through each moment of eternal duration, will not forever forbid the dismissal of the debtors to annihilation?"

Our author's inquiry implies that possibly *infinite wisdom* can never find out a way whereby to meet the claims of Divine *justice*. For, if the sinner keeps eternally ahead of justice, by adding to his *debt*, must not justice be eternally seeking satisfaction in vain? Where then is *wisdom*, that it can devise no means to help *justice* to satisfaction? Has the sinner so improved in this short life, that when he enters the next, he may practice so wisely, that while *justice* is looking up the *old* debt and seeking payment, he manages to run still deeper in debt, so that justice is outrun in the race? Truly, if the sinner has become such an adept, in this imperfect state, and has escaped *justice* in this world, he

is not likely to be overtaken by it in the next, if his life is to extend into that. Our author asks—

"Is it not true that each new moment of sin puts in its claim anew on Divine justice, for new retribution?"

That may be while men are under law claiming obedience. But how is it, when a murderer is led forth to execution, suppose he murder a dozen on the way to the gallows; does the law take cognizance of those murders? Not at all.—Who is accountable for those additional murders? The officer of justice, if any body. Why so? Because it was his business to see that the criminal was secured so that he could harm no one. So "*natural* reason" would affirm; and all civilization would cry out against the officer of justice for neglect of duty if he allowed the criminal to add another murder to his previous; and still more if he were to add to his neglect the offence of contriving to make the murderer die *thirteen* deaths, or *twelve* times harder ones for the additional murders. No; the "hypothesis" of our respected author, on this topic, is at variance with justice, if "natural reason" is to decide. When punishment *begins*—if it is not designed for reformation—the claims of law for obedience *end*. It is the makers and executive officers of the law who are to see that the criminal has no further power or opportunity to commit crime: not to do this is an act of *injustice* both to the criminal and to community. We believe this view is a self-evident one; and we need not to press it further, and might dismiss all that follows in our author's argument from justice. It will be expected, however, that we should not dismiss it so summarily.

He says—"To the question, Shall the atrocious, and cruel," &c., "or any of the giant offenders of this life, go out of this world unwhipped of justice, to find no retribution beyond? 'No,' you reply. 'No, if there be a righteous God, He will, for awhile at least, keep back the power of the grave, until justice has had its atonement."

The "reply," our author gives to his question, *nature* can never discover; because that can neither "keep back the

power of the grave" nor look beyond it. Besides, "natural reason" is satisfied when a wicked man is dead, and regards that as the end of the claims of justice; and unless a spirit of revenge takes the place of reason, it would never think of following even a "giant offender" into another state—beyond death—to inflict *pain*. At any rate, we do not know from nature that any such thing will occur: nature seems satisfied when an enemy is dead, and wishes not his revival into life, unless he could be brought to repentance and reformation.

Our author goes on to inquire—"But if in his impenitent state the punished offender is adding perpetually to his sin, does not each new moment of that period of penal woe, claim the next moment following, also as due to retribution? And," he adds, "this must be the case immortally with a soul immortally sinning."

Let us see if we can look through our author's point in this paragraph. Does he, or does he not, believe that the wages of sin—committed in this life—is *immortal woe?* If so, how can the position be assumed, or maintained, that *possibly* that penalty will be inflicted, because the sinner, while undergoing this "penal woe"—this *eternal* woe—will be "adding to his sin"? Why seek such a refuge for the horrible idea of eternal woe? Is our natural sense of justice shocked at the infliction of such woe, for the sins of *this* life? It would seem so; and hence our author endeavors to find some plausible "hypothesis" to quiet this feeling of nature. But how does he do it? By supposing the sinner adding to his sin while undergoing his punishment for the sins of this life. Yet he has informed us of no law the sinner is then under claiming *obedience;* and all nature saith, "Where there is no law there is no transgression." Hence our author's "possible" case resolves itself into a simple "*absurdity*." But if he does not believe that the sins of this life earn the *wages* of eternal woe, then, if eternal suffering is inflicted, all nature must cry out against it as *unjust*. Besides, if the sinner in a future state is where he can

commit sin, he must be under some law which it is *possible* for him to obey. How then can our author tell but that instead of the "soul immortally sinning" he may, when under the discipline of that state, conclude to be evermore obedient? Specially, since our author thinks it possible that the horrible torture of that state may keep "new born beings" from sinning and help to "*perfect elder*" ones. Hence "possibly" it may lead those enduring the "penal woe" to conclude best to stop sinning; then, it seems, our author's "natural reason" would judge it might be very doubtful if it would accord with "Divine *justice*" to continue their "sorrows immortally."

Our author says—"It is clear that the unrepenting, defiant and persisting sinner cannot claim, as a matter of justice, that God whom he ever defies or disobeys, should deliver him by annihilation from the natural consequences of his obduracy in crime. Manifestly he could not demand it as his right."

If God had informed the individual that "the wages of sin is *death*," and "the soul that sinneth *it shall die*," Justice would cease to be "justice" if instead of *death*, it turned aside to inflict an endless *life in torment*. As to the sinner's "right" to "demand annihilation;" it *is* the "right" of the worst criminal to "demand" that no *worse* punishment shall be inflicted upon him than what the law clearly specifies: and it is an act of injustice to treat any criminal otherwise. So far as "nature" is concerned in this "argument," if a man is convicted of crime, the penalty of which is *death*, "natural reason" would say, to substitute unnumbered years of torture, over a slow fire, would be an act of insufferable *injustice;* and the criminal would have a "right" to "demand" that he should not be dealt with in this manner.

"To speak of an everlasting *not-being* as an everlasting punishment, is in our view a misnomer," saith our author

If our author had only substituted *death* for "*not being*," he would have had no occasion for his "misnomer." An

everlasting *death*, implies that the subject was once *alive*, hence, to be everlastingly deprived of life, and eternally to remain in *death is* an "everlasting punishment" if it is an infliction of law against a transgressor.

Our author goes on—"Such a doom may be a calamity, a loss most dreadful to our instinctive love of existence; but to term it an atonement to justice, is false to the proper idea of that word."

We do not admire the term "atonement," in this connection; but if our author chooses to use it, he will find it equally effectual against endless woe. Does "immortal sorrow" make "an atonement to justice?" If the atonement is made the sorrow must cease, unless justice claims more than its "right"—which would be injustice. But if the sorrow is to be unending, or eternal, then "an atonement to justice" is *never* made, and never can be, unless the *end of eternal* can be reached. Justice eternally seeking atonement—satisfaction—but pursues its object in vain—it never reaches the point of satisfaction. Our author has a "misnomer" for "everlasting punishment" when he calls it "immortal sorrow" or "woe." Justice eternally lags behind its claim, and "never, *no never*" reaches satisfaction!

Our author admits, that "everlasting *not-being*"—DEATH—would be "a loss most dreadful to our instinctive love of existence."

Just so we may suppose our CREATOR regards it; and hence *death* is the most terrific punishment that He could threaten—it is the "*capital* punishment;" and when it is without a revocation it is an "everlasting punishment." It is the only "capital" one that "natural reason" can acquiesce in as just for the most "giant" criminal. But our author says—

"It is evident that in this present world, satisfaction of justice to God's government implies continuance of existence beyond the grave. The human mind instinctively feels this when some enormous criminal goes out of this life unpunished."

We would say—"it is evident," if "justice" really seeks "satisfaction," a *living* "existence beyond the grave" should

be altogether *denied* the transgressor; then sinning would be cut short, so far as the criminal is concerned. But if he is to have a living existence in another state—according to our author's hypothesis—sinning is to go on eternally, and we can have no assurance that justice will be meted out to the sinner, or that justice will any more find "satisfaction beyond the grave" than it did "in this present world:" the same reasons may exist then that exist now, "possibly," for not allowing justice to take satisfaction, supposing it not satisfied by the sufferings of this life and the subsequent *death* of the sinner. Furthermore, how does our author know that any "criminal goes out of this life unpunished?" Has he entered into the workings of each individual mind, and seen its conflicts, sorrows and distresses? Has he followed that mind in all its secret anguish till death extinguished it? Has he entered into the inmost soul of the CREATOR, to know what burdens He has laid on the wayward sinner? How does he know that the great God—who made man, and constituted him as he is—does not see that the burdens of a sinful course, ending in *death irrevocable*, is not a full "satisfaction" to His *justice*, even though it might not *seem* so to man who "looketh on the *outward* appearance?" *Revenge* might call for more; but "possibly" justice does not.

But our author continues—"We do not feel that such a departure cancels the claims of punishment, but that justice requires he should live hereafter."

What if "we do not *feel*" it? Is our author sure that this does not arise from a *feeling* of *revenge*, rather than a sense of justice? We are of opinion that every sanctified heart, acting without revenge—as it must, if sanctified—would spontaneously say, "*He is dead, and that is enough.*" If one dying on the cross, followed with the most bitter malice of his murderers, could pray—"Father, forgive them; they know not what they do," how do we know that our *feeling*—if we have it—that justice does not get satisfaction in this life, or at most by the *death* of the criminal, is a feeling

in harmony with the Divine mind? "Possibly" it is not; and our unperverted *nature* looks upon the *torture* of the worst criminal as an outrage on justice. Punishment of criminals for reformation, or to prevent their further crimes, our "natural reason" concurs in; but as a mere matter to inflict *pain*, it does not and never can concur in.

"But, continues our author—"If he is not thus to live again, we cannot help feeling he has *escaped;* and the violated sentiment of justice in our minds and in the government of the universe has no atonement."

These conclusions depend on *education*, not on "natural reason;" for *we* "cannot help feeling" that the worst criminal, cut off eternally from *life*, and all the bliss and joy of an eternal living existence, not only has *not* "*escaped*," but has a most fearful retribution visited upon him, whereby all *our* "sentiment of justice" is fully met. To revive him into life, without hope, and simply that he might have "immortal sorrow," would *violate*, we believe, the *unperverted* "sentiment of justice" in every human heart. It is common to hear men condemn those who speak against their enemies when dead. They consider it an outrage to "follow a man into the grave." They seem to regard death as having cancelled all the claims we can have against our worst enemy; and nothing but simple revenge could prompt us to wish him any further evil. Such is "natural reason." So it seems to us.

Our author next endeavors to establish the idea that *death* —or "the forfeiture of existence"—is not an "atonement" to justice for sin. He says—

"Forfeiture is punishment, when it is the withdrawal of a right—of that which is one's own,—not merely the refusal to extend a gift or gratuity." * * * "The mere withholding from vice a reward due to virtue, or the withdrawal or non-extension of a pure gratuity, we do not regard as a punishment or retribution; because the goods taken away are not the criminal's right; they are in no proper sense, the man's own."

Thus the penalty of *death* is no punishment. Adam, for

example, had no *right* to life; it was "a gift or gratuity," bestowed upon him by his CREATOR. When he was told if he eat of a certain tree, "thou shalt *surely die*," it was declaring that there should be a "withdrawal or non-extension of a pure gratuity," and hence, our author, on his "hypothesis," could "not regard" it "as a *punishment* or retribution; because the" *life* "taken away" was "not" Adam's "right;" it was "in no proper sense the man's own." We do not know but such a position satisfies our author's "natural reason," but we doubt if it will satisfy that of many others. "*Death* is the wages of sin," and therefore is its punishment; but we forbear pressing this point till we meet our author in "Revelation."

He adds—"The withdrawment of life was simply the discontinuance of a gratuitous boon, and NOT TO BE was simply NOT TO SUFFER—a mere negation of all punishment as well as of all favor."

This mode of argument sets at naught the greatest of all penalties known in "nature;" and to us certainly looks like a simple "absurdity." We use the word *absurdity*, because our author, at the outset of this argument, challenged the disproof of his *conjectural hypotheses*, by their being shown to be "either illegitimate, absurd, or unreal;" and we think several of his positions are all three; and particularly the positions we have just considered. We wish it distinctly understood that in using the term *absurdity*, no disrespect is intended to our worthy author. We know well the difficulties he has to encounter from nature in an attempt to sustain the idea of the "*immortality* of the wicked." We doubt not he is honestly endeavoring to reconcile our "natural reason" to the idea of "immortal sorrow" and "eternal *pain*:" such an effort must be a desperate one, and all our ideas of *death*—deprivation of life—being a punishment, must be swept away to reach the end. If our author can succeed here he expects a summary disposal of the subject by *his construction* of the language of "Revelation." But we will not forestall him there.

"Punishment," adds our author, "is something positive, imply ing in its very idea, a future—*a subsequence to crime.*"

And is not *death* "a subsequence to crime?" and is it not "something *positive*" in its infliction? Does human law, or "natural reason," require a murderer, for example, to be kept from dying in order that his punishment should be "something positive?" But again our author says—

"Eternal perdition is not merely the sins of a brief, immature, dim-lit life, paid off with an immortality of pain; but it is eternal sinning, every moment freshly demanding fresh retribution. For manifestly, a sinful soul not repenting, though under the scourge of retribution, only perpetuates sin; yea becomes fiercer and madder in guilt by its very suffering."

We thought our author would land there. Punishment is never inflicted, in fact. But we have yet to learn our author's authority for his "hypothesis," that a man undergoing a final retribution can either sin or be held responsible for any conduct that may then occur. Nature does not teach it. "Natural reason" has not discovered it; and hence no human laws recognize such crimes in a condemned murderer. If our author finds in "Revelation" such doctrine we shall have the benefit of his knowledge when he shall produce a "Thus saith the LORD" for it; till then we will only add, it looks to us like an "absurdity" and altogether "unreal," for reasons which we have assigned in the previous part of our review. Our author adds—

"A sinner incorrigible, morally lost—such as our argument here considers,—will justice dismiss such a soul from being?"

"Such a soul," in such a condition, undergoing final punishment, as our author's "argument" supposes, is "unreal" —the supposition seems an "absurdity;" and hence the argument, built upon it, "illegitimate." To the question, "Will justice dismiss such a soul from being?" we will answer when the existence of "such a soul" is proved; which as yet our author has not attempted, but only "conjectured" as a "possible" case. We might much more

properly ask him—Will God inflict the penalty of *death?*—*Shall "the soul that sinneth die?"* or will it be kept in eternal living existence, because an imaginary justice will not allow God to do as He has said?

The idea of our author of "perpetual new guilt demanding perpetual new punishment, and perpetual new punishment requiring perpetual new extension of being," might be of some value in this argument if he could show that the punishment is *not* DEATH, and that the punished are in a *probationary* state while undergoing punishment. Till this is done some will justly think his position both "unreal" and "absurd."

His effort to clear the "justice and benevolence" of God for putting a man on a course of life "involving such results," is creditable to his heart: and we agree with our respected author that the "*foreknowledge*" of God does "not affect guilt if it does not take away freedom;" but that foreknowledge in a Being at liberty to create or not create sensitive creatures would seem to make it inconsistent with wisdom and love to give being to creatures whose destiny would *certainly* be such as our author speaks of. Bishop NEWTON thus speaks on this point:

"Nothing can be more contrary to the divine nature and attributes than for a God all-wise, all-powerful, all-good, all-perfect, to bestow existence on any beings, whose destiny, he foresees and foreknows, must terminate in wretchedness and misery, without recovery or remedy, without respite or end. 'God is love,' and he would rather have not given life, than render that life a torment and curse to all eternity. Imagine a creature, nay, imagine numberless creatures produced out of nothing, delivered over to torments of endless ages, without the least hope or possibility of relaxation or redemption. *Imagine it you may, but you can never seriously believe it*, nor reconcile it to God and goodness. God could never make any [creature] whose end he foreknew would be misery everlasting. The Lord proclaims himself, Exodus 34: 6, 7, 'The Lord, the Lord God, merciful and gracious, long-suffering and abundant in goodness and truth, keeping mercy for thousands, forgiving iniquity and transgression and sin;' but how can such attributes consist with a system of irre-

coverable vengeance for thousands, transgressions never to be forgiven, and torments never to have an end?"—*Newton's Works. Vol. 6th, London Edition,* 1787. *Dissertation* 60, "*On the Final State and Condition of Man.*"

Such is the utterance of "natural reason;" not of the mind of a weak man, but one of the strongest of the age.—We do not see how it is possible to come to any other conclusion in contemplating the character of the CREATOR, as a whole.

We agree with our author that whatever may be the "circumstances" of man's "moral trial," in this life, they are "fair and equitable;" but we maintain that man is entitled to a clear and distinct announcement of the penalty in case of failure; and that he shall not be left to "conjectures" and "possibilities;" or to find out by some speculation, when DEATH is announced as the penalty that it does not mean death proper, but *eternal torture!* Such an administration "natural reason" cannot but pronounce unjust and cruel; and no pretence that "possibly" the "moral order of the universe" may "demand" such unrevealed tortures can ever clear that administration of the charge of duplicity and unjustifiable neglect in government. No such state of endless woe has nature made known to the race of Adam; and if "Revelation" has, that "Revelation" has never been in possession of the great majority of men. Where then is the ground in nature or reason for inflicting "immortal sorrow" or "*eternal pain*" on sinners of Adam's race? Especially for plunging them into a state of punishment where reformation is impossible, and sin is made an eternal necessity?—Such a punishment unperverted "natural reason" must declare "*absurd and unreal,*" and therefore an impossibility under the government of a *holy, wise, and just* Being. MOLOCH *devoured* his victims, and their tortures were but for a moment. Nature shudders at that even; but Moloch's conduct was mercy compared with that we are called to believe

"*may* possibly" take place in the government of men by their CREATOR.

The general remarks of our author on the fairness of man's moral trial, and of his *freedom* in that trial, we see no ground to dissent from. A few expressions, however, call for a passing notice. He asks—

"Is not freedom, though fearful, a glorious gift? Essential as it is to virtue, who would wish it withheld, even though bringing a liability to an eternal fall? The chances, the opportunity, the faculty of an endless life—even with the risk of an endless ruin—who would not regard the offer as a mighty boon?"

To the first of these questions, we answer, *Yes.* To the second, we reply, we would not have "freedom withheld," even with its "liability." To the third question, if our author would change one word—which a true antithesis requires—we should say "the offer, with the risk, is a mighty boon." Had he substituted *death* for "*ruin*" we should have responded—*amen.* It would then read—"The chances, the opportunity, the faculty of an *endless* LIFE—even with the risk of an *endless* DEATH—who would not regard the offer as a mighty boon?" This would express truth, and must commend itself to the "natural reason" of all reasonable men. But as the question is presented by our author it is quite another matter. He means by *ruin* that state of endless sinning and suffering—of hopeless torment and anguish—which is to run parallel with the *eternal future.* We are confident that no man, fully understanding the liability to such a state, and the chances of his probationary scene terminating in that state, if put to his choice, would accept the present life or consider it a "boon" at all, even though "possibly" he might gain a state of endless felicity. The hazard would be too fearful, and human reason would turn pale at the *risk:* and we cannot perhaps better illustrate this point than by giving an extract from a sermon by SAURIN on "*The eternal misery of hell.*" He says:

"I sink under the weight of this subject; and I declare, when I

see my friends, my relations, the people of my charge—when I think that I, that you, that we are all threatened with these torments—when I see, in the lukewarmness of my devotions, in the langor of my love, in the faintness of my resolutions and designs, the least evidence, though it be only probable or presumptive, of my future misery, yet I find in the thought a *mortal poison*, which diffuses itself into every period of my life, rendering society tiresome, nourishment insipid, pleasure disgustful, and life itself a cruel bitter—I cease to wonder that a fear of hell has made some melancholy, and others mad; that it has inclined some to expose themselves to a living martyrdom by fleeing from all commerce with the rest of mankind, and others to suffer the most violent and terrible torments."

We have given this extract from the *American Tract Society's* Tracts, No. 277. Can any state of mind be more natural to a sincere believer in eternal misery than that of Mr. Saurin? Would any sane man, of his own *free choice*, be placed in such a hazardous position? Would he *choose* to drink of his "*mortal poison*" through "*every period* of" his "*life*," making "*life itself a cruel bitter*," for the possible chance of endless happiness, while he is much more likely to land in that "endless woe," the very *thoughts* of which now fill him with such distress?

If all the advocates for the idea of "immortal sorrow," and "*eternal pain*," believed it a reality, as did Saurin, we should not see them walking our streets with those cheerful countenances, indulging in the mirth so characteristic to many of them, as we now do. We should not see them laboring to adorn their outward selves, and engaging in schemes of party or self-aggrandizement, as now so often is manifest. *No:* like Saurin, their souls would find a "mortal poison" in the "thought" of the awful hazard of their position! "The risk of an endless ruin," such as our author anticipates, cannot but overbalance "the chances" of a happy hereafter to such a degree that never to have had life at all must be the choice of any man who really believes "the risk." "Natural reason" revolts at such a hazard. Our author proceeds—

"God *would*, he *must*, create *free* souls, if he creates any. He has created souls that have freely fallen. But seeing them fall, would he not expunge their existence? Why then *foreseeing*, did he create them at all? Moreover, he has created, and has seen their fall, and has not expunged from being. 'But he will ultimately do it.' Why then did he not do it immediately?—then, when they fell?—at the first guilty act? Why not at the second?—the third? Can you fix a line at which Divine love shall arrest that guilty and lost career? Are you sure there is a line? Mere conjectures is a poor foundation for assumption on a question of this kind."

We are glad our author abjures "conjecture" as a "foundation." He may yet see, if he does not now, that his whole "argument from nature" is naught but "*conjecture*" about the endless future, "or "the immortality of the wicked." In the foregoing questions he has overlooked the fact that men under the present administration, are in a *probationary state*, where reformation is possible, and reconciliation with the Creator may take place; and that every living man has a large mixture of happiness and joy from the hand of God.

We might ask him, why the owner of a fruit tree should not cut it down the first year it does not bear?—why not the second? why spare it another year? Is it not the hope that it may yet become fruitful? And may it not be a fact that when men become hopelessly fixed in sin they are "immediately expunged from being"? Can our author affirm, it is not so? Does he know the precise time when the transgressor arrives at such a consummation? Does he know that is *not* "the line at which Divine" *justice* "arrests that guilty" and incorrigible sinner, and "expunges from being"? Let him remember his own words, that "mere *conjecture* is a poor foundation for an assumption on a question of this kind." He goes on—

"If the reasons for expunging a guilty soul from being are not valid for the present moment, but are counterbalanced by other considerations of general interests and exegencies of the Divine government, who can affirm they shall not be overridden by such exegencies and interests, for ever."

As is usual with the advocates of endless sin and suffering, our author has *assumed* that the "guilty" are not *now* "expunged from being" because the *general* interests," &c., forbid it and hence may forbid it "*for ever.*" If so, how does he know but that the same "*general* interests," &c. will require the "guilty" to continue in a state where there is *hope* as there is now? and that some will be reformed?—perhaps all of them? Such is the "Divine government" at "the present moment." How can he "affirm" it shall not be so "for ever," if the wicked are to live hereafter for ever? Then what becomes of his imaginary "immortal sorrow" and "*eternal pain?*"

Our author adds—"This moment, as much as millions of years hence, is part of the infinite government of one and the same God."

Then is it not a *legitimate* conclusion that *probation* is eternal? and that there *is hope* in the case of the worst sinners unless death—actual extinction of being—interposes? Our author probably sings with the poet—

> "And while the lamp holds out to burn
> The vilest sinner may return."

What then shall hinder the most hardened sinner, with the life of eternity before him, from becoming reconciled to God? Many of that class do turn to God *now;* and "millions of years hence, is part of the infinite government of one and the same God" as "this present moment."

Our author felt this difficulty pressing upon him, and makes an attempt to escape it. He says—

"We do not assume that the present always shall be; but that the actually existent has such presumption in its favor, that the burthen of proof is thrown upon him who affirms there is to be a change."

This is truly an easy way to escape a dilemma. If an endless future is to be the portion of all men, then there will "be a change" from the present; for *death*—cessation from life—does now take place. If death does not take place in the future, there is most certainly a change, and a

very important one. If there is *no change*, sinners may be converted and reconciled to God there; and the unreconciled will have many mercies and blessings, which will make life to them desirable; for it is so "this moment," here! We rather think our author will find "the burthen of proof" belongs to his side of the question; and we do not wonder he is loth to "assume that the present always shall be"; but until he assumes it or proves it all his "possibilities, conjectures and hypotheses," built on the "Divine government," cannot avail the cause of endless sin and pain.

Our author next gives us another list of "possible and adequate uses in the eternal duration of the wicked," in which he travels over substantially the same ground of "newly accruing guilt—to brace and innerve virtue newly born," &c., and concludes his enumeration by saying—

"We wish it to be remembered, all through this portion of our argument, that we are not aiming here to bring forward *positive proofs*, from the light of nature, of the immortality of the wicked; but to rebut the presumption against it, which, on the ground of natural reason and justice, dare, as it seems to us, to wrest Scripture from its natural interpretation,"

"Positive proofs," then, we are not to look for from our author; he only designs to prepare the way for *his* "interpretation" of Scripture. When he reaches "Scripture" we shall see if he is ready to adhere to "its *natural* interpretation." We hope he may be, and then we shall not need a long contest.

Our author admits that nature does not speak "in the same clear, positive terms on" the immortality of the wicked, "as in regard to the eternal life of the good." This admission is something; but take away revelation altogether and we would like to see something more "positive" than anything our author has yet presented, or than any heathen philosophers have ever found, in proof of "the eternal life of the good." He may yet find that nature, with all its philosophy, never gave any "positive terms" expressive of "eter-

nal life" or "immortality" to the good even; much less for the wicked.

Our author adds—"Over this question, apart from revelation, nature might hang in awful doubt and fear. But manifestly she is qualified to give to this doctrine no denial, and is certainly competent to present insuperable difficulties to all caviling or dogmatising against express revelation."

Thus our author *assumes* there is "express revelation" of the immortality of the wicked. We shall see if he finds it when he comes to Scripture. Suppose we make a *parody* of our author's last statement thus—

"Over this question—of the *utter extermination* of the wicked—apart from revelation, nature might hang in doubt. But manifestly she is qualified to give to this doctrine no denial, and it is competent to present insuperable difficulties to all caviling or dogmatizing against the express revelation that 'ALL *the wicked will God destroy*;' for, 'the wicked shall perish, and the enemies of the LORD shall be as the fat of lambs; they shall consume; into smoke shall they consume away.'"

But we do not intend to forestall "revelation," as our author seems endeavoring to do; we anxiously look to meet him there; and we shall then know what is "express revelation," and which theory is "against" it, that of the *extermination* of the wicked, or that of their *immortality* in sin and pain.

In our author's remarks in reply to the suggestion that God's love must be unreconcilable with His view of the final state of the wicked, he says—

"God's love is just. Its glory must kindle a consuming fire toward moral evil, both as in itself ineffably odious, and as the implacable enemy of happiness."

We thank our author for this concession. Let this sentiment stand as a truth, and he has granted all we contend for. A "consuming fire," acting unrestrained and unchecked, must inevitably destroy that on which it acts; hence, "moral

evil" must cease by the conversion or annihilation of its perpetrators, or "*all the wicked:*" and the reasons for its annihilation are well expressed by our author—it is "in itself ineffably odious" to God; therefore he will send a "consuming fire" upon it: it is "the implacable enemy of happiness" of holy beings; hence unholy beings must either be converted or annihilated: God will—though He is now long-suffering, not willing that any should perish—"kindle a *consuming* fire," and it shall be *consumed.*

It is quite manifest, however, that our author did not design that we should take his words, in the foregoing concession, in their "natural interpretation"—as he would have us take "Scripture," and as he may find we shall take it—for he goes on to suggest, that "many things" in nature "contradict our finite and limited conceptions of Divine benevolence."

He says—"We should not roast men in fire, or plunge them in the sea, or starve, or freeze them to death, or kill them by pestilence. Our minds would shudder at torturing the infant and the helpless with the pangs of mortal disease, and wasting them with consumption, or racking them with spasm, or at the indiscriminate massacre of all ages, and sexes, and characters, by the million forms of death of which the world is full." He adds—"If God's love breaks not in behalf of the infant, the innocent, or the good, the power of cold, heat, poison, plague, fever, electricity, or gravitation, are we warranted in presuming he will intervene to arrest, in the case of the incorrigibly and impenitently guilty, the natural consequences of their crimes—the course of endless sin and woe, upon which, by the laws of their moral being, their wickedness has embarked them?"

We answer, there is no analogy in the cases whatever. The evils of this world—which our author has named—are all natural evils; which are permitted in a *disciplinary* state; and, so far as we have knowledge, bear no comparison with the amount of individual enjoyments; and the crisis is generally short, and ends in *death;* not in protracted, unutterable, and *hopeless woe.* Yet, but for revelation, we could not decide that "God is love:" and but for revelation we

could not tell why these natural evils are permitted. If they were made immortal, perpetual, and unmixed with any pleasure to the individual experiencing them, then our "natural reason" must conclude they were the infliction of a Deity whose nature was destitute of love, and was the most malicious and hateful being imaginable.

As to "the natural consequence of" the "crimes" of the wicked, it is *death*. So all nature proclaims in regard to the laws of our *physical* being. Repeated and persevering violation of those laws bring the transgressor to premature death. It will be difficult for any one to show that it is not the same with our *moral* nature. Sin repeated, and persisted in, brings *decrease* of moral sense—which in itself is an awful penalty;—continuing this course, the moral sense *dies*, and the subject is "past feeling"—the consummation of penalty on his moral nature. Physical death closes the scene; and for all that *nature* reveals, the demands of justice are satisfied. All "conjectures" about the endless future—without revelation to guide us—may justly be characterized "the wisdom of this world" which "is foolishness with God;" for "the world by wisdom knew not God." We shall not therefore differ with our respected author in the idea that

"We are ill-qualified to affirm what may or may not be, or to prescribe for revelation the destiny of a morally lost being."

We are willing revelation should decide that destiny; and we are willing to abide by that decision in the "*natural* interpretation of Scripture." Our author says—

"If love does not interrupt moral law now—if it does not intervene to save those whom it has created and placed in their present sphere and circumstances for trial, from the consequences, natural or penal, of their crimes—if we are not at liberty to suppose it will interrupt law at the grave, but the crimes of this life will reach after retribution in the next, and claim, as the advocates of annihilation admit, vast ages there for atonement to justice, how can we fix the date beyond which Divine love shall no more listen to Divine justice?"

We confess that to those who "*admit*" the "*claim*" of justice will require "VAST AGES" in *a life beyond "the grave"* for the mere infliction of hopeless "pain," this argument is not so easy to dispose of. We answer for *ourself alone*—*We* do *not* "*admit*" the position. Nature reveals no such "retribution;" and before we admit another *life*, beyond the grave, for *such a purpose*, we must have *plain and positive* testimony, or the assumption is to have no credit. *Is there positive testimony that the wicked dead will be made alive* FOR SUCH A PURPOSE? Till this question has an affirmative answer we do *not* "*admit*" that "the crimes of this life will claim VAST AGES"—nor any ages at all—in another, or resurrection-*life*, for "retribution." "*The wages of sin is* DEATH." When the contrary is *proved* by *positive* testimony, it will be in time for us to "*admit*" it; but *inferences*, "conjectures," and mere "hypotheses" will not satisfy us; give us a "thus saith the Lord" from nature or revelation. Till then we meet the assumption of "*vast ages*" in another life, after death, for "retribution," with a simple denial.

All our author has said—towards the close of his argument—on the horrid sufferings and woes of this life, being of the same character as that we have already considered—which he has introduced to show that sin and woe *may* never end, because *now* such things are permitted—we let pass, by a reference to our previous response; and by repeating, that there is no *analogy* between this and the state of sin and woe he is trying to make appear may be a "reality," notwithstanding its "loathsomeness and misery are unutterably repellant and horrible."

Our author states an objection to his argument, drawn from present woes, to the *unlimited* continuance of sin and misery in this manner—

"But this is only endured for a limited time, and then compensated by the infinite good flowing from it, and to which it is a necessary incident.'"

We do not assent to this statement of an objection, *as a whole.* The evils of this life—so far as they are unavoidable—are overruled for "good" to those who endure them patiently. But shall we assume that the "infinite good" could not have been attained but for "moral evil," and the woes and sufferings that flow from that? Were these "a *necessary* incident"? We make no such concession: we regard it as without foundation in truth. These evils were introduced by man's undertaking to hew out cisterns for himself which can "hold no water"—and disregarding his Maker's authority, who would have led him "beside still waters, and into green pastures" of "infinite good" in an unruffled path, and crowned him with eternal life, without these evils, if he had harkened to the voice of God. He gave man a distinct warning that *death* would be the result of following his own will to the disregard of his Creator's.

The sufferings and woes of this life are not "a necessary incident" to this life, as man came from the hand of his Creator. He permits them now as a severer discipline for man's waywardness; and if unavailing for man's reformation death puts an end to them and the subject of them. But our author asks—

"Are we sure this relation of evil as an efficient or incident of good, is of limited date?"

We reply by asking—Is our author "sure this relation of evil," &c., existed before man's rebellion? Is he sure it existed from all eternity? If it did not, it is not "a necessary incident" to the following of "infinite good." If it did thus exist always, then, does it not "necessarily" follow, there is something in the infinite Being that is *evil?* Can he avoid this conclusion? If it did not exist from all eternity *past*, the presumption is it will not exist to all eternity *future*, and it is for *him* to prove it will.

Our author says—"Through our moral constitution sentence of doom is pronounced on each act of wrong we witness in others; and

this sentence of doom also prophecies a future existence as due to retribution, in case of the evil-doer escaping justice here."

"Our moral constitution," unperverted by false teaching or revenge, pronounces *death*, without recovery,—deprivation of life, never to be restored—an ample retribution on the worst offender, and therefore is a *prophecy* that such is to be his fate: his life is forfeited and lost, never to be restored. A fearful "retribution" this, for preferring the "pleasures of sin for a season" to *eternal life.*

"This voice of our moral constitution," saith our author, "is the voice of God the Creator, speaking through it."

Very well: we are content to have it so, and leave it to the reader to determine for himself whether the voice of our moral constitution is found in our author's view, or that of his reviewer.

Our author's remarks on "natural religion" having "extensively embraced the doctrine of the immortality of the wicked," we answer by extracts from the work of Bishop WHATELY on "*Scripture Revelations concerning a Future State;* found in the English edition of his work, pages 16 to 26. He says—

"Among the heathen philosophers, Plato has been appealed to, as having believed in a future state of reward and punishment, on the ground that the passages in his works in which he inculcates the doctrine, are *much more numerous* than those in which he expresses his doubt of it. I cannot undertake to say that such is not the case; for this arithmetical mode (as it may be called) of ascertaining a writer's sentiments, by counting the passages on opposite sides, is one which had never occurred to me; nor do I think it is likely to be generally adopted. If, for instance, an author were to write ten volumes in defence of Christianity, and two or three times to express his suspicion that the whole is a tissue of fables, I believe few of his readers would feel any doubt as to his real sentiments. When a writer is at variance with himself, it is usual to judge from the nature of the subject, and the circumstances of the case, *which* is likely to be his real persuasion, and which, the one, he may think it decorous, or politically expedient, to profess.

"Now in the present case, if the ancient writers disbelieved a fu-

ture state of reward and punishment, one can easily understand why they should nevertheless occasionally speak as if they did believe it; since the doctrine, they all agreed, was useful in keeping the multitude in awe. On the other hand, would they, if they did believe in it, ever deny its truth? or rather (which is more commonly the case in their works) would they allude to it as a fable so notoriously and completely disbelieved by all enlightened people as not to be worth denying, much less refuting, any more than tales of fairies are by modern writers?

"Even Aristotle has been appealed to as teaching (in the first book of the Nicomachean Ethics) the doctrine of a future state of enjoyment or suffering; though it is admitted by all, that, within a few pages, he speaks of death as the complete and final extinction of existence, 'beyond which there is neither good nor evil to be expected.' He does not even *assert* this as a thing to be proved, or which might be doubted; but *alludes* to it merely, as unquestioned and unquestionable. The other passage (in which he is supposed to speak of a state of consciousness after death) has been entirely mistaken by those who have so understood it. He expressly speaks of the dead, *in that very passage*, as 'having *no* perception;' and all along proceeds on that supposition.

"But many things *appear* good or evil to a person who has no perception of them at the time they exist. For example, many have undergone great toils for the sake of leaving behind them an illustrious name, or of bequeathing a large fortune to their children: almost every one dislikes the idea of having his character branded with infamy after his death; or of his children coming to poverty or disgrace; many are pleased with the thought of a splendid funeral and stately monument; or their bones reposing beside those of their forefathers, or of their beloved friends; and many dread the idea of their bodies being disinterred and dissected, or torn by dogs. Now no one, I suppose, would maintain that all who partake of such feelings, expect that they shall be conscious, at the time, of what is befalling their bodies, their reputation, or their families after death; much less, that they expect that their happiness will, at that time, be effected by it. In fact, such feelings as I have been speaking of, seem to have always prevailed, even the more strongly, in those who expected no future state.

"It is of these posthumous occurrences that Aristotle is speaking, in the passage in question. But he expressly says, in that very passage, that "it would be *absurd* to speak of a man's actually enjoying happiness after he is dead;" evidently proceeding (as he always does) on the supposition that the dead have ceased to exist.

"The ancient heathens did but conjecture, without proof, respecting a future state. And there is this remarkable circumstance to be noticed in addition; that those who taught the doctrine (as the ancient heathen lawgivers themselves did, from a persuasion of its importance for men's conduct,) do not seem themselves to have believed what they taught, but to have thought merely of the expediency of inculcating this belief on the vulgar.

"It does not appear, however, that they had much success in impressing their doctrine on the mass of the people: for though a state of future rewards and punishments was commonly talked of among them, it seems to have been regarded as little more than an amusing fable. It does not appear, from the account of their own writers, that men's lives were ever influenced by any such belief. On the contrary, we find them, in speeches publicly delivered and now extant, ridiculing the very notion of any one's seriously believing the doctrine. And when they found death seemingly unavoidable and near at hand, as in the case of a very destructive pestilence, we are told, that those of them who had been the most devout worshippers of their gods, and had applied to them with various superstitious ceremonies for deliverance from the plague, finding that the disease still raged, and that they had little chance of escaping it, at once cast off all thoughts of religion; and, resolving to enjoy life while it lasted, gave a loose to all their vicious inclinations. This shows, that even those who had the firmest faith in the power of their gods, looked to them for *temporal* deliverance only, and for their preservation in *this* life, and had not only no belief, but no suspicion even, that these Beings had any power to reward and punish beyond the grave:—that there was any truth in the popular tales respecting a future state.

"It may be thought, however, by some, that the wisest of the heathen philosophers, though they did not hold the notions of the vulgar as to the particulars of a future state of rewards and punishments, yet had convinced themselves (as in their writings they profess) of the immortality of the soul. And it is true that they had, in a certain sense; but in such a sense as in fact makes the doctrine amount to nothing at all. They imagined that the souls of men, and of all other animals, were not created by God, but were themselves parts of the divine mind, from which they were separated, when united with bodies; and to which they would return and be reunited, on quitting those bodies: so that the soul, according to this notion, was immortal both ways; that is, not only was to have no end, but had no beginning; and was to return after death into the same condition in which it was before our birth: a state without

any distinct personal existence, or consciousness. It was the *substance of which the soul is composed*, that (according to this doctrine) was eternal, rather than the soul itself; which, as a distinct Being, was swallowed up and put an end to. Now it would be ridiculous to speak of any consolation, or any moral restraint, or any other effect whatever, springing from the belief of *such* a future state as this, which consists in becoming, after death, the same as we were before birth. To all practical purposes, it is the same thing as annihilation.

"Accordingly the Apostle Paul, when speaking to the Corinthians (1 Cor. xv) of some persons who denied the '*Resurrection* of the dead,' (teaching, perhaps, some such doctrine as that I have just been speaking of,) declares, that in that case his 'preaching would have been vain.' To deny the '*resurrection*' is, according to him, to represent Christians as 'having hope *in this life only*,' and those 'who have fallen asleep in Christ, as having *perished*.' (v. 18, 19.) As for any such future existence as the ancient philosophers described, he does not consider it worth a thought.

"Such was the boasted discovery of the heathen sages! which has misled many inattentive readers of their works; who, finding them often profess the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, and not being aware what sort of immortality it was that they meant, have hastily concluded that they had discovered something approaching to the truth; or, at least, that their doctrine was one which might have some practical effect on the feelings and conduct, which it is plain it never could. And such, very nearly, is said to be the belief entertained now by the learned among the East Indian Bramins, though they teach a different doctrine to the vulgar."

We leave these remarks to carry their own weight, showing that "natural religion has" *never* "extensively embraced the doctrine of the immortality of the wicked," as our author affirms. "Natural religion" rejects and abhors such doctrine as "a fable." Our author, then, gains nothing to his argument by his appeal to such a source. He now comes to the following conclusion—

"Thus we have seen nature attesting most clearly and unequivocally to a future life for all, and an immortal life for the good; and if not as unmistakably and irresistibly demonstrating the endless existence of the wicked, at least she presents no insuperable difficulties and objections."

Whether our author has "seen nature attesting," as he says, the reader will judge. To our mind, he has not found nature "attesting" to "immortal life for the good," even; and without "Revelation" to bring "*life and immortality to light*," nature would be no better to guide us, on this subject, than any other *ignis-fatuus*. It seems to us to have led our author into "the gulf of night" where he went to "apply the ear to the infinite gloom" when he set out after "nature" to see if he could not "catch the accents of immortal sorrow." And strange as it may appear, in speaking of the "need of revelation," our author seems, unwittingly, to abandon nature to our side of the question and as against immortality. He thus speaks—

"There was need also of revelation to counteract the terrible and overmastering impressions of the circumstances of death. The form of physical death is most appalling. 'All we know or dream or fear of agony,' are, to our seeming, gathered in it. It seems like a mortal crisis in being; and the process of dissolution, its loathsomeness and horror, its seeming utter destruction of at least the house and organism of life, and then the utter disappearance of the being from all the ways and interests of this world—all these must have tended powerfully to produce, at least on the unthinking mass, the idea of annihilation—the reduction of the being to utter nothing."

Just this, precisely, is all nature can teach; not the "unthinking mass" only, but the wisest philosophers, as our quotations from Bishop Whately abundantly show. Nature, without corrupting her teaching, gives no other "idea" than that "of *annihilation*" by death. Nature, so far as it speaks anything, speaks against life after death, for any of Adam's race, good or bad. If any are to be immortal, "Revelation" must declare it; and declare it, too, not by theological *inferences*, but in plain, outspoken words, which all can understand—the unlearned as well as the learned. Where then is the "thus saith the LORD, all men are *immortal?*" or, "all men, *bad* and good, shall be immortal?" Let our author give us the testimony; and let the reader observe our author's argument from revelation, that he will not, be-

cause he *cannot*, produce a single text from the Bible that affirms the immortality of the wicked in plain and unequivocal language; and that there is not one text he can produce which saith, "*the soul* is immortal;" or that speaks of "immortality" as ever conferred on any of Adam's race except those *reconciled* to God. We ask the reader carefully to observe these facts in our author's Scripture argument.

Our author in the conclusion of his argument from nature, couples Moses and Solomon with the heathen Poets in their "fear, sympathy or despondence under the impression of" the "outward terrors of death." He says—

'In the poems of Homer and Hesiod, as also of Solomon and Moses, this feeling breaks out on us, often in strains of exquisite sweetness and of ineffable melancholy, the vesper dirge of humanity rising on the borders of eternal night." He adds, "How sad and despondent the strain that comes down to us from the elder world, even from the muse of Inspiration:—'I go whence I shall not return, even to the land of darkness, and the shadow of death; a land of darkness, as darkness itself; and of the shadow of death, without any order, and where the light is as darkness.' Job 10: 21, 22."

This, our author tells us, is "from the muse of *Inspiration*." To him—it seems—the *inspiring* Spirit gave a very erroneous idea of death! That Spirit did not see "the soul" that leaves its "material companion," at death, and launches out into *light!* No: "inspiration" had not *then*, and never has *since*, given any other view of *death* than that given by "the muse of Inspiration." It taught then, and has taught always since, that death is "a land of darkness, where the light is as darkness;" and that without a *resurrection* from the dead there is no future life, and no hope for the dead. Job was aware that if he *died in his sins* he would "not return" from death, but "remain in the tomb:" chapter 21: 32. Yet, when he was inspired with confidence in God, and rose above his fears, he could say—"For though a man die he may be revived, after finishing the days of this his life. I would wait patiently till *I come again into existence*:

then shalt Thou call and I will answer Thee." So reads the Septuagint, Job 14: 14, 15.

To show the need of revelation, our author gives two extracts from "Heathen Poesy;" which, one would think, were sufficient to prove all his efforts to find help for his theory of immortality—from nature—is labor lost. The "Poesy" is as follows:—

"The meanest herb we trample in the field,
Or in the garden nurture, when its leaf
In autumn dies, forebodes another Spring,
And from brief slumber wakes to life again:
Man wakes no more! Man, peerless, valiant, wise,
Once chilled by death, sleeps hopeless in the dust,
A long, unbroken, never-ending sleep."—*Moschus Epit. Bion.*

"Down through that yawning gulf, the grave,
When life's brief fit is o'er,
Shall sink the great, the good, the brave,
Down to the sunless shore,
Where, by the hush of sullen wave,
They sleep forevermore."—*Poetry of the Ancients.*

IMMORTALITY:

REVIEW OF THE ARGUMENT FROM SCRIPTURE.

BY GEO. STORRS, EDITOR OF BIBLE EXAMINER, NEW YORK.

In concluding our review of the argument from nature we asked the reader to "observe our author's argument from revelation, that he will not, because he *cannot*, produce a single text from the Bible that affirms the immortality of the wicked in plain and unequivocal language;" and we added, "there is not one text he can produce which saith, '*the soul* is immortal;' or that speaks of 'immortality' as ever conferred on any of Adam's race except those *reconciled* to God;" we desired the reader "carefully to observe these facts in our author's Scripture argument."

When we penned those remarks his Scripture argument had not appeared; yet we do not claim to be a prophet because our words have been fully verified. It needed no spirit of prophecy to state what has proved true, now that his argument has appeared: it was only necessary to have studied the Scriptures to know that he could produce no such text. Not one has he favored us with of this character.

We had supposed, from the first sentence of his argument from nature, that we were to have an essay on the immortality of the soul. That sentence is as follows:—"The argument for the immortality of the soul begins with God." "The necessary immortality of a created being," he declared, "is an absurdity." From such a starting point we thought we had a right to look for something more than "conjec-

tures," or *inferences* that God had conferred immortality on all the race of Adam; but if we are competent to judge in the case, our author has not attempted to prove that *such* a soul as he speaks of has an existence at all; or that *man* has immortality either by creation or as a superadded gift: hence his argument is not only made up entirely of *inferences*, but is based on an *assumption* that man is *dual*—or a creature of *two entities*, instead of being *one*. Taking this view, and pursuing this course, it is not strange that he should, virtually, ignore the Old Testament in his argument. Where else shall we go to obtain an account of man's creation, and to learn whether he is dual, or a unit?

Surely it seems important that this point should be settled by Scripture authority, and not by a mere *assumption* of a *companionship* of the man of earth with another entity, or being, which our author calls "*the soul*;" and which is so essential to his argument that he seems to have lost sight of man, *as man*, in pursuit of an imaginary entity, to which *the man*—formed of the dust of the ground—is only "its material *companion*:" such is his language.

In opening the argument from Scripture, our author says—"Our previous Article refers the whole question of man's immortality to the will of God."

That was just what we desired; and in order to this we think it was essential to commence where revelation commences its history of *man* and the expressed will of his CREATOR concerning him. Instead of this, the thoughtful reader will be surprised to find that our author passes the whole Mosaic account with profound silence. If he was in earnest to "refer the whole question of *man's* immortality to the will of God," why overlook and silently pass the inspired history of man's *origin*, and his *destiny* as a sinner? There he would have found man was a *unit* by creation. He would also have learned "the will of God" is clearly expressed, that sinning man shall *not* "live forever." Why has

he passed all this in total silence, and thrust upon us, first, an argument from nature, made up of "conjectures" and imaginary "possibilities," to prepare the way for *his construction* of "revelation," when one half of revelation is entirely disregarded in his argument from Scripture?

If he has seen fit to disregard and utterly neglect the Mosaic account of man's origin, and destiny as a sinner, and *assume* that man is *dual*—or that a superadded entity called "the soul" was given as a "companion" to the man which the Lord God formed of the dust of the ground—we shall see to it that this omission and assumption does not pass without investigation. He might as well undertake to decide the meaning of a legal instrument by looking at a few expressions in the last half, as to treat revelation in this way, and then affirm that certain expressions he sees fit to select, can have no other meaning than that he has attached to them. We hope not thus to deal with the testimony of the Most High.

Our author in recapitulating what the aim of his argument from nature was, says—

"The position of this question before the tribunal of nature, throws the *burthen of proof* on the deniers of the doctrine of immortality." He adds—"In order to establish his thesis, it will not suffice him to present mere conjecture, or meet hypothesis even with counter hypothesis; but, for a change in the economy, if not in the system of Divine government, from what we now behold," &c.

We *deny* that nature proves immortality to any created, living thing. Does our author dare *affirm* it does? If he does "the *burthen of proof*" is on him. He has been careful, however, throughout his argument from nature, not to commit himself to the affirmative, and wishes us, all through, to understand that he offers nothing as *proof* of the affirmative: he only deals in "possibilities," "conjectures," and "negatives"—a privilege he has no idea of allowing us! No, we must give *positive proof* that his "conjectures" are not realities! Yet he may deal in conjectures and possibi-

lities with such an apparent assurance, and so often repeated, that those who are in the habit of letting others think for them, are ready to receive as *proof positive* all these sketches of the imagination; and as undoubted truths.

As to "a change in the economy, if not in the system of Divine government, from what we now behold," it is our author's theory that necessitates such change—not ours—as we think we have abundantly shown in our previous article. *Death*—cessation of life—ends the longest chain of sinning, so far as nature *proves* anything; that is the *present* "system of Divine government." If it is not so hereafter—and our author affirms it is not—then it is his system that requires the change, and the "burthen of proof" lies on him, not on us.

In touching the Old Testament he says—

> "We hear it announced far back in the elder world, 'The wicked, though he dies in his full strength, with his breasts full of milk and his bones moistened with marrow,' yet 'is reserved for the day of destruction, and shall be brought forth to the day of wrath.'"

We regard this quotation, in its mangled and garbled form, as a simple perversion of Job's language. Let the text and its context be read together, and we think it will be clearly seen that Job teaches no such doctrine as our author's garbled quotation would indicate. Job speaks thus—"Shall any teach God knowledge? seeing He judgeth those that are high. One dieth in his full strength, being wholly at ease and quiet. His breasts are full of milk, and his bones moistened with marrow: another dieth in the bitterness of his soul, and never eateth with pleasure. They shall lie down alike *in the dust,* and the worms shall cover them." Surely here is nothing that looks like teaching *immortality.* Job goes on—"Behold I know your thoughts, and the devices which ye wrongfully imagine against me; for ye say, where is the house of the prince? and where are the dwelling places of the wicked? Have ye not asked them that go by the way? and do ye not know their tokens, that the wicked

is reserved to the day of destruction? that they shall be brought forth to the day of wrath." *Who* shall be brought forth? Our author says those that Job had just said "dieth," &c. Let us see if those are the persons spoken of. He adds —"Who shall declare his way to his face? and who shall repay him what he hath done? Yet he *shall be* BROUGHT to *the grave, and shall* REMAIN *in the tomb.*"

Surely this is not spoken of those whom he said, "dieth in full strength," or in "bitterness of soul." He is clearly speaking of some living wicked, who like the inhabitants of Sodom or the old world should be brought—after their *example*—to the day of wrath: not *from* death, but from their practice of wickedness, for saith he, they "*shall* be brought to the grave, and *shall remain in the tombs.*" Thus we see the discourse, when taken together, proves just the reverse of what our author intended by it. It does not teach that the wicked dead should be brought forth from the grave to the day of wrath but the reverse. Whatever may be the fact about the revival into life of the wicked dead, Job does not teach such revival. But we have only spoken on this text to show what we may expect from our author's construction of Scripture language.

Our author says—"We are told" * * * "of the spirits of the dead that were disturbed by the unholy invocations of the children of evil," &c.

Where are we "told" this? He has given us no text, and in the absence of one example, we *deny* that we are ever told, any where in the Bible, of "the *spirits* of the dead" being "disturbed" from any cause, or by any means. If so, where is the testimony? Let us have it.

With few words our author dispatches and dismisses the Old Testament, and says—

"These ages of the old dispensation had but a twilight illumination of the realm beyond the grave. But in the fulness of times, came to our world one mightier than death—who broke for man the closures of Hades and brought to light (i. e., manifested clearly to

man) not only life, but immortality." * * * "He indubitably teaches the happy immortality of the righteous."

Here, as is usual with the advocates of his theory, he must *add* a qualifying term to the immortality of the righteous—"*happy* immortality." No such phraseology is found in the Bible. The phrase immortality, in scripture, is never applied to any but the holy; *i. e.* to God, to Christ, or the saints at their resurrection; at which time *they put it on.* But our author is—and all other advocates of universal immortality for man, are—under the necessity of *adding* to the words of inspiration, "*happy.*"

"Everlasting punishment," says our author,—"what shall it be? 'What,' would not the plain unprejudiced common-sense reader ask —'what shall it be but everlasting shame and sorrow?' It would seem it could hardly suggest or admit any other than the above import, unless under the force of hermenutics that bring to the exegesis of it, a prejudgment, of what befits God's character, and of what inspiration must teach concerning the destiny of the lost."

We think "the plain unprejudiced common-sense reader" could never come to such conclusion, while the Scriptures plainly declare "the wages of sin is *death.*" Death, where the power of God should *everlastingly*, or eternally, be withheld from a revival into life: no revocation of the sentence. That power, which alone could revive from death, eternally withdrawn from them: their punishment of death is eternal. Such we believe is "the plain common-sense" meaning of the phrase; and, in our judgment, nothing but a "prejudgment" that man is immortal—which the Scriptures never affirm—could "suggest or admit any other import" to the phrase "eternal punishment"; but more on this hereafter.

Our author says—"The simple question before us, we premise here, is, What is a fair interpretation of language?" * * * "God hath spoken to man. He has spoken then, according to the laws of human language, and it is to be interpreted according to the laws of human speech."

In these sentiments we most heartily concur; and we

have no fears for the result if our author abides by them, and we shall now claim that the Mosaic account of Man's creation, trial, sin, and punishment, is to be first considered, that we may get the true idea of the Scripture use of language. This is just as necessary in this controversy as for a child to commence with the alphabet in order to learn to read. Here we shall be able to settle whether our author has not removed his cause from Bible language to that of mere human invention; and introduced, without proof or authority, phrases unknown to the inspired penmen. If so, is it any wonder he should leave the whole Mosaic history of man without even a passing notice? There is to be found the root of all language in this matter. Do we find, in that history, any testimony of the creation, or introduction of a distinct entity, for man, called "*the soul*," of which *the man*, made of the dust, was only the "*companion?*" If not, what right has our author to *assume* it—as he has done—and build his argument on that assumption?

The Mosaic account of man's *origin* is brief but distinct: it leaves us in no doubt—"The LORD God formed *man* of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and *man* became a living soul." Gen. 2: 7.

Here is no obscurity, no ambiguity; all is plain and straight-forward; nothing is left to be inferred or assumed. Man's *origin* is from *the dust*, by the creative power of the LORD God. His perfect organism is "*man*"—is "a *soul*;" another act of the CREATOR is necessary for this *soul* to become a *living* one: not another creation—not the adding of another entity: no; his MAKER "breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and *man* became a *living* soul." He was previously a soul, but without life, he now became a *living* one. Such was man's origin and nature, so far as we have any inspired authority to guide us. In this account "God has spoken according to the laws of human language, and it *is* to be interpreted according to the laws of human speech": thus interpreted, the idea of a superadded entity called "*the*

soul," of which the man from the dust was only the "material companion," vanishes into an unfounded assumption.

We see also, in this account, what *life* is,—not "*happiness.*" The primary use of the term *life* is to express the active or living condition of the organic substances of sensitive creatures, whose general condition is one of consciousness; and it is not, in its strict and literal sense, applicable to anything else. Let this be remembered.

To the "living soul"—or living *man*, his MAKER spoke of the possibility of his loss of life. He informed him if he eat of a certain tree he should "*surely die:*" which is clearly an announcement of the loss of that *life* with which his CREATOR had endowed him: and hence he would cease to be "a *living* soul;" and the details of the "language," as expressed when Adam was arraigned in judgment before his MAKER, make this certain: "In the sweat of thy face shalt *thou* eat bread, till *thou* return unto the ground: for out of it wast *thou* taken: for *dust thou* art, and unto dust shalt *thou return*;" Gen. 2: 19. Here "God has spoken according to the laws of human language, and it is to be interpreted according to the laws of human speech." Then what becomes of that imaginary entity which our author and his school call "the soul?" Of *such* an entity the inspired record gives us no account, either in the record of man's creation, fall, or doom. What right then have theologians to assume such an existence, and "interpret the Scriptures" under the controlling power of that assumption? And here we retort on our author in his own language—"Apart from" this *assumption*, "we think more than one interpretation of the teaching of Scripture on this theme would hardly have been thought of:" and that "*one* interpretation" would have been, *man is a unit—death dissolves him into his original elements;* and *the man* ceases to be a conscious existence.

But before we leave this part of the subject, we will contemplate, briefly, the closing of Paradise. Our author tells

us that his "previous article refers the whole question of man's immortality to the *will of God.*" Does he wish to know what that will is, as clearly expressed as Divine or "human language" can do it? Then let him come back to first principles: let him not flee from the Mosaic account as if it were some serpent. Look it calmly in the face. Who that does this without a "pre-judgment" of an immortal soul in man, can fail to see that the perpetuity of man's life depended on his *moral* development. If he harmonized with his CREATOR, by obedience, he was to have continued access to the tree of life, and live forever; if he did not harmonize with his MAKER, but disobey, he was to die—be *cut off* from life. Thus making holiness a necessary development for *continued life;* and unholiness a sure and certain precursor of *death*, or deprivation of life. This position is clearly set forth in the Mosaic account, and God's *will* fully expressed in the following language—"And now," [that he hath sinned] "*lest* he put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life, and eat, and *live forever:* therefore the LORD God sent him forth from the garden of Eden, to till the ground *whence he was taken.* So He drove out *the man:* and He placed at the east of the garden of Eden cherubims and a *flaming sword* which turned every way to keep the way of the tree of life."

If "God has spoken according to the laws of human language, and it is to be interpreted according to the laws of human speech"—as our author and ourself are agreed—here is plain and positive testimony that a *sinner* shall *not* live forever, and that such is "*the will of God;*" and the language is applied to man as a *unit:* whatever goes to make up that *unit* is embraced in the cutting off from life. Thus, even if the man could be proved to be dual, nothing is excepted from the doom of deprivation of life: all comes under one exclusion from living forever. Here we rest this part of the subject for the present, but shall have occasion, perhaps often, to refer to it in our review.

Our author claims that "the Scriptures do teach the immortal existence of the wicked, by direct, deliberate, formal declarations, as well as by implication, in numerous passages."

Then we hope he will give us some of these "direct, deliberate," and "formal declarations;" which as yet we have never seen, nor have we met the individual before, who has studied the subject, that has presumed to take such a position. Even BISHOP TILLOTSON, in his sermons printed 1774, vol. 2, admits that "The immortality of the soul is rather supposed, or taken for granted, than expressly revealed in the Bible;" and Dr. BAGNAL, in the Methodist Quarterly Review, of April, 1852, writing in defence of the same side of this question as our author, says—"In the Bible, we think, there is no passage which can be strictly said to declare that all human souls are immortal;" and he adds, "The only passages in the Bible which clearly teach the endless existence of all human beings, are those which speak of the endless happiness of the righteous and the endless misery of the wicked;" and he concludes by saying, "The question is resolved into this, 'Shall the wicked exist forever in misery?'"

This is precisely the course our author now pursues; and after having announced that there are "direct, deliberate," and "formal declarations" of "the immortal existence of the wicked," he relies entirely on texts that speak of their punishment; and endeavors to make the vast multitude of texts adverse to his views of their immortality submit to *his interpretation* of a few. He says of the multitude of texts against him,

"The words and phrases" * * * "are, when applied to the soul, not only susceptible of a limitation and modification of import which may avoid such contradiction, but are actually employed in the familiar and constant usage of the Scriptures, in such application, with such limitation and modification of meaning."

Thus our author would prepare the way for *his* construction of the language of Scripture, by first leaving man, *as*

man, to talk about "words and phrases when applied to *the soul*:" meaning, of course, by *soul*, an entity of which there is no account in man's creation. And furthermore, he cannot be ignorant that the terms on which he relies—everlasting and eternal—when applied to anything not *proved to be immortal*, are "not only susceptible of a limitation and modification of import, but are actually employed in the familiar and constant usage of Scripture in such application, with such limitation and modification of meaning." Why then is our author to have the exclusive benefit of limitation and modification in the meaning of terms? If he could give us "direct, deliberate," and "formal declarations" of the immortality of the wicked, then there might be reason in his claim. But no such declaration has he been able to produce. Let the reader not forget this. The reader will also find our author has labored—perhaps not intentionally—to make us lose sight of *the man* by a constant use of the term "*soul.*" The terms employed in relation to man's destiny he does not allow "to be interpreted according to the laws of human speech" as applicable to *man*, but he substitutes "*soul;*" a thing, which he would have us think is an entity—*a being*—by itself; which, when spoken of, changes all language—divine and human—into figures of speech except his favorite *everlasting*, etc.

We come now to what he denominates "*Ruling Texts.*" These he endeavors to surround with a kind of *solemnity*, as if we were not at liberty to compare them with other Scriptures, and put any construction upon them adverse to his declaration of their *positiveness* on his side of the question. We dissent from any idea of putting an *extra* solemnity upon one part of inspiration more than another; all of it is too solemn to be trifled with, and demands our reverence—one part just as much as another, and no more. His first ruling text is Math. 25: 34–46; particularly verses 41 and 46. On this text he remarks—

"One would at first suppose the words of Christ in this case were so explicit and positive in assertion of the immortality of man—good or evil—that they could not be made more so; that the hermeneutics that could evade them would defy any grasp of human language."

Indeed! "Man is immortal, or has an *immortal soul.*" Would not such language be "*more* explicit and positive in assertion of the immortality of man"? We judge it would be far "more" so; and yet no such "language" can be found in the Bible; if it could be, it would have been our author's "*Ruling Text.*" Instead of that, "TEKEL" is written over the theory of "the immortality of man," except as a bestowment by grace on the "good."

Our author next introduces three "propositions," of which he says, if they "can be established, no one will dispute that the text asserts the immortality of the wicked."

The following are the propositions—

"1st. It [the text] describes the doom of the wicked after death. 2d. It predicates of that doom, eternal duration. 3d. That doom implies the continued existence of its subjects."

His first proposition applied to Matt. 25th might be *questioned*, notwithstanding he saith it "is unquestionable." But to shorten our review we let it pass for the present, by simply saying, it is quite certain, it is *not* "*after* death" to all the wicked, for *some* will be alive at the time spoken of who have never died. The second proposition we assent to. The third we *deny.* Under his second proposition in speaking of the adjective of time—"*everlasting*"—he says—

"By its probable etymology," * * * "it denotes the ALWAYS-BEING, or EVER-BEING."

Is there *doubt* as to its "etymology?" If not, why use the phrase "its *probable* etymology?" We can admit no such *doubt* if our author expects us to receive his construction of the text as "explicit and positive in assertion of the immortality of man." That word "*probable*" was an unfortunate beginning, where we were promised the "*positive.*"—But we let it pass.

Our author says—"It is the proper adjective of eternity, so much so, that in common usage of the Scriptures it is applied characteristically to God, signifying his eternity. The original Greek had no stronger epithet of duration."

And yet the inspired penmen are not all satisfied with that simple epithet of duration when speaking of God; for, saith Paul, "the King eternal, *immortal*," &c. 1 Tim. 1 : 17. We are not left to one epithet: Paul seems to have found in "the original Greek" a "stronger" one to express the undying nature of God: quite a useless matter, truly, if our author's view is correct. We admit, however, that the adjective, under consideration, when applied to any being with no known circumstances to restrict its meaning, should have its full sense of unlimited duration. But when applied to creatures known to be in their constitution dying, it cannot have that sense without some express declaration of a change in their nature from mortal to immortality. Such a declaration is made concerning those *in* Christ; but nothing of the kind is said in relation to the wicked; hence though their "doom is of eternal duration" there is no evidence in the adjective employed that such doom is a living existence in pain.

Our author says—"It is true," * * * "it is sometimes attached to objects of measurable date."

Very well; but he might have said more: he might have said it is *much more frequently* "attached to objects of measurable date" than to others. But again he says—

"Such usage belongs to rhetorical and poetic diction, or to the language of imagination and passion, or appears with obvious limitations in the nature or relation of the subject to which it attaches," &c.

Just such an obvious limitation is required in the text under consideration, if our author succeeds in demonstrating that the threatened punishment is *pain*. But he adds—

"In this text there is" no "such limitation, unless in the nature of the soul, to suppose which begs the entire question, by assuming the very point at issue."

And is not our author "assuming the very point at issue," *viz.*, of a distinct soul-entity that is immortal? Is there one word said in the text, or its context, about "*the soul?*" Not a word. It speaks of men *as men:* men under this dispensation, *known* to be mortal, corruptible, dying—naturally tending to *dissolution.* If then their punishment is to be eternal—as we believe—it must be eternal *death*—cessation from life proper. And till our author gives us some positive testimony that the wicked "put on immortality," it is himself that "begs the entire question, by assuming the very point at issue." Let this fact be remembered.

Saith our author—"Amid the strongest proofs that Christ here designed by the term 'everlasting' to convey the idea of endless duration, is the historic fact that the Jews, with their ideas of the immortality of the soul, must have so understood it."

Now it happens that our Lord was talking to his disciples alone and "privately," (see chap. 24 : 3,) and he had guarded his disciples against the Jewish fables; first, by warning them to "beware of the *doctrine* of the Pharisees and Sadducees" (see chap. 16 : 6, 11, 12.) The Sadducees denied any future life, the Pharisees held to a future life by an immortal soul, or a transmigration of their souls into other bodies. Our Lord condemned the *doctrine* of both, and taught his disciples a future life by a resurrection from the dead; and that "at the resurrection of the just" he would reward the good. Whatever therefore the Jews taught or the Greeks, to whom our author refers, the disciples had been instructed to avoid and beware of such doctrine; and our Lord was now addressing his disciples "*privately.*" All the testimony our author has furnished from Jews and Greeks is ignored by our Lord's warning to his disciples to beware of their doctrine. Hence the following remarks by our author are of no force or value. He says—

"Our Saviour, in that discourse" [Math. 25th,] "must have been understood by those who heard him," [none but the disciples did hear him] "as meaning, by the term in question, strictly everlast-

ing; and he knew he must be so understood. Of course, using it without limitations, he designed to be so understood; and such must be its meaning in the passage."

We believe it was "understood by those who heard him," *viz.*, his disciples, as meaning "strictly everlasting:" and so *we* understand it. But what has that to do in proof of the immortality of the wicked? Just nothing at all, as we shall yet learn when we come to see what the apostles taught, who learned of Christ.

Our author says the "everlasting" is "predicated of the *soul* and especially the *doom of the soul after the last judgment*," &c.

We repeat it, not a word is said about "the *soul*" in the entire discourse. Why then this perpetual employment of that term? Why not speak scripturally? Jesus saith nothing about *gathering* "the *soul*," or "*souls*," before him. We hope there was no design to darken this subject by putting fancied "immortal souls" in the place of *men*, in their proper *personalities as men*. If they stand there *as men* they are known to be *mortal*, *corruptible*, till such time as we are distinctly informed that they are clothed with *life* that is *everlasting*. That information we have in express words in relation to the righteous—they enter "*into* LIFE *eternal*," and hence are immortal. But wicked men hear that awful sentence not as *soul*-entities but *as men—mortal men:* and hence there is no ground for an argument that they "put on immortality," or that their punishment, though eternal, is eternal pain.

Our author goes on thus—"The mind naturally, if admitting the existence of the spirit after death at all, conceives of it as among the most enduring of things. Especially would a limited import be attached to an epithet describing the *final doom* of the soul, because that doom is the very uttermost syllable of its history. It covers the infinite future. Bearing this, the soul disappears from view forever."

Here our author, as usual, loses sight of man, *as man*, and fixes on his imaginary *soul-entity*. He has also spoken of "the spirit" as if it was the same thing as "the soul."—

For this we are sure he has no scripture authority. The scriptures never use these words interchangably, as words of the same import: no, not once in the Bible can he find such a use. Whatever these words import, in scripture use, they are marked as distinct in their application. Take one or two examples. Heb. 4 : 12, "The word of God is quick and powerful, and sharper than any two-edged sword, piercing even to the *dividing* asunder of *soul* AND spirit," &c.—The soul *and* spirit are not the same, then. Again, 1 Thess. 5 : 23, "I pray God your whole *spirit* AND *soul* AND *body* be preserved blameless," &c. A clear distinction between them. What right then has our author to use these terms as synonymous? And what authority has he for using either of them in our Lord's description of the "*doom*" of the wicked?" Just none at all: but it is very convenient to do so, because the common theological notion is, that "*the soul* is immortal;" and if man was seen standing at the judgment scene *as man* he is seen as *mortal—corruptible;* and then his everlasting living existence will depend upon the fact of his putting on immortality—*incorruption.* To prove such a putting *on* for the wicked our author has not a solitary text in the Bible; no, *not one.* Hence by substituting soul or spirit he saves all the difficulty of attempting to prove the mortal wicked put on immortality, or incorruption; because his school believe "the spirit is among the *most* enduring things;" hence, is not inferior to God in its *enduring* nature! Now to arraign *such* a "thing," and sentence *it* to everlasting punishment, proves "immortal pain," *positively!* To let man, *as man*, be the subject of the punishment would not answer his purpose; because he could not prove *man* thus "enduring" without proving an entire change in his constitution, for which our author has no authority in the case of the wicked.

We come now to our author's third proposition on the text, Math. 25 : 41–46, which is—

"*This doom implies continuance of being in its object.*" He adds

"The words everlasting *punishment* imply this." He says, "The word translated punishment, *kolasis*, is a word denoting not the consequence, but the act of punishing." * * * "It indicates not result so much as process." * * * "It corresponds more nearly to our word *chastisement*, and might not inaptly have been rendered *punishing* instead of punishment." * * * "Its prime etymological idea is that of maiming, cutting, mutilation, and the like."

Now what does all this arguing prove? Does it prove the wicked "put on immortality?" that their "corruption puts on incorruption?" If it proves anything, on our author's side, it proves the wicked are never to be punish*ed*—they are "punish*ing*," but never to be punish*ed*. It is about the same as to say, a man is dy*ing* but he is never to *die*. Now by our author's rule of interpreting language—"according to the laws of human speech"—we would not hesitate to say, such a construction of the words of our Lord is a simple "*absurdity*." But, taking one of the "prime etymological ideas" of the word *kolasis*, *viz.*, "*cutting*," and considering it with what is said of the righteous in contrast, and all is plain. "The righteous into *life* eternal;" but the wicked "shall go to the eternal *cutting*" off from *life*. Such an antithesis is required by "the laws of human speech:" and such we doubt not is the true import of the words.

This word, *kolasis*, is never used by our Lord on any other occasion; and he uniformly uses other words to express *torment* where torment is clearly intended. Let the following examples be pondered. Luke 16 : 23, 28, "He lifted up his eyes, being in *torments*"—*Basanois*. "Lest they also come to this place of *torment*"—*Basanou*. Rev. 9 : 5, "To them it was given that they should not kill them, but that they should be *tormented*"—*Basanisthosi*—"five months: and their *torment*"—*Basanismos*—"was as the *torment*"—*Basanismos*—"of a scorpion," &c. Rev. 18 : 17, "How much she hath glorified herself, and lived deliciously, so much *torment*"—*Basanismon*—"and sorrow give her."

It is easy to multiply texts to show that our Lord never

uses the word *kolasis* to signify torment, but another word *always* and invariably, unless the text Math. 25 : 46 be an exception; to prove it an exception our author is bound, we think, to prove the wicked "*put on* incorruption and immortality," neither of which have they up to the time of the judgment spoken of.

But, our author says, "It"—*kolasis*—"is the same word which is rendered torment in 1 John 4: 18; where it is said, 'There is no fear in love, because fear hath torment.' This is the only other passage exhibiting this word in the New Testament. If translated in this manner in the clause under inspection, ambiguity of meaning would have been impossible."

As it is translated, our author thus admits "*ambiguity* of meaning," and hence *positive* proof of his construction of it fails. But in 1 John 4 : 18, Prof. MURDOCK, in his translation of the Syriac, renders the sentence—"Fear existeth *in peril;*" which seems to be the true idea. But again, as *kolasis* has various significations, "cutting, hindrance, restraint," &c., as well as "punishment," it would be no forced construction to read 1 John 4 : 18, "Fear is a *hindrance* to love;" or, "is a *restraint* to love." Just that kind of *hindrance* to love is the idea of *eternal torments.*

Our author goes on—"We infer this doom carries the idea of conscious being, *because of the adjunct attached to the instrument of the punishment predicated,* (whether in reality or figure, is immaterial.) That instrument or adjunct is called *everlasting* fire. But why apply the epithet everlasting to the agent, unless to convey the idea of everlasting action? It certainly would seem frivolous to say the fire was everlasting but the torment inflicted was not so?"

Here is an acknowledgment by our author that he *infers.* And truly his *inference* is remarkable when we consider that the term *everlasting* was so often used among the Jews to signify an "*age,*" many of which have passed away. And in this text we think no violence is done to interpret the language of the fire of *the age* prepared for the devil and his angels. That *age* will be the *death age* of the wicked. But leaving the term everlasting without change in the trans-

lation, what is there strange in applying it to the fire, or "agent," of the sinner's punishment, supposing that punishment to be *literal death?* The saints had been *recovered* from death; and, according to our author, the wicked had *once* been *recovered* from it; but now comes their *final doom:* and to show that there never would be another recovery from death, it is said the agent of their death is everlasting: that cuts off all possibility of recovery. Is it then "frivolous" to express the final fate of the wicked by "everlasting fire," which precluded a revival into *life?* Must we invent, and add to the awful sentence, a new term—as our author has done—to make the doom more terrific than our Lord has made it? "The *torment* inflicted," saith our author. Now the text saith not a word about *torment*, more or less. Torment there may be, in being *cut off* from *life;* but that is no part of the punishment; it is an accident, or unavoidable circumstance in taking away life, which must be done by some instrument or agent. The stumbling stone of our author and his school is in their assumption that protracted *pain*, or torment, and *punishment* are necessarily identical. But, is this true? The highest crime known to human laws is murder. The *capital*, or highest *punishment* is not protracted *pain* but *death*, or *deprivation of life.* That is called "capital punishment:" not because more pain is endured by it than by some other punishment; but because *life is extinct.* The sufferings of body or mind, in this case, are no part of the punishment, but accidental, whether less or more. This penal infliction by man may not, in propriety of language, be called "everlasting punishment," because, our author and others maintain the criminal will be made alive again by his CREATOR. If the CREATOR dooms the wicked man to be *cut off* from life, as a *final* punishment, there is a propriety in calling it "everlasting punishment," and in representing its finality, and the impossibility of restoration, by the action of an "everlasting fire;" which impresses on the mind the idea of the utter impossibility of another revival into life.

These remarks may suffice to meet all our author says about the language of our Lord being "a mere sonorious and idle play upon words"—"a resort to a mere trick of language, a childish illusion of the imagination," &c., if the "duration of the *suffering*" of the wicked is not in eternal "conscious being." He repudiates the idea of our Lord's talking in such a childish and idle manner, and so do we; and we trust we have shewn it is neither childish nor idle in the view we take of the matter. But we must say, we think our author is not quite clear of talking in a "childish and idle" manner in his closing remarks of the paragraph from which we took our last extract, and to which the reader may refer if he wishes to see it, as we shall give it no other notice.

Our author says—"In case of the sentence of the great day, if the time-term of the fire is not meant to be that of its infliction of pain, we can see no reason why it is introduced here."

Perhaps our author "can see no reason" for it. What then? Does that prove no one else "can see" a "reason" for it? and a *good* reason too? Surely, he is not *eyes* for all others. We think a good reason is found in our previous remarks. It is to show that there is no deliverance—*no recovery* into life: that the *death*—the *cutting off from life*—is never to be revoked. Our author next introduces a specious fallacy. It runs thus:

"In applying the epithet *everlasting* alike to the life of the righteous and the punishment of the wicked, in continuous clauses, we cannot suppose our Lord, in pronouncing the irreversible doom, would palter in a double sense of the same word, making the life endless, but the penal suffering not so."

In this remark there is no force or weight if our author had not changed the word of our Lord from *punishment* to "*suffering*;" but to have kept up consistency he should also have changed the word *life* to *happiness;* but for that change he had not yet prepared the way, and it would have been a bare-faced perversion of our Lord's words at this stage of the argument. Now we have no idea that our Lord used the

term *everlasting* "in a double sense;" but we do believe his sentence contains a plain and true antithesis, thus—

The righteous will go to *life* eternal:

The wicked will go to the *cutting off* eternal.

Here is a perfect antithesis; and it shows that while the righteous go to life eternal, the wicked go to the eternal *cutting off from life:* the one state is just as endless as the other: the one class *live* eternally, the other is eternally *dead*.

Our author asks—"Does it not imply something *felt* everlastingly?"

We answer, unhesitatingly, *no*. It implies no such thing. He asks:

"Should we think of saying of a man shot or beheaded, that he departs into everlasting punishment, even though there is no recovery from it, and its effects are enduring?"

There is no parallel in the supposed case; and our author appears to have *felt* this fact; else why substitute "*enduring*" for *everlasting?* He believes the "effects" of a man's being "shot or beheaded" are *not* everlasting; because he *will* live again, in his opinion. If so, there may be no real propriety in saying he departs into everlasting punishment. But suppose a man "shot or beheaded" could never, by any possible means, be restored to life, would not the case be altered? and would there be any impropriety in saying, when he is led out for execution, he goes to everlasting punishment? It is not uncommon, even now, to say, "he has gone forever:" that is, he cannot come back to life: his punishment is everlasting.

Saith our author—"In common parlance you would no more speak of the punishment of the annihilated than of the uncreated."

This sentence is a mere cavil. Whoever speaks "of the punishment of the *annihilated*"? We do not, and we know of none who do. The punishment is *death*—it is to be *cut off from life:* or, if our author would like the expression

better, it is "annihilation": not punishing "the annihilated"; but punishing the wicked *by annihilation*, or by annihilating *them;* so that they shall "*be no more*", as the Psalmist prayed, Psa. 104: 35, "Let the sinners be *consumed* out of the earth, and let *the wicked be no more*"; and in view of such a result the Psalmist added—"Bless thou the LORD, O my soul. Praise ye the LORD." We think this *inspired* prayer will be answered; the "*Praise*" for its accomplishment will yet be heard from every living intelligence; but our author, it seems, thinks otherwise.

"Again," our author says, "the words 'everlasting punishment' imply everlasting continuance of being, because our Saviour must have *been conscious they conveyed that signification to those listening to him.*"

Here is another *assumption*, as we have before shown. None but our Saviour's disciples were "*listening* to him", when he uttered these words; and he had warned them, previously, to "beware of the doctrine of the Pharisees:" and that the disciples did not receive our author's view of the "signification" of "the words," will appear from the fact that in none of their recorded discourses in the *Acts*, nor in any *epistle* which they wrote, do they ever speak of everlasting torments, or eternal sufferings, nor endless misery. This fact shows that "those *listening* to" our Saviour's discourse, Math. 24th and 25th, did not have "*conveyed*" to them the "signification" our author contends for. To say, then—as our author has done—that "Jesus must have intended immortal woe," by the phrase "eternal punishment," because some of the Jews believed in such woe, is an unfounded assumption; for the disciples, who were the *only* "*listeners*" to that discourse, never give the least evidence, by anything they ever said or wrote, that they received such a doctrine from their Master's words.

"We think, then, our" author's "three propositions are" *not* proven in case of this text:" and that he has utterly failed

to establish the *last*. In concluding his argument on the text under consideration, he says—

"This is the most full, formal and methodic statement of the process and sentence of the final judgment to be found in the Scriptures, and taken in all its aspects, may be regarded as, not less, certainly, than any other, a text entitled to rule on this topic." To this we do not object; but he adds—"We pause here to inquire, then, whether the above passage, to one *looking at it by itself*, and bringing to its examination no theory to be established, and no prejudgments to be sustained, would not seem perfectly decisive of the whole question?"

We have italicised five words in this extract to attract the reader's attention to the fact, that our author asks us *to do* what the Scriptures *condemn;* and such a course is a "prejudgment" in itself, which is most unwarrantable. Inspired authority enjoins us to "*search the Scriptures;*" not to "look at" a text "by itself;" but as Paul did, "*comparing* spiritual things with spiritual." Pursuing this course, and accepting the inspired Paul as our Commentator, instead of an *un*inspired man, we learn that the punishment spoken of by our Lord, Math. 25, is "everlasting *destruction:*" see 2 Thess. 1: 9. The scenes described and the *time* of execution are the same in both these Scriptures, as the reader will see be "*comparing*" them together. Our Lord lays the scene "When the Son of man shall come in his glory, and all the holy *angels* with him," and Paul lays it "When the Lord Jesus shall be revealed from heaven with his mighty *angels;*" then, he tells us, certain wicked men 'shall be *punished* with *everlasting* DESTRUCTION." Till our author comes with his "prejudgment" to view this text, we shall say, it is "so plain and so unambiguous that there could be no mistaking its intent," if he and his associates had "no theory to be established," arising from their unscriptural assumption of an "*immortal* soul" in man.

Our author next proceeds to the contemplation, Mark 9: 43, 48. "And if thy hand offend thee, cut it off: it is better for thee to enter into life maimed, than having two hands, to go into hell, into the fire that never shall be quenched: where

their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched." To this and the parallel text, Math. 18: 8, the author applies his "*three propositions*," and says—

"First, That *this passage relates to the doom of the wicked after death, is beyond doubt.*" He adds—"We know of no criticism requiring notice, that questions it. We can conceive of no other rational construction in the case. Evidently the words could have had, to the Jews, with their notions of a future state, no other meaning."

We remark, in the first place, these words were not spoken to the "Jews" but to the disciples *alone*. Please examine the context in both chapters. Those disciples had been taught, as we have seen, to "beware of the doctrine of the Pharisees" who "made void the counsel of God by their *traditions*"—of which, the immortality of a *soul-entity* was one—and the Saviour pronounced them, to their faces, "*fools and blind.*" Math. 23: 19. The "notions" of these characters seem to be the *rule* by which our author would establish all his propositions, and assume that our Lord practiced deception if he did not use terms in the Pharisee's sense. But our Lord did sometimes use phrases which they understood in *their* sense while *he* had a different one; and did not undeceive them. While standing in the Jewish temple, he said to "the Jews"—"Destroy this temple, and in three days I will raise it up." John 2: 19. "Then said the Jews, 'Forty and six years was this temple in building, and wilt thou rear it up in three days?'" Did Jesus tell them, they misunderstood him? Not at all: nor was it till after "he was risen from the dead" that the disciples, even, understood that "he spake of the temple of his body." In numerous instances he spake to the blind, self-willed, and proud Jews in a manner they did not understand; nor did he undeceive them, for the obvious reason, they would not—like his disciples—ask an explanation. But our author assumes the position that our Lord's words must, on all occasions, be understood according to the Jewish construction of phrases.

When our Lord said to the Scribes and Pharisees—whom

he had called just previous "fools and blind"—"Ye serpents, ye generation of vipers, how can ye escape the damnation of hell"—"the condemnation of *gehenna*"—he must be understood, according to our author's view, as speaking of their "*doom after death;*" and possibly the Pharisees so understood him. Does it therefore follow that such was his meaning? We think not; and the context compared with Jer. 7th and 19th goes to prove conclusively, to our mind, that such was not his meaning. Our Lord tells these same persons, that upon them "shall come all the righteous blood shed upon the earth, from the blood of righteous Abel to the blood of Zacharias son of Barachias, whom ye slew between the temple and the altar. Verily I say unto you, *all these things* shall come upon THIS GENERATION." He then makes his lament over Jerusalem, and adds, "Behold your house is left unto you desolate." He had charged these Scribes and Pharisees with being engaged in filling "up the measure of" their "fathers'" iniquities; and thus, that *generation* were preparing themselves for the "condemnation of *gehenna.*" Was *that* condemnation some "doom *after death?*" If so, will our author give us the law threatening such a doom? Paul tells us "as many as have sinned in the law shall be judged by *the law;*" Rom 2: 12. Give us the law, then, that doomed the Jews, for their sins, to *gehenna* "AFTER DEATH." We fearlessly affirm, *there was no such law* ever given to the *Jews.* The *gehenna* our Lord speaks of, Math. 23: 33, is clearly the same spoken of Jer. 7th and 19th. Let the reader examine those chapters, and see if it is not evident the judgments written in those prophecies are what our Lord referred to when he said, "How can ye escape the condemnation of *gehenna?*" Let him remember that the term *Gehenna* is from *Ge—a valley,*—and *Hinnom*—a man's name. "*The Valley of Hinnom.*" This valley in former times was used in the worship of *Moloch;* and when the Jews departed from God they too burned their sons and daughters in the fire, in that valley, to bloody Moloch: see

Amos 5 : 26; and Jer. 32 : 35, where God charges the Jews that "they built the high places of Baal, which are in *the valley of the son of Hinnom*, to cause their sons and daughters to pass through the fire unto Molech." For such sins God threatened the Jews, if they did not repent and bring forth fruit meet for repentance, He would visit them and Jerusalem, and "kindle a fire" there, "and it shall not be quenched:" Jer. 17 : 27. "Behold the days come, saith the LORD, that it shall no more be called Tophet, nor The Valley of the son of Hinnom, but The valley of slaughter," &c.; Jer. 7 : 32–34. Again, Jer. 19th, God saith—"Because they have forsaken me" * * * and "have built also high places to Baal, to burn their sons with fire for burnt offerings unto Baal" * * * "therefore, behold, the days come, saith the LORD, that *this place* shall no more be called Tophet, nor The valley of the son of Hinnom, but The valley of slaughter. And I will make void the counsel of Judah and Jerusalem in *this place;* and I will cause them to fall by the sword before their enemies, and by the hand of them that seek their lives: and their carcases will I give to be meat for the fowls of heaven, and the beasts of the earth; and I will make this city desolate," &c. Now, saith the Saviour to the "fools and blind," viz., the Scribes and Pharisees of his time, "Fill ye up the measure of your fathers" * * * "how can ye escape the condemnation of *gehenna?*" that condemnation of which God spake by the prophet, just considered. Was this all to take place "*after death?*" So our author may assume; and so might the "hypocrites" to whom our Lord spoke construe it, seeing they had become *Paganized* in their "notions" about *souls* and a future life by a *present* immortality; and hence perverted the plainest texts of the Scriptures God had given them. But what right have we to affirm Jesus used the words in *their* sense, when their sense was a perverted one? Was it not their business to "*search the scriptures*," and get the sense from that, and not from their "traditions?" Jesus was responsible only

for his own sense in the use of words, especially when that sense was the true scriptural one. If the Jews had departed from that sense and adopted one of human invention, they must eat the fruit of their own corruption of the words of the MOST HIGH. Jesus was under no obligation to instruct them in other than scripture words, even though they did put a different construction upon such terms than that of their true import. It was their business to learn, by searching the scriptures, the proper sense of these terms and phrases, and not follow "fools, and blind" corruptors of the words of truth.

We then do not admit that the passage Mark 9 : 43, &c., necessarily relates to a "doom *after death*;" it may apply to such judgments as were coming on the impenitent of that "generation," resulting in their complete and total destruction from life, as the fire of gehenna destroyed, consumed irrecoverably whatever was cast into it. But whether the passage relates to an infliction closing this life or to a punishment "after death," in a revived state, it is the same thing as to the true import of the words—they denote *death*—utter and total destruction; "annihilation," if our author prefers that term, and "could have to the" unperverted "Jews no other meaning."

Look at this subject without a "prejudgment" and see if we are not correct.

"*Gehenna—The Valley of Hinnom*," south of Jerusalem—"*once celebrated for the horrid worship of Moloch, and afterwards polluted with every species of filth, as well as the carcases of animals, and dead bodies of malefactors, to consume which, in order to avert the pestilence which such a mass of corruption would occasion, constant fires were kept burning.*"—Gr. Lex.

Now let us ask, for what was anything cast into this fire? Was it to preserve and torment, or to *destroy?* Every one will answer, to destroy, or *annihilate* it. Very well; here is the *figure* of the "*doom*" of the wicked. No *Jew*, without

perverting its significance, could possibly understand this term, when employed relative to that "doom," as expressive of protracted torment. With the *Gentiles* neither our Lord or his apostles ever employed the term *gehenna*. To a Gentile its use as a figure would not be felt till it was explained. The Jew needed no explanation—it always expressed the idea of total and irrevocable destruction. With the Gentiles the apostles always used other terms, such as *death*, *destroy*, *destruction*, &c.

Now we ask those who have not "prejudged" the case, if the fact that the figure denotes utter destruction—and the fact that our Lord nor his apostles ever used this form of speech except to the Jews, does not afford overwhelming evidence that he spake not of protracted conscious existence to those doomed to the "*fire of gehenna?*" And that he did mean by it *death*, proper, and irrevocable, whether inflicted at the close of this life, or at the close of a future life *after* this? "*This*, certainly, is the only obvious, common sense import of the language used," to use our author's own words. "Common sense" saith, "unquenchable fire" is that which *destroys*, and cannot be arrested in its work of *destruction*. "Common sense" saith, the worm that dieth not will *devour* that on which it feeds. The two phrases combined—as in our Lord's discourse—"common sense" saith, are the strongest possible expressions for *total* destruction, or annihilation. And in this sense "unquenchable fire" is often used in the "scriptures" Jesus commanded the Jews to "*search.*" See Jer. 7 : 20; 17 : 27; Ezk. 20 : 47, 48. *Those* scriptures our author seems to pass very slightly to look at a text "*by itself;*" we have not so learned of Christ, but search the Old Testament that we may understand the New, believing both given by the inspiration of *one* Spirit.

Let us look a little more closely at Mark 9 : 43, &c., than our author appears to have done. What does the text say? "If thy hand offend thee, cut it off: it is better for thee to *enter into* LIFE maimed, than having two hands, to go into

hell"—*gehenna*—"into the fire that shall never be quenched," &c.

The reader will observe the thing to be gained, by cutting off the hand, is *life*—"*to enter into life.*" Then that which is the *loss* is *life*, or failing "to enter into life;" and the *figurative agency*—fire and worms—denote the sure and certain exclusion from life, by showing the continued "mortality and corruption" of the wicked, and hence their certain and irreversible destruction, as gehenna's fires devoured and destroyed whatever was cast therein.

The text therefore shows that the wicked are corruptible and mortal when this doom is inflicted upon them; and that they do *not* "enter into life," but DIE—for, "the wages of sin is *death;*" Rom. 6: 23; and "The soul that sinneth *it shall die;*" Ezk. 18: 4, 20. Whenever this doom occurs, then, it is inflicted on *mortal* beings; and the agencies employed—"whether figurative or literal"—make this certain: for *immortality* cannot suffer nor die: such an idea has no harmony with divine nor human language. Suffering and death are connected *only* with mortality. To us, it seems truly astonishing that intelligent and thoughtful men should not see that immortality and suffering can no more be amalgamated than fire and water: one or the other must recede —they cannot *co-exist.* This fact is so plain and self-evident that we shall spend no time in arguing it.

Let the advocates of "eternal pain" prove the contrary if they can: they will find they have something more difficult to prove than a "*universal negative.*" We regard the idea of an immortal being's suffering as a self-evident "*absurdity.*" Hence to claim Mark 9: 43, and parallel texts, as teaching such doctrine is a claim showing an utter destitution of any "direct" and "formal declarations" of "the immortal existence of the wicked," which our author promised to give, at the outset of his Scripture Argument. We find then, "positive reasons for interpreting" the "language" in the text under consideration adverse to our author's views, notwith-

standing he pronounces it a "sheer assumption" to do so.—If his interpretation was inspired it might be assumption to differ from it; as it is, we think the "sheer assumption" is on his side, as he has not presented the shadow of proof that the wicked change corruption for incorruption, and mortality for immortality *before, at the time* of, or *after* the judgment. And if he could do so—though he cannot—it would only demonstrate his theory, of "eternal pain," an "eternal absurdity," and an impossibility. Look where he will the Cherubim and flaming sword turn every way to keep the tree of life, lest sinning men should eat and live forever. God has *willed* they shall *not* "live forever:" "the wages of sin is *death;*" and as "no positive reasons appear for restricting" this language, "these terms must bear their full, natural meaning, and the doom affirmed must be *eternal*" DEATH.

But saith our author—"When our Saviour warns us against being cast into hell, 'where their worm dieth not and the fire is not quenched,' he certainly can design nothing else than to warn us of a doom which inflicts unquenchable and ever-gnawing pain."

Indeed! Have we not shown something more than probable reasons that he meant no such thing, but just the reverse? Is our author and his school possessed of so much more wisdom than he who was the "*wisdom* of God," that they can express their ideas of the punishment of the wicked in unmistakable language, so that none doubt they mean "immortal *sorrow*"—"eternal *pain*"—"endless misery"—while the Son of God used no such language, at any time, to express the doom of the wicked? Are they wiser than he? Have they learned to express themselves more clearly than the *Great Teacher?* If our Saviour meant "immortal existence in immortal woe"—as our author affirms—was he not just as capable of expressing himself in such unmistakable language as our author is? No one is in the least danger of misunderstanding our author's language; it needs no long and labored argument to establish the fact that he means "eternal *pain.*"

Our author's appeal to "*Judith*, though"—as he saith—"not of inspired authority," shows his barrenness of "Scripture argument," and proves only that men long ago, as well as now, made "void the words of God through their traditions."

Our author says, "The fact that the language and imagery here used" (Mark 9: 43) "may have been derived from a prophecy of the Old Testament of temporal calamities merely, affects not all this" (his) "interpretation, in the connection in which they here stand. They are here taken out of finite scene or date and transferred to eternity and the soul; and all limitary barriers fall."

This is truly "*sheer assumption.*" Where is our author's "thus saith the Lord" for it? And here, as elsewhere, he obtrudes "*the soul*" for *the man.* Not one word does our Lord utter in the text about "the soul" or "eternity." Our author manifestly felt himself in an awkward position after this assumption, and he set himself to break the force of a rebut from the Old Testament; in the first place, by insinuating that

"It would be difficult to prove that *even as used in the original prophecy*" the words "are limited." Our author then referring to the prophecy, Isa. 35, of "unquenchable fire, burning pitch," &c., "of Idumea," asks, "But have there *ever been* such phenomena in Idumea as are described in the above prediction?" He adds—"And that which was symbolized by those phenomena, a power of desolation, is it not truly still unquenched and unquenchable? and who shall say it shall ever be extinguished?"

Our author—perhaps not designedly—has left out of his consideration an important part of that prophecy which completely stultifies his conclusions. It is as follows—"It shall lie waste: *none shall pass through it* FOR EVER AND EVER." Here is the strong "*time-term*" about which our author has said so much: and yet the period expressed by that "time-term" has *ended;* for modern travelers not only "pass through" that land but describe it very minutely.

Our author goes on—"Then even the original prophecy from which these images are taken, which was predicated of things that evidently

lie in time, cannot be shown to have used these epithets except as significant of perpetuity. Much less then can it be of force to show they are taken in any less than infinite import, applied to the future of the soul."

But, we have "shown" that "for ever and ever" had a limitation; for men do now "pass through" Idumea. And we might urge that tho' the fire was unquenchable it did not imply an *endless action* on *victims;* for its action related to men, as well as to the land; otherwise, why not "pass through" it at any time? Our author says this fire is "still unquenched and unquenchable." But it does not *now* burn men, for they "pass through" the land unharmed: which it was said they should not do "for ever and ever."

Our author's remark about the "epithets" in the prophecy being "significant of *perpetuity*" indicates a doubt in his own mind of the correctness of his interpretation. Why not have said, "expressive of *eternal* duration"? That would not have answered his purpose; for the "*victim*"—even *the land*—will either be restored to fruitfulness, in the restitution, or be utterly destroyed in the final conflagration of earth. What then becomes of his eternal "*agency*"—unquenchable fire—and his "implied *victim*"? Turn which way he will the sword of truth hews his theory in pieces. But the words must have an "infinite import applied to the future of the soul," saith our author. That is begging the whole question at issue. It is assuming "the soul" to be an immortal entity; just the point to be proved, if it can be done; not forgetting that if successful in doing that, he must further prove that immortality and suffering can *co-exist;* which is denied.

But our author gives further evidence of *doubting* his interpretation of prophecy; and fearful it may be "proven" incorrect, and that the language is of "limited import", he proceeds to speak of "a plausible theory" by which he can convert the language into "prophetic symbols" and "types" of "the *final* catastrophe of all things." Well, suppose he

could do this, what does he gain? The "symbols and types," if they be such—which we do not admit till he proves it by something more than "a *plausible* theory"—all terminate in *literal destruction*, when threatened judgments are the subjects of them. But, this resort to symbols and types shows the lack of those "*direct*, *deliberate* and *formal* declarations," our author promised to give us in support of "the immortal existence of the wicked," and which thus far we have looked for in vain.

No wonder our author should start back from his *speculations* on prophetic symbols and types, and disclaim using them "as an argument of independent force." The fact is, it has *no* "*force*" at all except in his "feeling." Types and symbols are not to be the sport of uninspired theorists. Where inspiration has given us plainly their application we stand on the *rock:* speculations are *sand.* Such our author's appear to be in this case, and *nothing more.*

Our author saith—"Certainly the term *unquenchable* is not the one we should naturally select to indicate that the *soul* shall be burned up."

"Certainly" the Saviour saith nothing about "the *soul*" in the text: that *substitute* for *man's personality* is necessary for our author's theory; without it the baldness of his argument would be self-evident. Man, *as man*, is the subject of the discourse: *man*, who cuts off a right hand, or plucks out a right eye, in order to preserve himself, or "to enter into life." Will it be said, "the *soul*" can thus *dismember* itself? Who, we ask, keeps nearest to the divine testimony, our author or ourself? John the Baptist saith of Christ—"He will *burn up* the chaff with unquenchable fire." If the chaff does not represent the wicked, what does it represent? The prophet Malachi saith—"Behold the day of the LORD cometh, that shall burn as an oven; and all the proud, yea, all that do wickedly, shall be stubble: and the day that cometh *shall burn them up*, saith the LORD of hosts, that it shall leave them NEITHER ROOT *nor* BRANCH."

Here is a "thus saith the LORD," that whatever constitutes the wicked, whether made up of "*soul*" alone—as our author's words would seem to affirm—or whatever enters into their composition, *all* is consumed—nothing is left. Such a text sweeps all our author's "plausible" *theories* to the winds.

Our author's next effort is to get clear of Isa. 66: 24, from which our Lord's words Mark 9: 43 are clearly borrowed. He says—

"It will not suffice to say that the process of the destruction of bodies by the worms must be limited; for the scene described in those words of Isaiah is probably symbolical, and that *the thing symbolized* shall not be perpetual, is just the thing to be proved."

Indeed! "*Probably*" it is "*symbolical*"! Please give us a "thus saith the LORD;" then *conjectures* will not be needed. Till our author "proves" his conjecture—which he thinks "*probably*" may be true—"just the thing to be proved" lies on his shoulders, not ours. Let him prove there is any *symbol* about the language. Till he does that we meet his conjecture with a simple *denial*.

But, adds our author—"It remains to be proved that if of limited significancy applied to things in time, it must of course have the same restriction of literal import applied to things in eternity."

Let our author "prove" that this language is ever "applied to things in eternity." That is an important point, which as yet he has not met. He has given us no "thus saith the Lord" for such an assumption: it rests on no higher authority than his *conjecture* and his "*probably*."

Our author concludes his remarks on Mark 9: 43 by a sort of special plea that our Lord could not be guilty of deceiving his hearers: and he introduces again the "Jews," and their notions, which we have fully met before, so that we need not to add much here. The "Jews" were not his "*auditory*;" and he had sufficiently warned his disciples against *their doctrine*"; and as our Lord was talking to *plain* men, taken from their fishing, and other honest employments, he

would be likely to address them in *plain* language. He said nothing to them about "immortal souls," nor any other "souls" in this discourse; but spoke of their *personality* just as they appeared to themselves, *as men.* As such—whole and entire—he spoke of *entering* "*into life*," and of their *whole selves* perishing, if they did not put away that which might cause them to sin: and he spoke of that perishing as a failure "to enter into life;" and of their being cut off from life by such agencies as forever excluded the hope of a recovery from death. That such was the understanding of the apostles is manifest—as we have before stated—from *the fact* that they never employed such unscriptural phrases as our author and his school continually employ when they speak of the doom of the wicked—such as, "*immortal sorrow—eternal pain—endless misery*, or *torments*," &c. Such language is not employed by those who "*listened*" to the discourses of our Lord, or who like Paul was taught the doctrine he preached by a direct "*revelation*" from Jesus after his ascension to heaven. That such men, thus taught, never—*no never*—gave utterance to such language as modern *divines* use, in speaking of the doom of the wicked, is a sufficient refutation of all this special pleading for "immortal sorrow—eternal pain—endless torments," &c. "*Death—die—destroy—destroyed—destruction—burned—burned up—consumed—perish—utterly perish*," and the like, are the chosen phrases of men commissioned and inspired to promulgate the doctrine of Christ on this momentous subject. These chosen phrases, we have seen our author and his school attempting to convert to their theory in violation of "the laws of human language, interpreted according to the laws of human speech." Such an anomaly in interpretation can only be accounted for by *the fact* that they have started their investigations with the *assumption* of man's duality, one half of which is an "*immortal soul:*" this assumption is not like the "philosopher's stone" that converted every thing "into gold;" but it much more resembles the fabled

"*bohun-upas*;" it *poisons* or destroys every truth of the Bible, till it has driven thoughtful men to real or supposed infidelity: *i. e.* to a rejection of the Bible itself, or a rejection of the theological interpretations of its teachings, such as we have been considering; which, in the minds of these theologians, is "infidelity;" but in fact is only a denial of *their infallibility*.

Our author's closing remark on Mark 9 : 43, we insert for future reference and a passing remark. Speaking of "*everlasting* flame" and "the *undying* worm" he says—

"We shudder to ask" * * * "how much shall God subtract from the years of eternal life, that he may limit the ages of immortal sorrow?"

Here, if we do not misunderstand him—and we see not from the connection how we can—he expressly declares the *wicked* have "*eternal life*," in contradiction to the most plain and positive declarations of inspiration; for, "the *wages* of sin is *death*, but the *gift* of God is *eternal life*, through Jesus Christ our Lord:" Rom. 6 : 23.

As our author finds none of those "direct, deliberate, and formal declarations" that "teach the *immortal existence* of the wicked," which he promised us, he now takes his stand in a book confessed by nearly all expositors most difficult of explanation, because so highly figurative and symbolical. Here he commences with Rev. 14 : 9–11, "If any man worship the beast" * * * "he shall be tormented" * * * "and the smoke of their torment ascendeth up forever and ever."

"Here," he says, "the only question is, *Does the passage relate to the doom of the wicked after death?*"

He will find, however, that is *not* "the *only* question," for he opens by saying—

"First the adverb of duration applied (*eis aionas aionon*, unto eternity of eternities,) like our phrase, for ever and ever, is the strongest expression known to the language to convey the idea of *absolute eternity*, and must carry that meaning, if the subject and connection can receive it."

Our author, it seems to us, has overthrown his own argument, by admitting a *plurality* of "eternities." There are more *eternities* than one, it seems; and the torment of the wicked spoken of is only "*unto* THE eternity of eternities." If our author had translated the language "unto the AGE *of the ages*," we think he would have had the exact sense of the language. The torment is to precede the *great age*—the age of Messiah's reign on the earth—and extends "*unto*" *that age*, which is truly *the age* of the ages. There has been the *Adamic* AGE: the *Patriarchal* AGE; the *Jewish*, or *Mosaic* AGE; the *Gospel* AGE; next comes the AGE of Messiah's personal reign, which is "THE AGE of the *ages*"—the consummation of the dispensations of God with men, so far as distinctly revealed. It is "*unto*" that "age of the ages" the "worshippers of the beast"—living at the time that *age* of the ages is about to open—are tormented. Judgments, commenced on that class of wicked men spoken of, are to precede that day and have no cessation or interruption: they will be tormented most fearfully without relief or rest "*unto* the age of the ages"—not *after* it. Let that fact be remembered.

This view avoids the "absurdity" of multiplying eternity proper, which is "inhabited" *alone* by "the High and Lofty One." See Isaiah 57: 15, the only place in the Bible where the word "*eternity*" occurs in our translation.

To the question, then, "Does the text apply to the state of the wicked beyond the grave?" we give an unqualified, NO: it is *this side* of "*the age* of the ages," and only extends "*unto*" it. But our author says—

> "It would seem from the nature and extent of the scene disclosed, that the fulfillment of these words could find no place in time, or the finite. Its only theater must be eternity."

We might respond, "It would seem from the" characters spoken of—"worshippers of the beast"—and "the scene disclosed" in the fulfillment of the threat, that "these words" must relate to inflictions "*upon the earth*," and in *this life;* and are, therefore, *not* "*after death.*"

The previous chapter gave us an account not only of the beast and his image, but the threatening of the beast, "that as many as would not worship the image of the beast should be *killed;*" verse 15. To counteract this, God caused an angel to make the terrible threatening in the text; and its appropriateness to deter men from obeying the beast is apparent.

The chapter following the text opens thus—"I saw another sign in heaven, great and marvelous, seven angels having the seven *last* plagues; and in them is *filled up* the wrath of God." The original is "In them was completed the wrath of God."

Mark well, these plagues are the *last* on some body; and they are to have a *completion;* hence it is impossible that they can be eternal, or *endless.* Now observe, verses 7 and 8, it is said, "One of the four vital beings gave unto the seven angels seven golden vials full of the wrath of God," &c. "And the temple was filled with smoke from the glory of God, and from his power; and *no man* was able to enter into the temple, *till* the seven plagues of the seven angels *were fulfilled,*" *or completed.*

Let it be distinctly noted, these plagues are THE LAST, and that they COMPLETE *the wrath of God* on the power to be visited; and also that no MAN can enter into the *temple of God* till they are COMPLETED. Now what follows—If these plagues, or part of them, fall on the wicked spoken of in chap. 14: 9–11, then either no man ever can enter the temple of God, or the wrath spoken of will have been completed, or finished. Now listen—"I heard a great voice out of the temple, saying to the seven angels, Go your ways, and pour out the vials of the wrath of God [*where?*] UPON THE EARTH:" not in hell, nor the moon, nor any other fancy location. "And the first went and poured out his vial *upon the earth.*" Well, what happened? "And there fell a *noisome and grievous sore* upon *the men* which had THE

MARK OF THE BEAST, and upon them which WORSHIPED HIS IMAGE."

Here is the commencement of the exact fulfillment of the threatening in chap. 14. *There* we find the *threatening; here* the wrath in a course *of accomplishment*, and it has not missed the persons threatened. These plagues are *all* to fall on men upon the earth; chap. 16: 1; they are the "filling up the wrath of God," and they are "*the last:*" and till they are filled up and completed, no man can enter the temple of God: then what becomes of "*the eternity of eternities*" of their torment? It has passed away, like other *fancies of mere theorists.*

The judgments embraced in these seven last plagues are fully developed in the 16th, 17th, 18th, and 19th chapters, and result in the entire destruction of "*Babylon the great*" —which seems to be only another symbol of the beast. Babylon is judged, condemned, thrown down, burned with fire, and to "*be found no more at* all," chap. 18: 21. The terrible torments inflicted on her, and her devotees, as set forth in the chapters named, is a full and perfect fulfillment of chap. 14: 9 to 11; and it is seen to be "*on the earth;*" and no support or countenance is given to the assumption of endless sin and suffering by it.

As we have shown that the threatened wrath is to be "upon the earth," and that it must have a *completion*, or no man can ever enter the "*temple in heaven*," it is unnecessary to spend time to prove that the term, forever and ever, in the text, is used, as often elsewhere, to signify no more than an undefined period. We might greatly extend remarks on this subject; but trust enough has been said to convince all candid inquirers, and more would not avail with bigots, and dealers in mere assumptions.

We judge we have fully met and refuted our author's interpretation of Rev. 14: 9–11. If we needed to add anything more, it would be only to show the "absurdity" of applying a threatening of a particular and *specified* class of

sinners to *all* sinners. Our author's theory makes God's threatening against this specified class—*viz.*, the "worshipers of the beast"—to amount to just this—"If any man worship the beast I will punish him precisely as I will all other sinners;" thus converting a *special* threat into a *common* one, which is a manifest "*absurdity.*"

ALBERT BARNES, in his analysis of Revelation, says, chap. 14: 9–12 "tells the final overthrow of all the *upholders* of that anti-christian power," *viz.*, papacy. See his "*Notes.*"

Our author attempts to fix the judgments of Rev. 14: 9–11 "after death" by referring to Rev. 19: 20; with what success we will now see. He says—

"It is identical with the representation of retribution unquestionably in the spiritual and coming world, found in Rev. 19: 20—'And the beast was taken, and with him the false prophet that wrought miracles before him, with which he deceived them that had received the mark of the beast, and them that worshiped his image. These both were cast alive into a lake of fire, burning with brimstone.'

Now that this scene does *not* belong to "retribution unquestionably *in the spiritual and coming world*," our author might have seen by including the verse following, which was necessary to complete the "scene." It reads thus—

"And *the remnant* were *slain* with the sword of him that sat upon the horse, which sword proceeded out of his mouth: and *all the fowls were filled with their flesh.*"

This does not look much like a scene "in the *spiritual* world." And then, when *all* the wicked are cast into the torments of an endless fire—as our author's theory maintains—what "REMNANT" is there left to be "*slain* with the sword?" and what "*fowls*" are there, *after* earth's conflagration, to be "filled with their *flesh?*" Aye! and what "*flesh*" is there to feed on?

Besides all this, the scene Rev. 19: 20 describes the fate of the "*beast* and the false *prophet*," and of them *alone;* and has nothing to do with "the *worshipers* of the beast." The text saith expressly, "*These* BOTH were cast," etc.; not

these both and *their worshipers*, as it should do to give any countenance to our author's construction of it.

Whatever is symbolized by the beast and false prophet are the subjects of this "retribution," and the symbolical *agency* represents *destruction*, not *preservation* in any state.

The action of *fire* invariably *extinguishes* LIFE in any object which possessed it: though the *process* of extinction may be attended with suffering, yet its result is to destroy life. Hence fire, as an agent, imports no more, necessarily, than a total extinction of the victim.

Our author next attempts to connect the fate of the devil, Rev. 20 : 10, with his argument, as proof of the same fate for all the wicked. To say nothing of the devil here as a *symbol* of some earthly *dynasty*, we meet the point, and all our author has said upon it, with *two facts:*

First, the devil is to be destroyed. "For this purpose the Son of God was manifested, that he might destroy the works of the devil;" 1 John 3 : 10. "For as much then as the children are partakers of flesh and blood, he" [Christ] "also himself likewise took part of the same; that through death he might *destroy him* who had the power of death, that is, *the devil;*" Heb. 2 : 14. "The LORD God said unto the serpent" * * * (is it "that *old serpent*" Rev. 20?) "I will put enmity between thee and the woman, and between thy seed and her seed, IT *shall bruise* THY HEAD, and thou shalt bruise his heel;" Gen. 3 : 14, 15.

Bruising a serpent's head is to extinguish life—*to utterly destroy him.* The Son of God for this purpose was manifested to "destroy the devil," his "works," and "death," of which the devil "had the power."

Here is a clean sweep; and "according to the laws of human language, interpreted according to the laws of human speech," forever settles the question of the literal destruction of the devil and all his works; including, of course, all his children. Whatever then may be the nature or duration

of the torments, that *precede* the consummation, they *cannot be eternal*, in our author's sense of that term.

Our *second fact*, in disproof of our author's interpretation of these texts, is found Rev. 5 : 13. "And every creature which is in heaven, and on the earth, and under the earth, and such as are in the sea, and *all* that are in them, heard I saying, Blessing, and honor, and glory, and power, be unto him that sitteth upon the throne, and unto the Lamb forever and ever."

If this language does not embrace all *living* intelligences we cannot conceive how such an idea could be expressed; and "according to the laws of human language, interpreted according to the laws of human speech," if it does not "annihilate" the wicked, it *does* "annihilate" our author's entire theory of "immortal sorrow," and "eternal torments" of conscious "victims." The time shall come when every living intelligence shall praise God and the Lamb; and our author may take which "horn of the dilemma" suits him best—*the universal* CONVERSION *of the devil and his children*, or *their universal* ANNIHILATION. We believe in the latter. But which way soever he turns, the flaming sword of truth hews his Dagon of "immortal sorrow and eternal pain" in pieces; and we trust he may yet rejoice that he has been emancipated from that "gulf of night" where he went, at the outset of his arguments, to "apply the ear to the infinite gloom, to see whether" he might "not perchance catch, coming up through its mystery and silence, the accents of immortal sorrow." Our brother applied his "ear" to the wrong place; and no wonder misty ghosts or goblins have flittered before his eyes, and whispered in his ears sounds of "immortal sorrow and eternal pain." Men generally raise such ghosts as they seek after. The spirit of evil, under such circumstances, is ever present to suggest the most awful, if not blasphemous thoughts of God. In love to our brother, and his associates in theory, we have endeavored to call him away from "the gulf of night" to the *clear* light of

God's *plain* and eternal truth, and ask him to "look up," and open his "ear" to the song of "*every creature*" ascribing "blessing, and honor, and glory, and power" to God and the Lamb.

Having finished his "*Ruling Texts*"—three in number—and not having produced one *plainly* affirming the *immortality* of the wicked, our author enters on the work of a special plea against the *plain* and obvious meaning of the multitude of texts which speak of the reward of the righteous and the punishment of the wicked. He opens this part of the subject as follows—

"Now it may, in the first place, be an essential question, if there is a seeming discrepancy of common, obvious, and literal imports, which ought to yield; passages plain, explicit, direct, positive, deliberately, and solemnly declarative, or those exhibiting testimony indirect, incidental, allusive?"

Our author thinks the latter ought to "yield;" and in this we are happy to be, for once, *perfectly agreed* with him. He goes on thus—

"If, then, destruction, death, perdition, are predicated of wicked souls, it must be such death, destruction, and perdition as can coexist with everlasting punishment; i. e. with endless, conscious suffering. We can understand them no otherwise than as meaning a spiritual ruin in immortal progress."

Thus our author starts on his career of upturning hundreds of texts from their plain and obvious import with talk about "wicked *souls*," and "spiritual ruin in immortal progress." To have spoken of "wicked" *men* would not have answered his purpose—*they* are too material, and self-evidently *mortal;* their ruin, then, might have been a *literal* one, and not merely "a spiritual." We cannot forbear to call attention again to this fact—though we have done it before—that he has throughout his arguments labored to keep a *soul-entity* before the reader, instead of speaking of men *as men.* He has ignored *man, as man,* throughout. By what authority has he done this? We know he has not done it

by scripture authority: the Bible knows nothing and reveals nothing of man *only as man.* Such a plain statement as the Mosaic account of man's origin and nature, is quite too material for our author; and he chooses to depart from it to talk about "the soul," to which the God-made man is nothing but a "material *companion.*" He has, we repeat it, thoughout his arguments, ignored the Mosaic account of *man*, and substituted in its place a fancy *soul-entity*, which has no likeness nor resemblance to the Scripture man.—Having thus departed from the Bible man, and substituted an imaginary being, he can give it what qualities and properties he pleases, and talk about its immortality, "immortal sorrow," and "endless sufferings;" and all the plain teaching of the Bible, of the wicked *man's* DEATH-doom, must flee before this *ghostly spectre*, misnamed "*the soul.*" Hear him: he says—

"We contend that the wonted and normal usage of the terms" (*death*, &c.) "claimed as teaching annihilation, presents, when predicated of the soul, a widely different meaning."

Does any one fail to see, by our author's own acknowledgment, that "death," &c., would literally mean *death*, if man was considered *as man?* If the threat that wicked *men* "shall be punished withe verlasting *destruction*" was "predicated" of *man*, as such, it would be a *literal* destruction. But as this would be fatal to our author's theory, *man* is thrust aside, and carefully hidden from sight, while another entity, called "*the soul*," is thrust into view. "Who hath required this at your hands"? might be asked of our author with as terrible emphasis as when such language was used by the LORD to ancient Israel. What right has he, or any other man, to displace *man* and substitute a *soul-entity?* And to add to this imposture, the imposing idea that this *soul* is immortal, stands out in the foreground—without one "thus saith the Lord" for it—to change hundreds of texts from their plain and literal sense into mere *figures* of speech. Such is

the position of this question at the point where our author has arrived.

"God hath spoken to *man*," said our author, and added—"He has spoken then, according to the laws of human language, and it is to be interpreted according to the laws of human speech." To this sentiment we responded a hearty approval. But now our author is about to ignore this law of interpretation, and drops "*man*" to whom "God has spoken," and takes "*the soul*." Is *that* man? Man is *a* soul—"a *living* soul" while alive, but a *dead* soul when dead. But that is not "the soul" of which our author speaks: no, they are as unlike as light and darkness: as unlike as *reality* and a *fancy*.

The terms which our author is about to encounter—and which he wishes to evade—express the idea of the literal destruction of the wicked, and are used and repeated more than two hundred times in the Scriptures; such as Death, Die—Destroy, Destroyed, Destruction—Perish—Lose life—Burned, Burned up—Not be—Come to an end—Consumed—Devoured—Slain—Cut off—Blotted out—Ground to powder—Hewn down—Reap corruption—Torn in pieces—Rooted up—Be as nothing and a thing of nought," &c. More than two hundred declarations which "God hath spoken to *man*", in plain language, which cannot be misunderstood—"according to the laws of human speech"—are now to be converted into figures by a spectre called "*the soul*"! A mighty task; and our author has set upon it with a zeal worthy of a champion who seeks to defend "immortal sorrow" and "endless suffering." Our author's first attempt is to displace LIFE, and ETERNAL LIFE," and *death*, from their obvious and natural import "according to laws of human speech." He says—

"The terms life and death, with their derivatives, cognates, and equivalents, are frequently applied by our Saviour to the spiritual condition of men; and his usage of them may be regarded as the model of that of the New Testament generally, in which part of the Scriptures alone, our present argument requires us to trace their imports."

That the Saviour *sometimes* used the terms *life* and *death* in reference to a moral state we do not deny: all such cases are obvious—no other construction could rationally be put upon his words, and no thoughtful man would misunderstand the language in such instances. But that our Saviour *generally*, or very "frequently", used such terms of the mere "spiritual condition of men," we do deny. The system of interpretation our author adopts is "foreshadowed" as follows—

"In some passages, the Old Testament usage might be shown to foreshadow that of the New, especially in the primal threat denounced against eating the fruit of the forbidden tree, 'In the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die'—which, interpreted in the light of its fulfillment, seems to apply the term death to a change that should pass upon the spirit in the day of the transgression."

We thank our author for condescending to glance at the Mosaic account of *man;* but where he found an entity called "the spirit" in that account he has not told us: and that the threat—"THOU shalt *surely die*"—applied to "a change upon *the spirit*" is a most unwarrantable assumption; and we do not wonder our author asserted it so cautiously: he says it "*seems*" to do so. How does it "seem" to? Why, saith he, "in the light of its *fulfillment.*" What is that *light?* and *where* is it? There is no such light in the language employed in the threat: there is none in the LORD God's formal declaration relating to its "fulfillment"; but just the reverse—"Out of the ground wast *thou* taken: for *dust*" [*not* "*spirit*"] "THOU art, and *unto dust* shalt THOU return." This does not look much like sustaining our author's assumption that the *death* threatened was "a change that should pass upon the spirit." Not one solitary text in the Law or the Prophets—*i. e.*, in the Old Testament—can our author find, where the phrase "*surely die*" occurs, in which any thing other than a literal death of the man is expressed. To talk of its applying to "a change upon the spirit," as distinguished from *the man*, or of its applying to a "spiritual"

death, is *not* to "speak according to the law and the testimony" of the Old Testament; and "if they speak not according to this word, it is because there is no light in them:" Isa. 8: 20.

Our author, as usual, now casts *man* aside, and proceeds to say—

"Let us then examine Christ's usage of these terms applied to the soul, and see if they are, as thus employed by him, mere synonyms of existence or non-existence."

Here our author stumbles at the very outset. Who pretends "these terms" are "mere synonyms of existence or non-existence"? No one, that we are aware of. Certainly *we* do not. Does the term *life*, in "common and normal usage," applied to creatures having intelligence, signify *living* existence? Does the term *death*, thus applied, signify the cessation of *living* existence? These are the questions which our author was bound to answer, but which he has not touched; but with his fancy *soul-entity* he has introduced for us a fancy definition of the terms in dispute, which we neither allow nor accept. Henceforth he "fights as one that beateth *the air*." See 1 Corth. 9: 26. Had he stated the question truly, and in our own words, there could have been but one answer. and that is adverse to his theory.

"The word *life*," saith our author, "as used in the Scriptures to denote a benefit bestowed by Christ on believers, is never equivalent to mere existence."

Truly! And who ever said it was "equivalent to *mere* existence"? No one: but it is often used for a *living* existence, as our author will find we shall demonstrate before we have done.

"What is mere existence predicated of the soul?" asks our author.

Truly. A very appropriate question about "*the soul*." But he adds—

"Can we conceive of it separate from intellectual and moral cha-

racter and actions? Does it not live only in such character and act?"

Then *infants* have no "*souls*" to be *conceived* of: for they have no "character and acts" at the first dawn of life. Our author continues—

"The *life* of the soul hereafter is its continuance as a *soul* in its normal state, in its proper, healthful action and harmonies. The body may *exist* and not *live;* so may the soul. Without certain functional action sustained, it is a dead soul."

"Soul, *soul*, *soul*," fills our author's vision. Well, he is not likely to find *man;* if he should, all his questions are answered at once. Take his last remark and put the proper word *man* where he has used *soul*, thus—"The *life* of *the man* hereafter is his continuance *as a man* in his normal state, in his proper, healthful action and harmonies." Has not this simple and true paraphrase stultified his whole theory of *life?* Clearly it has.

Such a soul as our author speaks of is unknown in Scripture language. The only original word in the New Testament translated *soul* is *psuchee*. The word occurs, in the history of our Lord, as given in the four gospels, about fifty times, not including parallels. Fifteen times it is translated *soul* and nineteen times *life*. Coming to the texts, where *psuchee* occurs with no "pre-judgment" in the case, there is not one of them that could be made to harmonize with our author's idea of "the soul." There is scarcely an instance where the translators have used the English word *soul* for *psuchee*, which would not have been more expressive had they used *life*, or the personal pronouns, "*I*"—"*myself*," &c. expressing the proper *personalty*. Take a few examples. Christ saith to his disciples, Math. 26: 38—"My *soul* is exceeding sorrowful, even unto *death*." Was this *such* a soul as our author speaks of? Could *such* a soul *die?* Will our author say, Yes? Then he yields the whole argument; for he will not pretend Christ's *soul* could die *such* a death as he is contending for, *viz:* a moral or *spiritual* one. Then

if Christ's soul was to die, at all, it must have been a literal death: in other words, it was Christ, *personally*, who was to die, and who did die, as the Scriptures abundantly testify. The text then strictly rendered, reads—"*I* am exceeding sorrowful even unto death."

Again, Math. 12: 18, God by the prophet, saith—"Behold my servant whom I have chosen: my beloved, in whom *my soul* is well pleased." Read this—"In whom *I* am well pleased," and have we not the exact sense? Luke 2: 35—Simeon said to Mary—"Yea, a sword shall pierce through thy own soul also:" *i. e.* "through *you*": distress and sorrow shall pierce *thy mind*, *thyself*.

Take Math. 16: 26—which would be the most like sustaining our author's view of "the soul" of any text—and couple it with verse 25—from which in fact it cannot be separated—and what is the result? Let it be remembered *psuchee* is the original word translated *life* twice in verse 25, and *soul* twice in verse 26. Now what authority was there for this variation in the translation? Just none at all. Even Dr. Adam Clarke, though a believer in the *soul-entity* of our author, was compelled to acknowledge there is no authority for such a variation, and says—"sure I am it means *life* in both verses." See his Commentary on the text. Read the two verses thus—"Whosoever will *save* his *life*"—*psucheen*—"shall *lose* it: and whosoever will lose his *life*"—*psucheen*—"for my sake, shall find it: *for* what is a man profited, if he shall gain the whole world and lose his own *life?*"—*psucheen*—"or what shall a man give in exchange for his *life?*"—*psuchees*. Compare this with our Lord's words. John 12: 25, "He that loveth his *life*"—*psucheen*—"shall lose it; and he that hateth his *life*"—*psucheen*—"in *this* world, shall keep it unto *life*"—*zŏeen*, not *psucheen*—"eternal."

To seize upon a word which manifestly has no *such* sense as that our author attaches to *soul*, and make that the basis of his entire argument—and to talk about the meaning of

the terms *life* and *death* when "applied to *the soul*," is to beg the whole question at issue. Is *man* immortal? can *man* DIE? Can "*man* LIVE again?" Can man's *life* become EXTINCT—so that *as man* he shall "*be no more*"? Can *man* "*live* forever," or have an *endless life?* These are the true questions at issue, and which our author has totally evaded. He has utterly separated or "put assunder what God hath joined together." He talks of "a dead soul" which cannot "fly from its own dead self as from its dead material *companion*"! He has "annihilated" the *Bible man* to make place for a *traditionary* and *imaginary* being.

Let it then be distinctly understood, that, while our author talks about a *soul-entity*, we shall talk of man, *as man;* and thus keep "to the law and the testimony." And let it be further understood, that the question to be considered is *not* whether the term *life* is sometimes used in a secondary and figurative sense to "mean more" than "mere existence" —such as happiness, or a moral condition even—all this we admit: but, when "LIFE and ETERNAL LIFE" are held out to be sought after, as a matter of *promise* by God, through His Son, has it or does it include the idea of continued and unending *living* existence? We affirm it does. Our author's entire argument is null unless he denies it. If he denies it, he robs the Son of God of the honor of being—in the proper sense of the word—the *Life-Giver.*

With these remarks we pass nearly all our author's labor to prove what we have never denied, *viz.*, the use of the terms sometimes in a figurative or *secondary* sense, and affirm—

That LIVING *existence, and that only, or chiefly, is meant by the terms* "LIFE, *and* ETERNAL LIFE" *in* SOME *passages of Scripture.* If that is shown, beyond a reasonable doubt, then has our author "labored in vain and spent his strength for naught."

First, then, let us look at the connection of one of our author's first and principal texts, John 5: 26—"As the

Father hath *life* in himself, so hath he given to the Son to have *life* in himself." Is there any doubt but that *life* proper—or *living* existence—is what is meant in this text? This is an important text as the foundation, showing from whence the promised life—eternal life—is to come.

Our author quotes verse 24—"He that heareth my word, and believeth on him that sent me, hath everlasting life, and shall not come into condemnation; but *is* passed from death unto life," and says—

"Everlasting life is here affirmed as a *present possession* of the soul and death is spoken of as a *past condition* of souls that have begun to live." He adds—"Surely that condition was not one of non-existence, but of moral ruin. But the import of death, by antithesis, must define that of life used in immediate juxtaposition."

Here our author, as usual, substitutes "*soul*" for our Lord's "He that heareth," &c. Our Lord makes it *the person—the man;* our author makes it "*the soul.*" "Everlasting life is a *present possession* of the soul," he says; "of souls that have begun to live." Let us here ask our author—Can these *souls* now *suffer?* Can they be *unhappy?*—Can they be "exceeding sorrowful?" If so, the "*possession*" of "everlasting life" is no security for unmixed *happiness:* and what becomes of the idea of his school that "eternal life" means "eternal *happiness?*" Did our author mean to teach his scholars a better lesson? We hope so. At any rate he has exploded that *notion;* for the believer has "everlasting life as a *present possession;*" but he is not always *happy:* far otherwise. We thank our author for putting this *rod* of correction upon the unruly of his school: we hope they will not pervert the words of inspiration any more.

"Everlasting life is here affirmed as a *present possession*" to *him* that "believeth." That in a qualified sense *we* believe. The believer does not die, as other men die. Christ takes the believer's *life* into his own keeping. If the believer falls "*asleep*"—for that is all he does—his "life is"

still "hid with Christ in God; and when Christ our life shall appear, *then* shall" the believer "appear with him in glory;" Col. 3:3, 4. "Everlasting life" is the believer's "present possession;" and it is *the life* he now has; which "whosoever will *lose* for" Christ's "sake, he shall find it:" see Math. 16:25. It is the eternal perpetuation of his LIVING *existence;* not another and a different life from the present, but its restoration by resurrection, and its permanent continuance. Such a continuance in life would Adam have had if he had not sinned. By sin he lost the right to everlasting life, and was excluded from the tree of life, *lest* he should "take and eat thereof, and *live forever.*"

Will our author, or some of his school, tell us if the LORD God meant by that exclusion of Adam to prevent his ever obtaining a "*spiritual* life?" Did He mean to keep him from ever becoming *holy?* But this is a little digression, though a very natural one.

After all, the *actual* "posseesion of everlasting life" is reserved for "the world to come." "He shall receive," saith our Lord, "*in the world to come* eternal life;" Mark 10:30. And Paul said to Timothy, "Fight the good fight of faith; *lay hold* on eternal life;" 1 Tim. 6:12. It was still future, notwithstanding Timothy's "*spiritual*" life.

The believer "is passed from death unto life." "Death is spoken of," saith our author, "as a *past condition.*"—True; but did our author not observe that it is "*condemnation*" to "death," that was the "past condition?" So it is evident from the text itself. Besides, our Lord taught Nicodemus, two chapters previously, "He that believeth on him [the Son of God] is *not* condemned: but he that believeth not *is condemned already*," &c. The believer does *now* pass from "condemnation" to "death unto life." The sentence of *death*, in his case, *is revoked.* He is *in Christ*, and Christ's Spirit is *in* him; and saith an apostle, Rom. 8:11, "If the Spirit of Him that raised up Jesus from *the dead* dwell in you, He that raised up Christ from *the dead*

shall also quicken your mortal bodies by His Spirit that dwelleth in you."

Was Jesus *spiritually* DEAD? Was that *the death* from which God raised His Son? But it was the same death from which the same Spirit would quicken those in whom it dwelt.

"'If one died for all then were all dead;'" 2 Corth. 5 : 14. "Who imagines by this," saith our author, "is meant then were all non-existent?"

Truly, who does "imagine" it! We know of none; and how the *imagination* entered our author's head to ask such a question we cannot tell, unless "the soul" spectre induced it.

"If one died for all then were all" *condemned* to death, is the natural import of the apostle's words: for saith he, Rom. 5 : 16, "the judgment was by one to *condemnation;*" and he adds, verse 17, "by one man's offence *death* reigned:" all were condemned to *death*, and Christ *died* for all, because all were thus *condemned* to death. Here we find an easy and scriptural solution of the text.

We now wish to state *a fact*. Our Saviour gave as one of the evidences of his Messiahship, "To *the poor* the gospel is preached;" Luke 7 : 22; and Paul saith, 1 Corth. 1 : 26, "For ye see your calling, brethren, how that not many *wise men* after the flesh, not many mighty, not many noble, are called," &c. The *fact* in these texts is this, "the poor" and the *unlearned* were those, chiefly, who embraced the gospel and were benefitted by it. Hence it is both unreasonable and absurd to suppose the gospel *promises* were in the *mystical* language our author's theory implies. According to that theory there ought to have been *many* wise and learned men to teach the poor and unlearned that the words of promise, of "LIFE, and ETERNAL LIFE," meant *not* what they seemed to import, "according to the laws of human language, interpreted according to the laws of human speech;" but '*moral life*," or "*spiritual life*;" which phrases, however,

we believe never once occur in the Scriptures of truth; and hence are suspicious phrases, to say the least.

Our Lord and his apostles use the phrases *life*, *eternal life*, *everlasting life*, hundreds of times, and never once caution their hearers that these terms are to be understood in any other sense than that of a literal *living existence*—such an existence as their hearers now possessed, extended without being interrupted by death, as their present life is. This fact outweighs all the learned efforts of theologians to establish a contrary view.

For our author to thrust forward perpetually—as he has done—the idea that we maintain *life* includes no more than "*mere* existence," is to show he is not informed as to our real sentiments, or that he is unwilling to have them appear in his Essay. We maintain that *life*, and *eternal life*—as promises of the gospel—embrace a *living existence* as "the *gift* of God through Jesus Christ," and that living existence one of uninterrupted *enjoyment and delight*. Our author rejects the living existence, as a gospel blessing, and contends that eternal life is only "eternal *bliss* and *excellency*." Which of us most honor our Lord Jesus Christ? and which speaks most "according to the laws of human language"? Let the reader judge.

We now proceed directly with our evidence that a *living* "existence," and that chiefly, if not only, is meant by the terms *live*, *life*, and *eternal life* in *some passages* of Scripture. Bearing in mind the one, "as the Father hath life in himself, so hath he given to the Son to have life in himself," we proceed.

"I am he that *liveth* and was *dead;* and behold I am *alive* forevermore:" Rev. 1: 18. Does any one question our risen Lord here meant *literal* life and death?

"Because I *live* ye shall *live* also:" John 14: 19. Is here any room for doubt that a *literal* life is meant?

"I am the resurrection and the *life:* he that believeth in me though he were *dead* yet shall he *live:*" John 11: 25.

Are not *life and death literal* here? If not, so may not the "resurrection" be; and our Lord's words were but poor comfort to weeping Martha whose brother was dead.

"He that loveth his *life* shall lose it; and he that hateth his *life* in this world shall keep *it* unto *life eternal;*" John 12: 25. "Whosoever will save his *life* shall *lose it;*" and whosoever will lose his *life* for my sake shall *find it:* Math. 16: 25. Is there—can there be—any doubt but *literal* life is here spoken of? We are sure there cannot be "according to the laws of human language, interpreted according to the laws of human speech."

Again—"Who is made not after the law of a carnal commandment, but after the power of and *endless life.*" * * * "Wherefore he is able also to save them to the uttermost that come unto God by him, seeing he *ever liveth* to make intercession for them:" Heb. 7: 16, 25. Do any doubt that *literal life* is the true, if not the only idea here? The Priests under the law "were not suffered to continue by reason of *death,*" verse 23; but Jesus was made a Priest "after the power of an endless *life,*" and "ever *liveth* to make intercession for them that come to God by him." Nothing can be plainer.

"For if by one man's offence *death* reigned by one; much more they which receive abundance of grace and of the gift of righteousness shall *reign in life* by one, Jesus Christ:" Rom. 5: 17. Here the connection shows that literal death and life are the subjects of discourse. "Sin entered into the world and *death* by sin" * * * "*death reigned* from Adam to Moses, even over them that had not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression:" verses 12, 14. Here we see *what* death was spoken of; and verse 17 repeats the identical words "*death reigned* by one," but those "which *receive* abundance of grace and of the gift of righteousness *shall reign in life*"—a *future* blessing promised, to be obtained *only*—"by one, Jesus Christ;" and it is not a "*moral* state" that constitutes the life; but a specified moral

state is a *pre-requisite* to attaining that life; and hence none but the righteous shall possess it.

These texts are a sample of many others in which life, or eternal life—meaning a living existence—is the subject of discourse, and the promise of the gospel. Our author's labor to establish a contrary view may satisfy his own mind; but we are sure, in this, he "speaks not according to the law and to the testimony;" nor could he speak as he does, at all, with even an appearance of truth, if he had not changed man's personality for a soul-entity; the existence of which he has assumed, and then converted "*he—him—man*," &c., —terms used by our Lord—into his ideal "soul": thus departing from Scripture language to teach the "traditions of men."

Let us look at the manner in which our author has treated our Lord's discourse on *life*, John 6th.

He quotes as follows—"Labor not for the meat that perisheth, but for that which endureth to everlasting life; and (verses 47, 50, 51,) '*He* that believeth on me hath everlasting life.'—'This is the bread that cometh down from heaven, that *whosoever eateth should* not die.'—If *any man* eat of this bread *he* shall live forever.' Evidently the life and death here spoken of are predicted of *the soul*, for no one imagines there was a reversal of the doom of corporeal death to believers," saith our author.

In the foregoing quotation the italicising is ours: *first*, to show our Lord speaks of *the man*, while our author says, "evidently" it is "the soul." Which shall we believe? *Second*, we italicised the words "whosoever eateth should," to call attention to the fact that our author has changed our Lord's words for his own; thus marring the beauty and breaking the force of our Saviour's glorious assurance. The text reads as follows—"This is the bread that cometh down from heaven that a *man* may eat thereof and not die." We confess our author's quotation, using the words "whosoever eateth should" not die, reminded us of Eve's answer to the serpent—"God hath said, ye shall not eat of it, neither shall ye *touch it lest* ye die."

Our Lord talks of "*man*," and calls him "HE"—"ANY MAN." Our author says, it is "the soul"! Strange that our Saviour should not once have spoken of "the soul," nor mentioned this important *fixture* of our author's throughout this entire discourse on life, if all the time that was what he meant. We wonder if he meant "the soul" when he said, "I will raise HIM up at the last day"? Just as much, we have no doubt, as when he said, "If any MAN eat of this bread, HE shall live forever." How shall *he* be put in actual possession of this everlasting life? "I will raise *him* up at the *last day*. Four times in this discourse our Lord repeats this promise. Did he mean "the soul," we ask again? If so, "the soul" must have been *dead*, and is not to have a resurrection till "the last day." How would that tally with our author's theory? But, "no one imagines there was a reversal of the doom of corporeal death to believers," exclaims our author.

We hope "no one imagines" it; but we trust every believer in Jesus, as "the resurrection and the life," is firmly persuaded that the "reversal of the doom of corporeal death to believers" is a settled and revealed fact; not less than *four* times expressly declared in this very chapter, by Jesus himself. If it is not "a reversal of the doom of *corporeal* death," will our author please tell us what death of "believers" it is, which our Lord will raise them up from "at the last day"? Our Lord Jesus Christ, for believers, "*hath abolished death*"—"*counterworked*" it, as Dr. A. Clarke renders it: "made death *ineffectual*," as Macknight reads it. Whatever view we take it shows the great work of Jesus for his people was to reverse "the doom of *corporeal* death," as our author calls it; another word coined to turn off the eyes from the great truth of literal life as the "gift of God through Jesus Christ."

That our Lord was speaking of literal life and death, in this chapter, to our mind, is perfectly apparent. "Your fathers did eat manna in the wilderness, and are *dead*." Was

that not literal death? Dr. ADAM CLARKE, on this text says, It was the belief of "the Jews" that their fathers who died in the wilderness would never have a resurrection; *i. e.*, were never to live again. "This is the bread, which cometh down from heaven, that a man may eat thereof and NOT DIE," as you admit your fathers did in the wilderness, who did eat the manna. "I am the living bread which came down from heaven: if ANY MAN eat of this bread, HE shall LIVE forever."—"As the *living* Father hath sent me, and I *live* by the Father: so he that eateth me, even HE shall LIVE by me. This is the living bread which came down from heaven: not as your fathers did eat manna and are *dead:* HE that eateth of this bread shall LIVE forever:" verses 49, 50, 57, 58.

To argue against the literal import of the terms life, live, and living, because some of the connecting expressions are clearly figurative—and assume it is "the soul" that is spoken of—though not once named—seems to us like a struggle against LIFE; and looks like an attempt—not designed, of course—to "*kill* the Prince of Life." See Acts 3: 14–15. Let no one suppose, from these remarks, that we oppose the idea of a "spiritual" life: *i. e.* a holy moral development whereby believers become "partakers of the divine nature," which fits them for an "endless life," and prepares them for the resurrection to incorruption and immortality, of which Paul speaks particularly, 1 Corth. 15, when the entire man becomes like the second Adam, "spiritual:" then, with a holy, moral development—obtained in this mortal state—the believer shall "*put on* incorruption and immortality," and is endowed with "the power of an endless life"—made like unto Christ—he has a *living existence*, and will live forever, because Christ *lives*. Thus prepared, and thus endowed, the believer has "joy unspeakable and full of glory," without evermore being "in heaviness through manifold temptations," as he was in this his mortal state. Immortality and happiness are inseparable. An immortal being cannot be unhappy or suffer—the thing is impossible. All suf-

fering imports *decay*, *decrease* of life: continued suffering, continued decrease: unarrested suffering must reach death—dissolution. Suffering is a struggle of life against death: an encroachment of death on life: it must be removed or death sooner or later must and will triumph—life will cease. To talk then of an immortal sufferer, or of "immortal sorrow," is to talk an immortal "absurdity"—it is a palpable contradiction. No problem in science or theology is plainer; and nothing but the unfounded and unscriptural assumption, of an immortal entity in man, called "the soul," could ever have "darkened counsel by words without knowledge" so as to have hidden the fact, that IMMORTALITY AND SUFFERING *cannot* CO-EXIST.

Before leaving our author's remarks on the terms life, and eternal life, we will notice the interpretation he gives of two or three other texts. He says—

"In John 17: 1, 3, our Lord in his prayer defines eternal life thus: '*This is eternal life:*' What? Endless existence? Not at all. But, '*This is eternal life, to know Thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom Thou hast sent.*'" Our author saith—"It is manifest that something widely different from mere eternal existence is imported in the predicate of the above proposition: for by no relation of natural efficiency or equivalency, can you transmute such knowledge into a mere endless continuancy of being."

Our author's pressing the idea of "*mere* eternal existence," and "*mere* endless being"—as he has done throughout this argument—is unfavorable to his candor, or to his knowledge. Mr. DOBNEY in his excellent work on "Future Punishment" has exposed the unjustness of our opponents' using such language as a representation of our views: and every writer, of any note, who has written on our side of the question, has repudiated the idea that the phrase "eternal life" is ever understood by us to mean "*mere* eternal existence," or is ever used in that sense. Yet, still our author persists in its use, as if that was our idea of the phrase! Is this right? We do maintain, and demonstrate from the

scriptures of truth, that a *living* existence is *chiefly*, and first of all, embraced in the phrase in *some passages* in the Bible. If that is true in *one* passage our position is invulnerable, that a "living existence," which is *eternal*, is a gospel benefit, or a gift bestowed *alone* on the righteous; while it embraces also the exclusion of every possible evil, and the presence of every possible good that the "*living* creature" is capable of. Is that "*mere* eternal existence"? as our author seems determined to affirm we hold, notwithstanding all our denials. Is such a course just? Does the truth require such a persistence in misrepresentation? Let the reader decide.

The text John 17: 3, our author has not quoted accurately, as it stands in the English translation. It reads "This is life eternal, *that they*" [viz: "all flesh," of the previous verse,] "*might* know Thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom Thou hast sent." The words—"that they might"—which we have italicised in the verse, our author has dropt entirely from the text, and substituted the single word "*to*." It might have been an oversight: but had he left those words as they stand in the text, his construction of it would prove universal salvation, and thus explode his whole theory. It would prove universal salvation, because our author's construction of the words would admit of no ellipsis; hence consistency would require that the language of the previous verse should admit of none, and so "all flesh" *must have* eternal life given them. Our author's construction is, that our Lord's language "defines eternal life": *i. e.*, tells us *what it is;* and it is, "that *they*" ["all flesh," previous verse,] "might know Thee," &c. The language of the previous verse is, "Thou hast given him" [the Son] "power over all flesh, that he should give eternal life to as many as Thou hast given him." If the next verse "defines" what eternal life is, as our author affirms, how is he to escape the conclusion that "all flesh" shall possess it?

The fact is, it is no definition of eternal life at all; it is a

statement of THE WAY in which "all flesh" must have eternal life, if they possess it; or if they would have it *given* to them. The knowledge itself, spoken of, is not the eternal life, but the indispensable pre-requisite in order to the Son's bestowing it upon them. Thus Dr. BLOOMFIELD, in his critical notes, edited by the late Prof. STUART, says—"The general sense may be expressed in paraphrase as follows: '*This is the way* by which they may obtain eternal salvation, namely, to acknowledge Thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom Thou has sent [as the true Messiah].'" This, we doubt not, is the true import of the words; and it sweeps away our author's assumption, that it "defines eternal life." It is no such thing. It is no definition at all of the *thing*, but of *the way* to it. And our author's appeal to the words—"*This is* eternal life," &c., to support his theory, is of the same character as the appeal of the Papists to our Lord's words—"*This is* my body" in proof that the bread is the literal body of Christ. The conclusion is just as truthful in the one case as in the other, in our judgment.

We shall notice but one more of our author's efforts to overthrow our idea of eternal life. He refers to 1 John 5: 12, 13, and says—

> "We are told, '*He that hath the Son hath life, but he that hath not the Son hath not life,*' who thinks of interpreting these terms as affirmative of existence or non-existence, or fails to perceive the design of the apostle to teach us that he that hath Christ's Spirit, alone hath the principal of immortal blessedness and holiness?"

Let us examine 1 John 5: 10–12, and see if our author has not laid himself open to the "solemn" and awful charge contained in verse 10. "He that believeth on the Son of God hath the witness in himself: he that believeth not God hath *made Him a liar;* because he believeth not the RECORD that God gave of His Son." Here is solemnity and awfulness enough, if our author wants that—as he has more than once intimated that he wished to fix it on our minds. God's *record*, whatever it is, is to be believed, or we make "Him a

liar." To give the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ *the lie*, one would think was more than enough to make a "devil tremble." But, John, *what* is the record God gave of His Son, which if a man believe not he hath made Him a liar? Tell us in plain words; do not, O, do not use figures of speech now, for we may mistake the true sense, and commit the awful sin you speak of. John replies—

"And THIS *is* THE RECORD, that God hath given to *us* ETERNAL LIFE, and *this life* is *in* His Son: *he* that hath the Son hath *life;* and *he* that hath not the Son of God hath *not life.*"

We bow to "this record"—we believe it with all our heart—we have no doubt of its truth—we receive it just as it stands—away with all your theological daubings of the "record"—"let God be TRUE," though it should prove Scribes, Rabbins, Doctors of Divinity, and divines of all sorts "liars:" better the whole should be proved liars than that the blessed God or His Son should be charged with giving a *false record* to "the poor," the "unlearned and ignorant men." But we forbear; we feel the solemnity and awfulness of the subject too deeply to give full utterance to the feelings that come over us at seeing this plain and positive record wrested and converted to suit the unscriptural and unwarrantable idea that all men have an eternal life *in themselves:* that is, have an "immortal soul, that can never die" literally. Without one positive testimony from Genesis to Revelation that any man has an "immortal soul" or a "deathless spirit," it is affirmed they all have: and that assumption compels them to change the words of the solemn "RECORD" to mean "immortal *blessedness* and holiness;" or "eternal *bliss* and excellency," as our author calls it elsewhere.

In Christ God hath given to us an eternal *living* existence; which existence being unending—because the subjects are immortal—excludes pain and decay, and necessarily embraces all possible pleasure and enjoyment. *He* therefore that hath Christ—is *in him*—hath life, the eternal life spoken of. God

has made Christ the fountain, or reservoir of this life, by giving him "to have life *in himself*, as the Father hath *life* in Himself;" John 5 : 26; "for God giveth not the Spirit by measure unto him;" John 3 : 34; and by being "*in* Christ" believers become "partakers of the divine nature;" 2 Pet. 1 : 4; thus becoming "temples of the Holy *Spirit*;" 1 Corth. 6 : 19; "and if the *Spirit* of Him that raised up Jesus from the dead *dwell in* you, He that raised up Christ from the dead shall also quicken your mortal bodies by His Spirit that dwelleth in you;" Rom. 8 : 11; "for God hath both raised up the Lord, and will also raise up us by His power;" 1 Corth. 6 : 14. Thus does God endow the members of Christ with "the power of an endless life." Characteristically our author concludes his remarks on life, by saying—

"From all these examples it is evident that life exhibited in the Scriptures, as Christ's gift to the soul, *is* by no means mere existence, though of course it necessarily implies existence."

Three points here we will give a passing notice. First,—The Scriptures no where speak of Christ's giving life to the soul as contradistinguished from *the man*, or to the body even. And if our author has not ignored the resurrection of the dead, by his theory, then he certainly lost sight of it: for it manifestly is not of importance enough for him to give hardly a passing notice in all he has said on life. Second,—He has reiterated the phrase "*mere* existence;" thus continuing to make an untruthful impression as to our views.—Third,—He seems almost to grant all we contend for. The life given by Christ, he says—"*Is* by no means mere existence, though of course it necessarily implies existence." If he had only said, It implies the gift of a living existence, we would have exclaimed—*amen*—WE ARE AGREED. But, alas! he does not allow Christ to give "eternal life"—in a literal sense—even to the *bodies* of his saints! No, *no:* those "material companions" of "the soul" must not be mentioned as ever living again, lest Christ should be seen as giving eternal life *literally* in any sense to his followers! What

spectre has scared the "resurrection of the dead" from his view? Is it the fear if that should stand out, as Christ and his apostles made it to stand forth, our author would be seen to be a perverter of the truth of God, by denying that a "*living* existence," beyond the grave, is the gift of God?—that LIFE, and ETERNAL LIFE to these "material companions" is a promised benefit of Christ to the believer, when he saith, "I will raise HIM up at the last day," and "because *I* live *ye* shall live also?" Did our author's soul-entity scare away Gabriel with "the last trump," *at* which, Paul informs us, "The dead shall be raised incorruptible, and *we* shall be changed?" Was he fearful the truth would out, that life, literal life from the dead, is a promised, gospel benefit, without which no living existence did Paul regard as any compensation for sufferings and deprivations here? for, Paul saith—"If after the manner of men I have fought with beasts at Ephesus, *what advantageth it me* if the dead rise not? let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die." 1 Corth. 15: 52 and 32. But if our author's soul-entity theory, and his argument upon it, is correct, Paul need not have troubled himself any more about the resurrection of the dead than our author has; which is just none at all. Why this studied silence? There is too much life about the resurrection to have it allowed to shine prominently on his path. Ghosts must have darkness to be seen: and if the resurrection of the dead had been allowed the prominence that Christ and the apostles gave it, the spectre—"the soul"—our author has been so entranced with, would have disappeared, for it cannot exist in the light of the revival of the dead "at the last day." That resurrection is a re-living of the literal dead, or it is no resurrection at all; and if made literally alive to die no more, then is it an "eternal life," and is "the gift of God, through Jesus Christ;" for "I am the resurrection and the life," saith Jesus.

Thus, strong as the truth of God, stands the immovable rock that "LIFE, and ETERNAL LIFE," is literal life; and

that eternal life is not "predicated of the soul," as our author assumes, but of the man. MAN is the subject of redemption; whatever constitutes man: not some fancy *part* of him. It is the HIM, himself, that needs redemption, and to whom the promise is made, and it is "In *hope* of eternal life, which God, that cannot lie, *promised* (*prochronōn aiōnōn*) before the *ages* began" that Paul, and all truthfully instructed Christians, labored and suffered, "if by any means," saith Paul, "I might attain unto the resurrection of the dead." See Titus 1 : 2, and Phil. 3 : 10, 11. How unlike our author's teaching is that of Paul.

All pretence that the phrase "eternal *life*" is used by our Lord and his apostles, not for life proper or literal, but, to express the idea of "eternal bliss," or "spiritual excellency and blessedness," is swept away when we consider, there was no barrenness in the original language, in which they spoke and wrote, of words for "bliss"—"spiritual excellency," &c., if that was the idea they wished to convey: and when John gave a statement of the "*record*," or testimony of God, if he had meant by "eternal life"—as our author assumes—"the principle of immortal blessedness and holiness," he could have expressed *his* meaning in as plain language as our author has his construction of it. That he did not so express himself, is sufficient evidence that he did *not* intend it.

Our author's fancy sketch of the state and condition of "the soul," which state the Scriptures denominate "*death*" —"the wages of sin"—we do not notice because it is purely a fancy, when applied to the future state of sinners, and without a solitary testimony of Scripture to sustain it. After he had finished this fancy sketch he says—

"When the Scriptures pronounce over it the hideous word '*death*,' they approach the nearest possible in mortal dialect to its fitting nomenclature; as God when he set forth the spectacle of physical death in this universe, went the farthest possible in the sign language of material things, to image the horror of an utter spiritual ruin."

If the word "death" approaches "the nearest possible in mortal dialect to the fitting" *name* of the final punishment of wicked men, and was the "name" which the Spirit of God inspired holy men to use, how happens it that our author can describe so much more clearly in what that punishment consists? How happens it, that "mortal dialect" has become so improved that our author can describe in detail, and very minutely, just what that *death* is, according to his theory? Is the "wisdom of men" so much in advance of the "wisdom of God," that while the latter took the word "death," as that "nearest possible in mortal dialect," our author far exceeds in the clearness of describing the sinner's awful doom? We ask the reader to examine, if convenient, all our author's fancy sketch of what "death" is, and see if it does not put to shame every inspired writer and speaker in the Bible. *He* can describe in "thoughts that breathe and words that burn;" but *they* are shut up to the term "*death*"! "Would God" our author had been "with the prophets," that the Bible might have spoken as clear as he does: then there could have been no mistake—no misunderstanding the subject!

However—after all this "new light" on the subject—God, Jesus Christ, and inspired men meant just what they said—"Thou shalt surely *die*."—"Why will ye die?"—"The soul that sinneth IT shall die?"—not, "is already dead," as our author's definition would require it to read: no—"It *shall* die."—"The wages of sin is death."—"Those mine enemies, which would not that I should reign over them, bring hither, and *slay* them before me." But we need not multiply texts: either one we have quoted outweighs ten thousand fancy descriptions, like those our author has spread out for our acceptance. We reject all such, and cleave to the words of inspiration.

We come now to our author's labor to dispose of the terms Destruction, Perdition, Destroyed, &c. With customary sagacity, he is to speak of them when "applied to *the*

soul." Without this transformation of *man*, what could he do? He says of the terms—

"It is admitted that these applied to the body indicate, if not annihilation of its particles, such change, disorganization and dissolution as amount to a cessation of its being."

Very well. Then our author is a believer in the annihilation of the body, just as we believe in the annihilation of *the man*, whom the LORD God made. We believe that by the destruction of the wicked—as the threatened punishment for a sinful life here—"such a change, disorganization and dissolution" takes place "as amounts to a cessation of" their "being." Can our author show it does not? No, he cannot. He can assume that there is an invisible entity in man whose "nomenclature" is "the soul!" And he can further assume that it is "immortal," and therefore cannot be disorganized so as to constitute "a cessation of its being." All these points he can assume, and then turn his assumptions into engines of war to annihilate the natural and obvious sense of the plainest terms of the Bible—the God-given utterances of inspired men as to the destiny of men—thus departing from an important rule he himself laid down, *viz:* "God hath spoken to *man*. He has spoken then, according to the laws of human language, and it is to be interpreted according to the laws of human speech." To this rule we assented; and by it we are willing to abide, come what may. But from it our author has departed, by assuming the existence of an entity for which he has not one plain, "thus saith the Lord;" and then by assuming that said entity is immortal, and hence not susceptible, in fact, of cessation of being. "*Man*," to whom "God has spoken," he will not suffer to be seen in his argument; the *soul-entity*, of his own creation, has to stand in the fore-front of the hotest onset, lest "life and death" should be understood "according to the laws of human speech," and thus prove the utter extinction of the wicked; for, "All the wicked will God *destroy*," Psa. 145: 20.

Our author, speaking of the modification of language "by the nature of the objects to which it is applied, or rather by our conception of the nature of the objects," says—

"The terms *destroyed*, *lost*, *dead*, *perished*, and the like, applied to the soul, while implying an import analogical in many respects to that of those terms predicated of the body, by no means carry an identity or complete similitude of import. They of necessity are modified in our interpretation by our previous conception of the object. For instance, one previously conceiving the soul as immortal would not be at all embarrassed in giving a natural and apposite signification to these terms applied to our spiritual nature, without implying at all the cessation of being."

Here our author has made a virtual acknowledgment that "previously conceiving the soul as immortal" is the ground of his entire argument. It is that previous conception that makes it necessary for him, and his school, to modify or change the meaning of the plain and obvious sense of Scripture terms relating to man's future reward or punishment. And we grant, that had he proved man's immortality—or the existence of such a soul as he speaks of, and its immortality —the necessary modification of language, he contends for should not be called in question. Where the known nature of the objects spoken of are such as makes a literal interpretation clearly an absurdity, there, any man, however ignorant, with plain common sense, readily perceives the language is to be modified so as to harmonize with the known nature of the object. But he has neither proved the one nor the other; he has assumed it throughout; and argued as if his assumption was not to be doubted. Until he has proved these two points, we say to him, as Job said to Eliphaz the Temanite —"How forcible are right words! But what doth your arguing reprove?" If such a distinct entity, as our author calls "the soul," does not exist—or if it exist and is not immortal, then what right has he to claim a modification of the terms Destroy, Destruction, Die, Death, and the like, when spoken of "*man*," in relation to his final destiny? Just none at all: and no man, not enslaved to a theory, will

submit his judgment to the control of such arguments. If any one has gone down the popular current of "previously conceiving the soul as immortal," of course, our author will most likely add impetus to their downward course. Others, who have their manhood and a little independence of thought left, will possibly see that his "Argument" is *no* argument, because his premises are *not proved* but assumed. All our author's talk, therefore, about the application of the terms Destruction, Perish, Destroyed, &c., to "*spiritual* being," is without force; because he has not proved man to be such a being. The Mosaic account of man's origin is against his assumption; and the apostle distinctly marks the unrenewed man as *animal;* and says—"The natural"—*psuchikos*, *animal*—"man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God;" * * * "neither can he know them because they are spiritually discerned," 1 Corth. 2: 14. Again Paul saith—"The first man is of the earth earthy: the second man is the Lord from heaven. As is the earthy, such are they also that are earthy: and as is the heavenly, such are they also that are heavenly," 1 Corth. 15: 47, 48. Thus Paul recognizes, and maintains, man, by his earthy descent from Adam, is destitute of a spiritual nature; and that such a nature flows only by and through the second Adam; and is therefore of grace, and conferred only on those who are united to Christ.

In the mouth of two witnesses—Moses and Paul—our author's notion that man is a "spiritual being" is disproved: and being disproved, his assumption, that the terms destruction, &c., applied to man's final doom, are not to be understood literally, falls to the ground, and along with it all his interpretation of the Scripture use of these terms, so that we need not to notice it particularly; and our author admits that "about their meaning"—the terms destruction, &c.,—"applied to material objects, there is as little doubt or ambiguity as about *death*, similarly applied." As he has made no attempt to disprove the statements of Moses and Paul, of man's origin and nature, we can safely give him all the

benefit that may arise from this part of his argument in any mind that requires a reason for a demand upon its belief.

We will give a little attention, however, to a sample of our author's argument on 2 Thess. 1 : 9, where Paul, speaking of the doom of wicked men, says—"Who shall be *punished* with everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord," &c. Our author maintains this destruction is "a ruin in eternal progress, or one in which the *soul* is eternally involved." He says—

"Let us not, with imagination led on by physical analogy, conceive of a spirit being destroyed, as a body would be destroyed, by a power tearing it to pieces, and producing dismemberment and dissolution; whereby the thing subjected to this violence loses its form and identity, and as an organized existence, ceases to be. We are now dealing with an object of a different nature; that which *thinks, reasons, feels, believes;* and the destruction threatened must be in its *proper realm of being*, and *amid the faculties and functions proper and vital to it*, i. e., must be in the regions of thought, reason, conscience, emotion, will."

Who and what is it, that "*thinks, reasons, feels* and *believes*"? Is it not *man? No:* saith our author, "we are dealing with an object of a different nature." We say, our author saith "no" to our inquiry, because, he ignores the idea that we are to "conceive of a *spirit* being destroyed, as a body would be destroyed." Has he not then excluded *man*—as created by his God—to introduce another "object of a different nature"? Clearly he has; for *man* was formed a "*body*" and made a *living* creature by the breath of life. Man is the object of the threatened destruction, 2 Thess. 1 : 9, and not "an object of a different nature," which fancy has created. Paul speaks of *men*, not of *spirits:* it is "*them* that know not God, and that obey not the gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ: who shall be punished with everlasting destruction." It is the *men* who are to be destroyed; and whatever else is, or is not included, their *bodies* most assuredly are not left out of the destruction Paul speaks of, though our author may be so lost in the contemplation

of a spectre as to be blinded to the fact. It *is* man that "thinks." It is *man* that *lives*. It is man that *dies*, not "a body" only; but "MAN *dieth*, and wasteth away." * * * "MAN lieth down and riseth not till the heavens be no more; *they* shall not awake nor be raised out of *their* sleep." * * * "If a *man* die shall *he* live again?" Job 14: 10–14. It is *man*—and not "an object of a different nature"—that the LORD God made, and to whom both the promises and threatenings of the Bible apply. Man's "body" is included in the threatened punishment of destruction or *the man* is not there. And if man's body is "destroyed by a power tearing it to pieces," or burning it up "with flaming fire," then *one part* of man is "annihilated," our author being witness, and that literally. The *thinker* is annihilated by the destruction Paul speaks of; and our author is left to find *thought* —as a living intelligence—if he can—when the *thinker* is destroyed.

Our author's theory is, in plain English, this—The sinner's present state is a moral ruin of his spiritual nature; and he is to be punished hereafter with moral ruin. But a state of moral ruin is reached in this life in which the sinner is "past feeling;" (see Eph. 4: 19,) then how will our author prove he may not be "past feeling" hereafter? Then what becomes of his notion of punishment? Again, his theory of the death of the soul, in the present life, is that of a moral disorganization of its proper faculties: the punishment hereafter is the same. Hence, according to his view, the sin and the punishment is one and the same thing. His theory is—That destruction is the punishment of the morally ruined; and that punishment is moral ruin!. That is—The destruction consists in eternal sin and wickedness inflicted for being a sinner and wicked: or, more properly—The sinner punishes himself. "All the wicked will *God* destroy," saith the inspired Psalmist; but *no*, saith our author's theory, their destruction is a moral ruin, and that is their own work: thus they sin and punish themselves. But the Bible repre-

sents God, or Christ, as the *punisher*. Such appears to us to be the true relation our author's theory bears to the subject of punishment. God is no longer the punisher; for He does not disorganize their moral nature, but they do it themselves. God does not involve them in moral ruin; they do that work themselves. Their punishment hereafter is nothing new—it is "moral ruin," and they were morally ruined in this life! If his views do not confound all ideas of punishment proper, as inflicted of God on sinners, we mistake the idea of punishment. God, by inspiring the prayer—"Oh let the wickedness of the wicked *come to an end*," has spoken the doom of both the wicked and their wickedness—they and *it shall* "*come to an end.*" Our author's theory saith, the wicked nor their wickedness shall *ever* come to an end, but continue eternally! God hath said—"The enemies of the Lord shall be as the fat of lambs; they shall consume: into smoke shall they *consume away*:" Psa. 37: 20. Our author's theory saith, They are *not* as the fat of lambs—they are spiritual and immortal, they can never "consume away," but will eternally remain.

We have felt disposed to pass our author's consideration of certain texts, where "destroy," &c., occur for the reasons already stated; but a few of his remarks on them will have a brief notice. To sustain his theory, that to destroy—as the final punishment—does not mean "extinction of being" —(we would say, *death*)—he introduces the cases of unclean spirits that "cried through the organs of the possessed." In one case the demon cried—"Art thou come to *destroy* us?" in another, "adjures" Jesus "not to *torment* him;" "and in Math. 8: 28" (Luke 8: 28, we presume is meant) "where," saith our author,

> "The demon follows his entreaties that Jesus would not torment him, with a prayer that he would '*not command him to depart into the abyss*,' or the place of infernal imprisonment and torment."

Our author concludes all these expressions—destroy, torment, and being sent into the abyss—"indicate the same

thing." Now, we do not admit that they all mean "the same thing," but widely different things; yet we shall remark only on one point. The expression, "not command them to depart into the *abyss*," in our translation is, "into the *deep*:" the original is "*abusson*:" our author says, it is "the place of infernal imprisonment and torment." It is well he did not say that place is *eternal*, as well "infernal," for Christ himself went into "*abusson!*" Does our author think Christ went into "the place of infernal imprisonment and torment?" Perhaps he does, but if so, then it is not *impossible* to get out, for Christ came out; and if so, others may: hence it cannot be *eternal!* But did Christ go into "the abyss"—the *abusson?* He did. Thus speaks Paul, Rom. 10: 7, "Say not in thy heart, who shall ascend into heaven? (that is, to bring Christ down from above:) or, who shall descend into the *deep*"—*abusson?* "the abyss"—"(that is, to bring Christ up from the dead.)"

Here are two facts distinctly stated by the apostle, which, taken together, completely demolish our author's whole theory. Let them be pondered well. In the first place, *Christ* did go into "*the abyss*"—*abusson*—therefore "the abyss" is not "the place of infernal imprisonment and torment." Second: Paul states distinctly that to be *dead* is to be in "the abyss"—abusson; for Christ when *dead* was there: "Who shall descend into the *abyss? that is*," saith Paul, "to bring up Christ from the *dead*."

We appeal to all men, who have not "prejudged" the case, if we have not demonstrated—by inspired authority—that to be in "the abyss" is to be dead—literally dead; for, in no other sense than *literal* death, did Paul speak of Christ as "dead:" hence "the abyss" *is not* "the place of infernal imprisonment and torment;" but to be literally dead. The demons, whatever they were in their nature, dreaded a literal death, which is the greatest of all calamities that could befall an intellectual being when it is final and irrevocable, as

it is to be in the case of "all the wicked," whom "God will destroy."

We might take up one by one all our author's quotations, which he endeavors to turn to the account of his theory, and show that they afford no more support to his views of them than those we have just considered. Whatever torment, in any given case, may precede death, it does not prove that *death—literal* death—is not the true "wages of sin," and the "capital punishment" to incorrigible and impenitent transgressors of God's commands. Whatever modification the terms death, destruction, &c., may be required to have in given cases of obvious necessity, no such modification is admissible or allowable in the statement of the *penalty* of law, unless it can first be shown that the subject of the penalty is manifestly of such a nature and constitution that the death or destruction threatened cannot be executed in the literal sense. No inferences will avail here. It must be plain, unequivocal testimony, that the most common mind addressed can understand, and not some theological speculation growing out of "the traditions of men." Till then, the advocates of endless sin and suffering can prove man immortal, or undying in his nature or constitution, by some plain "Thus saith the Lord," they have not made even a beginning in proof of their theory. To us it is truly astonishing how men of mind, of thought, of learning, can beguile themselves into the belief that man is a being who is to live forever, regardless of his moral character. *Holiness*, which is but another word for *harmony with God*, is an indispensable pre-requisite to "live forever." That "harmony"—where the gospel is proclaimed—is decided by the reception we give the Son of God. He is the chosen of God to give *life* to dying men. In him God is well pleased. Is God's choice our choice? Is His pleasure in His Son ours also? Is the honor God places upon His Son the honor with which we wish to see him honored? Is God's pleasure that His Son should be "the way, the truth, and *the life*," our pleasure

also? If we are with God—in harmony with Him in these things—then do we truly "come to God by" Christ, and are made partakers of the Holy Spirit of God, by which the love of God is shed abroad in our hearts—*the union* is consummated—we are in *harmony* with God, or are *holy*, and eternal life *is* the reward, or the inheritance. If out of harmony with God, death—deprivation of living existence—is our doom.

Our author, towards the close of his argument, touches slightly upon the resurrection, but styles it "the resurrection of the *body*:" though he seems to admit the resurrection, as a truth, yet it manifestly has no importance in his mind. And why should it have? His whole argument has been about "the soul," while its "material companion"—as he has all along styled the body—has evidently been a source of difficulty to be avoided, as it mightily embarrasses his argument, and would present *man* as the object of doom, and not the fancy being he has been contemplating. But as the resurrection could not be altogether avoided, instead of speaking, as the Scriptures do, of the resurrection of "*the dead*"—of the "*him*"—"I will raise *him* up at the last day," &c.—he has substituted "the body," as if that were the "him" to whom Christ's words of promise relate. Our author introduces this part of the subject by saying, "there are other passages claimed as proof-texts for annihilation," and proceeds as follows:

"Some of those relating to the *resurrection*, in which our Saviour is supposed to speak of it as a gift of God, which only a part of the human race 'shall be thought worthy to attain;' (Luke 20: 35,) or those in which Paul speaks of it as an object of earnest and anxious desire, but whose attainment was contingent, (Phil. 3: 11,) and other passages where the resurrection seems to attach only to a union with Christ, (John 6: 39, 40;) or those where the entire hope of the future life is thought to be made dependent on the resurrection of the body. 1 Cor. 15: 14, 17. Now the only force of argument in these passages, to prove what is claimed from them, is founded on the assumption that they teach a *partial resurrection;* and that if there is

no resurrection of the body, there is no future life. Whatever be their import otherwise, is not essential to our present argument.—Unless they sustain this position they are of no relevancy to the question now at issue."

Our author felt the force of these texts, which clearly teach "the resurrection of *the dead*," and not of "the body" merely, as his theory maintains, if it maintains a literal resurrection at all—of which there is some doubt. If he had said these texts are claimed by us on the ground that they teach a *peculiar* resurrection for the righteous, to a life that is eternal, because *they* then "*put on* immortality" and "incorruption," he would have blinded no one. The resurrection spoken of in all the texts he has referred to, *is* a *peculiar* resurrection, in which the wicked have no part. In this sense, it is a "*partial* resurrection" also; *i. e.*, a part only of the human family are the subjects of it. Nor can our author evade this, except by a denial of the resurrection spoken of being a literal one. This he has done in the case of Paul, Phil. 3: 11. After quoting two or three texts which he thinks teach "a universal resurrection," he says—

"If, then, the mere rising to life is in virtue of union with Christ, it is evident that such union is not the exclusive prerogative of believers."

Here, as usual, he talks of "the *mere* rising to life!" Is rising to life that is eternal, because the subjects of it *put on* incorruption and immortality," a "*mere* rising to life?" Why did our author strive to make that impression? Was it honorable and right to do so? But as if conscious he had misrepresented us, he adds—

"Or if that cannot be at all admitted, is it not clear that the life that is spoken of as the result of such union, is *something* more than *mere return, or continuance of conscious being?*"

Undoubtedly it embraces "something more;" but does it not embrace *that?* Does it not embrace "return" to life and eternal "continuance of conscious being?" That is the point our author should have met, but which he has evaded

A return to *such* a life *is* "the exclusive prerogative of believers;" and is the result of *union* with Christ, in which the wicked have no part.

After the last paragraph we have quoted from our author, he adds—

"So that the denial of it" [that life which is something more, &c.] "is not at all tantamount to the affirmation of the extinction of such being."

That is—if we understand our author—to deny the wicked that something more than mere return to life, which the righteous have, is not tantamount to the affirmation that *they* are *not* immortal; for it is their immortality that is the great question. We say then, to deny the wicked the eternity, future, of living existence, which the righteous are to have by the promise of God; and to exclude them from *putting on* immortality and incorruption—which is *peculiar* to the resurrection of the righteous, and comes only by a living "union with Christ"—is "tantamount to the affirmation of the extinction of" *their* "being," whether that "extinction" is without a resurrection or after having been revived from death: if revived, they are *mortal;* and being mortal cannot live forever, but must be subject to the laws of mortality which always end in *death.* From such death there is no revealed revival, but it is eternally unbroken.

Our author adds—"It follows also that the resurrection which Paul professes to pursue after, is not a restoration to existence, physical or corporeal, but a rising from moral death to perfect spiritual life, or to perfect holiness and godliness of being."

Thus, as we expected, our author's theory must lead him to a virtual denial of a literal resurrection of the dead. We are perfectly aware that he has approached this point very cautiously, and with a preamble that seems to admit "a universal resurrection," but may possibly be construed to mean a resurrection of some sort not actually embracing a re-living of the literally dead ones. But be that as it may, here is an

unqualified denial that the resurrection Paul professed to pursue is "a restoration to existence, physical or corporeal," but that it is "a rising from moral death," &c. He has not allowed us to claim, that revival from literal death was embraced in any way in Paul's statement. Had he said it is not a "*mere* restoration," &c., there might be some reason in giving him credit for not intending to exclude that, absolutely. As it stands, it is an unqualified denial that Paul embraced in his expression, at all, a revival from literal death.

Here, then, is an instance in which our author has made himself tangible. Let us look the text and the context full in the face. Phil. 3 : 8—"I count all things but loss," saith Paul, "for the excellency of the knowledge of Christ Jesus my Lord:" * * * "that I may know him, and the power of his resurrection," [Was that "from *moral* death?"] "and the fellowship of his sufferings, being made conformable unto his death;" [Is that "a moral death?"] "if by any means I might attain unto the resurrection of the dead:" —Greek, "*tōn* EX*anastasin tōn nekrōn;* literally, "the resurrection *out from* the dead."

If this language does not teach a literal revival into life from the dead, then, in our humble judgment, no language can teach it. Look at it. Christ *suffered;* ["his suffering," saith Paul.] Christ died; ["his death."] Christ rose from the dead; ["his resurrection," saith Paul.] Was all this literal, or "moral?" What next? Paul looked to have a "fellowship of his [Christ's] sufferings." That is literal. Paul expected to be "made conformable to his [Christ's] *death.*" Not "*moral* death;" for Christ never died such a death. What more? Christ was raised from the dead; ["his resurrection," saith Paul.] Then what? With the prospect of "sufferings and death" before him, Paul labored and struggled with all his trials and losses, and endured, confiding in his Lord, "If," saith he, "by any means I might attain unto the resurrection out from the dead," as his Lord Jesus

Christ had done. Christ was raised from the dead while others remained dead; his resurrection was *peculiar:* Paul wished to be also raised "out from the dead;" and he expected to be, while others would remain dead: whether those others would remain dead only for a time or for ever "is not essential to our present argument:" the resurrection he sought was *peculiar;* and, as is evident, was another and entirely different one from anything the wicked would have: hence was a gospel *benefit*, conferred *only* on the righteous; and was not a resurrection from a "moral death." The subjects of this resurrection are raised "spiritual" in their entire nature—"immortal, incorruptible." In such a resurrection the wicked have no part: *they* never, *no never*, possess any other nature than that inherited from Adam the first, who was "animal" and "earthy," of "the earth," and returned to the earth; "such are they also that are earthy:" see 1 Cor. 15: 45–49. Mortality, corruption, and death is their inheritance.

In the sense of *peculiar*, then, this text, and those in Luke 20: 35, and John 6: 39, 40, do "teach only a partial resurrection," and no wonder our author passed the subject so hastily, which fills so large a part of our Lord's preaching and that of his apostles. There is no subject of the New Testament occupies so prominent a place as that of the literal resurrection of the dead; and in the great multitude of instances it is spoken of as peculiar to the righteous. Yet our author can dispatch the whole question in less than two pages of his Essay! He could not even afford to quote the texts which he so quickly disposes of, but only refers to them. Was he afraid that the presentation of them would show the glaring "absurdity" of his notion, of a "rising from moral death?" Look at John 6: 39, 40, to which he refers: it reads thus—"And this is the Father's will which hath sent me, that of all which he hath given me I should lose nothing, but should raise it up again at the last day. And *this* is the will of Him that sent me, that every one which seeth the Son,

and believeth on him, may have everlasting life: and *I will raise* HIM *up* AT THE LAST DAY."

Is all this "a rising from moral death?" and, is not that to take place till "the last day?" Are such texts as these to be turned aside from their literal and obvious meaning, so as to make them tally with the notion that all men are immortal? Has "God spoken to *man?*" And has he spoken according to the laws of human language? and are" His words to *man* "to be interpreted according to the laws of human speech?" as our author said at the outset of his Scripture argument. Has he forgotten his own law of interpretation, that he can put forth such an interpretation as he has done on Phil. 3: 11, and insinuates on John 6: 39, 40? So it would seem, or else no violation of that law can take place. The text in Luke our author passes with the following remark—

"In the case presented in Luke 20: 35, 36, there is manifestly constant reference, not to a simple coming forth from the grave, but to a resurrection to the heavenly state; as shown by the fact that '*that* resurrection' and '*that* world'—so named in the passage—are predicated of those who are to be 'as the angels of God.'"

To this we reply—The point at issue between our Lord and the Sadducees was one that related to the whole question of the revival of the dead. "Then came to him certain of the Sadducees which deny that there is *any* resurrection," verse 27. "Which say there is *no* resurrection," Mark 12: 18, and Math. 22: 23. The resurrection to be treated of, then, covered the whole ground of dispute between our Lord and the Sadducees on the resurrection; and it could be none other than the fact whether there be a revival into life of the dead. The Sadducees did not come to inquire about "the heavenly state" of the revived dead; but with a denial of the revival of the dead into life. Our Lord, it seems, according to our author, changed the question from a general one to a special and partial one. It would seem as if—according to our author's position—our Lord did not regard the case of the wicked dead as of importance enough to de-

mand even a passing notice. Perhaps it is so. Be that as it may, if he met the Sadducees' question at all, he proved a literal *re-living* from the dead; and, of course, that literal life was a part of the resurrection; and this our author is compelled to admit, though manifestly with reluctance. He says, in this discourse "there is manifestly constant reference, not to a *simple* coming from the grave," &c. Very true, it was not simply that; but was it not *that*—with being made alive literally—whatever else might have been connected with it? Our author cannot escape the force of the argument of literal life, as an essential in the resurrection, by his little "simple" word; for our Lord adds—"Neither can they *die any more.*" They had been dead—literally so—*once*, but now they are made alive from the dead, and *cannot* "*die* any more."

We ask all men of candor, if such words are "interpreted according to the laws of human speech," do they not demonstrate that there is a literal death, and is to be a restoration from that death to a literal life? Whether the revival into life, our Lord speaks of in this discourse, is "only a partial resurrection is not essential to our present argument;" it is sufficient to have shown that it embraces *life* literal, and that it is *peculiar* to the righteous; which latter fact our author himself admits.

Our author's remarks in the following extract are perfectly gratuitous, and well nigh carry on the face of them a deliberate intention to misrepresent the views of those he is arguing against. He says—

"The doctrine of the resurrection is so explicitly taught by the gospel, and is so bound up with Christ's doctrine and history, that if that is rejected, its rejection *must carry the whole Christian system with it;* and the whole race then, the 'fallen asleep in Christ' as well as all others, are lost, i. e., gone from our knowledge and our hope, without redemption, without atonement; all still in their sins."

Do we not maintain the doctrine of the resurrection as the only hope of a future life to any man? while our opponents

maintain that the man proper "never dies," but only changes his mode of life by dropping his "material companion?" Hence, according to their view, there being no death properly speaking of *the man*, there is no need of a resurrection, and there cannot, by a possibility, be any of the "*him*"—*the man;* for a resurrection of that which never was dead is an "absurdity." To reject the gospel's proclaimed resurrection is to reject "the whole Christian system:" in that idea we are agreed with our author. Christ is the "resurrection and the life"—the *Giver* both of spiritual life *now*, and of literal life *after* death to all those who have been "made partakers of the divine nature" in their probationary state, which life is never to be interrupted—"neither can they die any more:" their life is eternal, because they "put on immortality and incorruption *at the last trump*." This is the *peculiar* gospel benefit; while "he that soweth to his flesh shall of the flesh reap corruption," Gal. 6:8; and "shall be no more," Psa. 104:35; shall be "burned up, saith the LORD of Hosts," and "neither root or branch" of them shall be left, Mal. 4:1; shall receive "the wages of sin" which "is *death*."

But the resurrection, in our author's view of the universal immortality of all men, or rather, of the soul-entities of all men, is of no apparent importance; and the denial of it—only so far as Christ is concerned—would not touch "the Christian system;" because—according to our author's system, that the great and leading terms relating to man's destiny, such as eternal life, death, destruction, &c.—all the rewards and punishment of the future are "predicated of the soul!" How then does the denial of the resurrection—if he means a literal one, or "the resurrection of the *body*," as he calls it—"carry the whole Christian system," so that "the whole race are lost?" We think it is his theory which carries away "the whole Christian system with it," by denying that future and eternal life—or *living* existence beyond the grave—depends on the revival into life of the dead; of

which revival Christ was "the first-fruits" of them who have "fallen asleep *in*" him: so that "if Christ be not raised, then they which are fallen asleep *in* Christ are *perished*." Our author seemed afraid to use the inspired word "perished;" but substitutes for it, "lost;" and even that he did not feel safe in leaving without a commentary to harmonize it with his view; hence, he saith, "i. e., gone from our knowledge," &c. He concludes his less than two pages on this vital topic by saying—

"These passages, then, relative to the resurrection, by no means controvert the position of the universal immortality of our race."

Facts show that "our race" are *now* mortal, for they *do die* literally. The Scriptures affirm, in the resurrection those in Christ who are "dead, shall be raised incorruptible," and "*put on* immortality;" but the Scriptures no where affirm that any man out of Christ shall *thus* be raised, or "put on immortality:" hence "these passages" do "controvert" and totally overthrow "the position of the universal immortality of our race;" for, that which is spoken of as *peculiar* to one class of men must *necessarily* exclude all others not included in that class: but to be "raised incorruptible" and to "put on immortality" in the resurrection, "at the last day," or "at the last trump," is, by inspired authority, declared to belong to "those *in* Christ," and is therefore peculiar to them: hence, all others are excluded from immortality. To us, such a conclusion is as undoubted as that two and two are equal to four. If this position is not proved, then there are no "laws of human speech" that are worth the name.

Our author next attempts to do away the force of the argument, against his views of endless sin and suffering, drawn from Rev. 20: 14, 15, where "death and hell" are cast into the lake of fire, indicating their destruction, and not their preservation in any way. He "approaches these terrible passages with a feeling of unspeakable awe and mystery."—

We wish he had felt more than he did, then he would not have launched into speculation on them. He says—

"First, granting that death and Hades here are mere ideal impersonations, and that their being cast into the lake of fire is meant their utter and eternal cessation, we *should restrict this prediction*, as we do the declaration subsequent, 'there shall be no more death,' *to the universe of the righteous*, the saved, or the unfallen."

Where is his "unspeakable awe" when he thus "adds unto these things" which "are written in this book?" Who authorized him to "restrict this prediction, 'there shall be no more death,' to the universe of the righteous?" The scene is laid after "death and hell" are destroyed, and the wicked have shared the same fate; then John "saw a new heaven and a new earth," and he "heard a great voice out of heaven saying" * * * "there shall be no more death, neither sorrow nor crying, neither shall there be ANY MORE PAIN: for the former things are passed away." Rev. 21: 1–4. This description is clearly parallel, in time, with Rev. 5: 13, on which we have previously remarked; and the two descriptions taken together, or either taken alone, completely demolish our author's notions of "eternal pain" and "immortal sorrow."

The following outburst of our author's imagination shows how intensely he had applied his "ear to the infinite gloom to see whether" he might "not perchance catch the accents of immortal sorrow." He says—

"Death and hell are cast with the devil and lost souls, into the lake of fire, not there to be annihilated, but *with them forever to dwell, on them endlessly to raven!* The image of the lake of fire with the wicked cast therein, is in itself horrible past thought; but in that lake of fire, *death and hell yawning to receive their fall!* Shut out from God's pure universe, and prisoned forever with those horrors in that Tartarean den—their endless prey! Sin, death, and hell, lost men and devils bound together, forever struggling, interlocked, in that abyss! Well might the apocalyptic muse cry, shudderingly,—*'This is the second death—that lake of fire!'*"

"Well might" our author have *shuddered* to have given

utterance to such thoughts of God, the CREATOR of all things. Like Saul of Tarsus, while "breathing out threatenings and slaughter," we hope our author can plead, that he wrote this paragraph "ignorantly in unbelief." That God, the Maker of all, has determined on such a doom, for any of the work of His hands, will require arguments stronger than anything our author has presented. His fancy sketch, if believed to be the revelation of the Bible, could not fail to drive a thinking man into an utter rejection of the book itself. The denial of the existence of any God at all, does not exceed in folly that of admitting the existence of such a God as our author's fancy sketch implies.

Our author concludes his "Scripture Argument" with a kind of recapitulation and reflections; which, as it is "may be," and his *opinion* of the position he occupies, we do not think proper to travel over; and it would only lead to a repetition of what has already been said; but one closing remark we will briefly notice. He says—

"Yet though we have been led to the awful height of this argument, guided as we believe by the word of the Eternal Spirit, still terror takes hold of us, and we are ready to shudder and faint, as we look from the fearful height down the avenues of endless night and sorrow."

We think our author has attained a "fearful height;" and we do not wonder he is "ready to shudder and faint" at the sight which, in his opinion, he beholds. But we differ with him in opinion as to how he came to that "fearful height:" *we* do *not* "believe" he was "led" there "by the word of the Eternal Spirit," but by another spirit, which "said unto the woman, *Ye shall* NOT *surely* DIE." The whole of our author's argument has been in harmony with that first *denial* of JEHOVAH'S utterance against man in case he sinned. That utterance, of the CREATOR of man, is the basis of all subsequent threatenings, as the final result to sinners. The *denial* of its literal fulfillment—"Ye shall *not* surely die"—is the basis of all attempts to endow man with an endless existence

without regard to moral character. That first denial of the literal accomplishment of JEHOVAH's threatening was, virtually, telling man he was *immortal*, or would live forever if he did disobey his Maker. If that denial differs, in fact, from our author's conclusions, relative to the wicked, we are unable to discover the difference. Hence the presumption is, that he has "been led to the awful height," where he finds himself, by another agency than the "Eternal Spirit." Well may he "shudder and faint" while representing the God of love and truth—who has sworn by Himself that He hath no pleasure in the *death* of the wicked—as being intent on keeping the wicked eternally *alive* in "endless night and sorrow." We should think any man ought to "shudder" while making such a representation of his MAKER.

It is strange indeed, that not one of the apostles—taught by our Lord Jesus himself—ever gave utterance to such descriptions of the future existence of wicked men as our author does Strange that they never employ such terms as "endless misery, eternal pain, immortal woe, unending torments;" or tell us how "devils and lost men bound together," are "forever struggling, interlocked," in the lake of fire. Strange that they should never speak of "*immortal ruin.*" Strange they should never once tell us, "that, whether for good or ill, we are, as a race, embarked on a voyage of *endless being!*" Our author can find words and phrases to express these ideas; but the apostles could find none, it seems; or rather, THEY HAD NO SUCH IDEAS TO EXPRESS. They talked as plain common-sense men, who had a plain message to the poor and unlearned. To such they talk of life and death: of a resurrection from death as "the hope" of the gospel: which resurrection, they maintained, is to be achieved, to those *in* Christ, "at the last trump;" when all such "shall be raised incorruptible," and "*put on* immortality;"—a useless and impossible matter, according to our author's theory. But it was of vast and prominent importance in the minds of the

apostles, and ever stood out in the fore-ground of all they said and taught.

The Bible throughout, from Genesis to Revelation, holds up to man "*Life* and *Death*." The first, the promised reward of obedience to God: the latter, as the penal infliction for disobedience. This our opponents are compelled to admit, because it cannot be denied without a palpable denial of the record of God; but to evade the literal force of the Bible utterance they invent a soul-entity, which they fancy is a sort of spiritual something—they cannot tell what—then they assume that this soul is immortal. Having thus committed murder on *man* they lose sight of "HIM" and fly off to dispose of the creature of their own production; to do which they must change both *Life* and *Death* to mean something that will harmonize with their immortal-soul theory. Thus do they corrupt the word of God to conform it to their own "*traditions*." The simple-hearted people who look to be fed, by the plain words of the God of truth, are told, "*life* does not mean *life* literal; nor *death* literal *death*." Very well! if these words are not to be taken in their plain and obvious import, when found in the Bible, then all its language may be mystical, and who shall tell us what the Bible does mean? "It is dangerous for you to have the Bible," cries the Papist. "You cannot understand it without a Priest," cries the *modern* Protestant. "Why not?" asks the hungry heart that desires the truth. "O, because, you will think God means literal death—ceasing from a living existence—when He saith 'Thou shalt surely *die*;' and you will suppose He means an eternal living existence, when He promises eternal life," answers the theologian! Thus between the Papist and the Protestant Priests the Bible is brought to the ground, and becomes an unmeaning and unintelligible book to all men except the would-be teachers; and they cannot agree among themselves what it does mean; only they seem to be perfectly agreed that it does *not* mean what it says of man's origin, nature, and destiny.

Disguise it as theologians may endeavor to do—it is their views of inherent immortality—and that all men have "embarked on a voyage of endless being"—which being, to the wicked, is to be one of "immortal sorrow," and "eternal pain"—that has led thinking men to embrace universal salvation, or the universal restoration of all men to holiness and happiness. It has led others to invent a "purgatory," where some at least can be purged from their sins in another life; and it has prepared the way for, and brought in, the last great and lying manifestation called "Spiritualism;" more properly, "Spirit Manifestations;" which is likely to sweep away, as with the besom of destruction itself, multitudes of ministers and church members who have been taught such theology as that contended for by our author. Wearied and disgusted, with such theological teaching, and supposing the Bible does sustain it, they go in search of more modern manifestations—made by these imaginary "immortal spirits," that have laid aside their "material companions,"—to get relief from such horrid representations of God and His government as those we have been reviewing. If they had been taught the truth, in the simplicity with which the Bible sets its forth, *viz:* "*life* and *death*"—life if holy: death if unholy—never would there have been the temptation to reject and leave that Book to go after lying divinations, as multitudes have in these last days.

Men are asked to sacrifice reason, common sense and all their other attributes as men, to receive theological notions, thrust upon them by the traditions of theological speculators, and told they must "receive them with childlike *faith;*" while their reason revolts at such horrid representations of their Maker. To be told, that "the word of the Eternal Spirit" makes known such a doom, as our author describes, as the portion of the largest part, or of any part of the human family, is so revolting and shocking to all their moral sense of justice and fair dealing, that thousands plunge into utter indifference to all religion, and regard it as an idle speculation,

fit only for interested Priests, who would make gain of their godliness by a fearful grasp on the superstition of those who dare not oppose their theological assumptions lest they get a portion in "immortal sorrow and eternal pain."

Suppose the few texts our author relies on would bear such a construction as he puts upon them: might not a reasonable man ask—"Will they not also bear another construction, more in harmony with the revealed character of God as the CREATOR of all, and whose tender mercies are over all His works?" And might it not further be inquired—"Is not another construction *demanded*, to harmonize other inspired declarations and inspired prayers? For example the following—"The wicked shall *perish*, and the enemies of the Lord shall be as the fat of lambs; they shall consume: *into smoke shall they* CONSUME AWAY," Psa. 37 : 20. "O let the wickedness of the wicked *come to* AN END," Psa. 7 : 9. "Let the sinners be consumed out of the earth, and let *the wicked be* NO MORE," Psa. 104 : 35. "Behold all that were incensed against thee shall be ashamed and confounded: they shall be as *nothing;* and they that strive with thee *shall perish.* Thou shalt seek them, and shalt *not find them*, even them that contended with thee: they that war against thee shall be as *as nothing*, and as a THING OF NAUGHT," Isa. 41 : 11, 12. "Say unto them, As I live, saith the LORD GOD, I have no pleasure in the *death* of the wicked; but that the wicked turn from his way and *live:* turn ye, turn ye from your evil ways; for why will YE DIE?" Ezk. 33 : 11. "Behold the day cometh that shall burn as an oven; and all the proud, yea, all that do wickedly shall be stubble; and the day that cometh shall *burn* THEM UP, said the LORD of hosts, that it shall leave them NEITHER ROOT NOR BRANCH," Malachi 4 : 1. "A certain fearful looking for of judgment and fiery indignation which shall DEVOUR the adversaries," Heb. 10 : 27. "He will BURN UP the chaff with unquenchable fire," Math. 3 : 12. "He that believeth not the Son *shall not see life;* but the wrath of God abideth on *him*," John 3 : 36.

"For God so loved the world that He gave His only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth on him should NOT PERISH, but have EVERLASTING LIFE," John 3 : 16. "They shall be as though THEY HAD NOT BEEN," Obadiah 16.

Hundreds of texts of like character are to be found in the Bible which come up as so many witnesses against our author's *construction* of a few texts—for he has only a few at most—not one of which declares there is "immortal sorrow" or "eternal pain" to a child of Adam's race. To establish his construction of the few texts—the very few—that he can possibly call to his aid, he must arraign more than two hundred texts—or witnesses—God has placed upon the stand, and make every one of them falsify their own words by demanding that their words should not be received according to their plain and obvious sense, when spoken of *man*, but in another and entirely different sense to correspond with his fancy creation, and imaginary entity, whose existence he has not proved; or if that existence was real, he has not and he cannot produce one text in the entire volume of inspiration, that saith it is *immortal*, either in the English version, or in the Hebrew or Greek originals. Yet he demands of us to receive his *construction* as if it was the "word of the Eternal Spirit." He has scouted at "annihilation," as if it were no punishment to be annihilated; and he has ridiculed the idea, by calling it "the punishment of the annihilat*ed*;" as if the doctrine of annihilation had no countenance in the Scriptures of truth; but if he could find as much for the phrase "immortal soul," or the "endless being" of "the race," he might have exulted over our views of the Scripture testimony—"*All the wicked will God* DESTROY," Psa. 145 : 20; "Who shall be punished with everlasting *destruction*," 2 Thes. 1 : 9. That we have Scripture countenance for using the term *annihilation*—which seems so odious to our author—we shall now very briefly show.

PROF. PICK, in his "*Bible Student's Concordance*"—a work of great value to a mere English scholar—gives us two ori-

ginal terms, the *literal* signification of which is, "*to annihilate:*" and these terms are applied to the destiny of wicked men in such connection as to make it certain that the Spirit of God—which inspired "holy men of old"—designed to teach the utter extirpation of the wicked, and not a *preservation* in any living state. These Hebrew terms are *Tsomath* and *Shomad.* In our translation they are sometimes rendered *destroy, destroyed,* and *cut off.* According to Prof. Pick there are about forty different Hebrew words that are translated destroy and destroyed. We will give a few instances where the terms occur, the literal signification of which, he tells us, is "*to annihilate.*" In Psa. 18 : 40 *tsomath* occurs. None doubt but that a portion of this Psalm is prophetical of Messiah and what he will do. Thus speaks the word of Prophecy—"Thou hast also given me the necks of mine enemies; that I may *tsomath—annihilate* them that hate me." Saith Jesus, Luke 19 : 27, when the Nobleman shall return he will say—"Those *mine enemies,* which would not that I should reign over them, bring hither, and *slay* them before me." Thus the prophecy, in Psa. 18, is to have a fulfillment when Messiah, who is to be King on David's throne, shall "return from heaven." So Paul declares, on that return the disobedient "shall be punished with everlasting *destruction:*" 2 Thess. 1 : 9. Thus the Prophet, our Lord, and Paul, witness together, that the enemies of Christ are to be *annihilated.*

Again, prophecy thus speaks, Psa. 54 : 5—"He [God] shall reward evil unto mine enemies: *tsomath—annihilate* them in thy truth." The truth of God is, the wicked shall be *annihilated.*

In Psa. 94 : 23, *tsomath* occurs twice; and the verse literally reads thus—"He shall bring upon them their own iniquity, and shall *annihilate* them in their own wickedness: yea, the LORD our God shall *annihilate* them." Thus the fate of the wicked is clearly stated.

In Psa. 101 : 8, *tsomath* occurs twice; and as the language

is clearly prophetical of Messiah, it speaks in language not to be mistaken. "I will early *annihilate all* the wicked of the land; that I may *annihilate* all the wicked doers from the city of the Lord."

Once more, Psa. 143: 12, David personating Messiah, prays—"Of thy mercy *annihilate* mine enemies, and *annihilate all* them that afflict my soul."

Finally, Psa. 145: 20, we read—"The LORD *preserveth* all them that love him: but *all* the wicked will he *shomad* —*annihilate.*"

These examples are amply sufficient to warrant us in using the term annihilation in relation to the destiny of all the enemies of God. Those who choose to deny it, and affirm that such a disposal of them is *impossible*, we leave to settle their controversy with Him who cannot lie, and whose word abideth forever. We believe that men who reject Christ as the *Life-Giver* will be eternally excluded from life—"be no more"—"be as though they had not been:" Psa. 104: 35. Obadiah 16—"The wicked shall perish, and the enemies of the LORD shall be as the fat of lambs; they shall consume: into smoke shall they consume away." Psa. 37: 20. Thus do the wicked PERISH UTTERLY AND FOREVER.

One testimony from the Acts of the Apostles may properly be introduced here. Acts 3: 23, "It shall come to pass that every soul, which will not hear that Prophet, shall be *destroyed* from among the people."

The word here translated destroyed is, *exolothreutheesetai.* Of this word Dr. BLOOMFIELD, in his *Critical* Notes on the New Testament, edited by Prof. STUART, saith, It "is a word found only in the Septuagint and the later writers; signifying to '*utterly exterminate.*'" Will our author, or some of his school, tell us how much short of annihilation it is, to be "*utterly exterminated?*" Such we believe is undoubtedly the fate of all incorrigibly wicked men. Christ came that dying men "might have life." If that proffered life is refused, or neglected, men "shall UTTERLY PERISH in their

own corruption," 2 Peter 2 : 12; be "UTTERLY EXTERMINATED." Then shall come to pass the saying that is written Rev. 5 : 13, "And every creature which is in heaven, and on the earth, and under the earth, and such as are in the sea, and all that are in them, heard I saying, Blessing, and honor, and glory, and power, be unto Him that sitteth upon the throne and unto the Lamb forever and ever."—*Amen.*

APPENDIX.

NO. I.

The following are the difficulties in the way of our author's theory of endless misery, as he himself states them, in his argument from Nature for Immortality.

Would not every attribute of God, that in behalf of the good pleads for immortality, in this case demand the utter extinction of a being that can only work eternal sin and pain? God's wisdom—shall that hold in immortal existence a being, who in that case can only be an immortal failure—an endless ruin, who has departed for ever from the aims of infinite wisdom and love, and defeats utterly the design of his creation? A being which can only be an eternal jar and discord in the universe! which clashes with all celestial order and system, and must go on clanging and clashing with these, through unending ages! which, instead of ministering to the illustration and triumph of virtue, can only be a hideous blazon of immortal sin and shame! and must for ever hate, and war upon, God and holiness and happiness! Shall Divine reason for ever continue an existence in which that reason for ever misses its aim? in which all the indications of aptitudes and faculties bestowed by creative wisdom, are hopelessly perverted or defeated? whose fitness for everlasting excellency can end only in everlasting shame? whose faculty of infinite knowledge, virtue, beneficence and happiness, turns to a destiny of endless madness, sin and sorrow? whose capacity, in fine, of eternal God-likeness only dooms it an eternal devil! If aptitudes, faculties and capacities of immortal reach, when tending to their true, beneficent and beautiful aim, are an assurance of immortality, what must be portended by their hopeless, eternal failure and perversion?

If, then, it be reasoned that God's wisdom must ever deliver from the grave, existences that belong to eternal and universal harmony, order and beauty, what must that same wisdom ordain for those who, through the universe and through eternity, can only be a defeature and discord, a failure and ruin, a curse and a crime?

And Divine goodness, delighting beyond thought in happiness, can it perpetuate a being only to endless pain? If God's love

guarantee endless life to the heirs and diffusers of bliss, what must it do with those who can only be children of eternal sorrow, and the foci of an eternal plague? If souls in health must be his eternal delight, what must those be who are everlastingly diseased, and to whom infinite existence is infinite despair? Can the arm of infinite love lift them up from the abyss of annihilation, only to hold them in eternal suffering? Does not such a thought strike human minds with horror? how much more, then, the Father of infinite mercies?

And Divine justice, too, would it not allow, yea, demand the extinction of such lost souls? Would it admit of an eternity of punishment for the offences of a life so feeble and so brief, and of a creature so ignorant, so weak and so infantile as man? So far from sustaining the sentiment of justice in the universe, would not its monstrous disproportion appear a tyranny, shocking the sentiment of justice as well as of mercy through the universe? And would not Divine justice—only another name for love, and wise as it is pure—would it not avoid the extremes alike of indulgence and of excessive severity, by annihilation?

Nor, it may be urged, does it avail against the charge of injustice and tyranny in the case, to argue that man is not eternally punished for the sins of this short and feeble life, but only placed by them in a condition and course which make it sure that he will sin on for ever, and so be punished for ever. For it is the action of an omniscient and omnipotent Creator and Governor, that we are considering. To One who is the eternal fountain of all life and being and power, and of all law and motive, what is the difference between certainty and necessity? To such an one it was perfectly sure beforehand, anterior to thus placing man on trial, that it would result in his eternal fall. Would our human justice permit a father thus to treat a child, or indeed any creature? Or should we regard him as wise and good, even if possibly just in doing it? Does not the very nature God has given us declare that justice, if it required of the Divine administration to kindle up a hell, would also require, after a time, its extinction? If constrained to utter the awful commission of a second death, would it not also, somewhere in infinite ages, revoke its commission? Can his throne stand only on the endless torment of offenders of a race and life like ours? Will not Divine justice rather, having compelled them to expiate their

crimes, surrender up victims which infinite love and wisdom may not reclaim, for that wisdom and love to annihilate?

And Divine holiness—can it be otherwise than offended and pained by the aspect of souls for ever unhealed and unrepentant, and to whom eternity can bring no change but that of endless progress in sin as well as woe? Must not such an object be loathsome and grievous in the sight of a pure God? Would He wish to make it immortal? As well conceive of a mind with a most exquisite sympathy, and a sense of the beautiful most quick and delicate, aiming to eternize some spectacle of deformity, torture, foulness or shame. Would not God's taste, so to speak, compel the removal of such a spectacle as soon as possible? With our obtuse and deadened sensibilities we can but dimly conceive how ineffably repulsive and abominable a sinful soul must be to God. Why, then, should He wish to conserve such a foulness and horror—yea, such an evergrowing foulness and horror—through everlasting ages? And if God's veracity speaking through the constitution of our nature and the expectations and convictions irresistibly springing from it, is thus pledged to grant to the obedient and the righteous the boon of an endless life, is not that veracity disengaged and released in relation to those forfeiting the boon? Do not thus Divine wisdom, love, justice and truth open for the morally lost soul the gates of the eternal grave?

Such are the difficulties that start on nature at the question of Immortality, in view of that most monstrous and dreadful anomaly, a spiritual intelligence implacably and irrevocably at war with God and virtue.

NO. II.

Man a Soul.—"That man is a living being, intrinsically and properly one and individual, not compound and separable, not, according to the common opinion, made up and framed of two distinct and different natures, as of body and soul, but the whole man is soul, and the soul man; that is to say, a body or substance, individual, animated, sensitive, and rational."—Milton. "*Treatise on Christian Doctrine*," Vol. I, pages 250, 251.

No. III.

"Resurrection of the Body."—It may be mentioned, as a fact not unworthy of notice, that the phrase "the resurrection of the body," so common in the religious instruction of our day, is not in all the Bible. The scriptures speak about the resurrection in this manner: "Thy dead men shall live,"—"the resurrection of the dead,"—"touching the resurrection of the dead,"—"the hope and resurrection of the dead," &c. Paul speaks, no doubt, of "the adoption, to wit, the redemption of our body," Rom. 8: 23, but it is questionable if here, and in similar instances, "body" is not used for *self*—and, if such be the case, he means the redemption of ourselves, or simply our redemption from the grave to live immortally with Jesus. Examples can easily be found in which the term "body" expresses the whole of man, whatever view may be taken of him, whether a compound of soul and spirit or wholly soul. For instance: "A body [entire humanity] hast thou prepared me;" Heb. 10: 5. "My substance," or, according to the margin, "my body [or I] was not hid from thee, when I was made in secret;" Ps. 139: 5. "That thy whole body [person—being] should be cast into hell," [Gehenna.] Matt. 5: 29. "The light of the body [of the man] is the eye;" 6: 22. "Thy whole body [thou, or the whole man] shall be full of darkness;" 6: 23. "Through the offering of the body of Jesus," that is, by the offering of Jesus, Heb. 10: 10. "The tongue defileth the whole body"—the whole man—James 3: 6. "Present your bodies [yourselves] a living sacrifice;" Rom 12: 1, &c. It is, then, clearly a scriptural mode of speech to import entire man by the word body, and we suggest that it is highly probable that such an expression as "the redemption of the body" just signifies our final and complete redemption by the glorious resurrection, about which the apostles and the early Christians delighted to speak so much. The salvation, redemption, and adoption of believers is not completed at once: a part is effected now, a part at the resurrection, when the great work of Divine love and power will be consummated. 1 Peter 1: 4–9. Even regeneration appears to be represented as progressive, or, rather, as having two stages—a new birth now by the influence of gospel truth, [James i: 13,] and a new birth by the resurrection to immortality when the Lord comes. Hence we read, "Neither can they die any more: for they are equal unto the angels; and are the children of God, being the children of the resurrection." Luke 20: 36.—And "Verily I say unto you, That ye which have followed me, in the regeneration when the Son of man shall sit in the throne of his glory, ye also [in the regeneration] shall sit upon twelve thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel." Math. 19: 28.

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